



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 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE  
 AFFAIRS/LOGISTICS) WASHINGTON DC RESERVE FORCES POLICY  
 BOARD 1988 F/G 15/1 NL






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# RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS

FISCAL YEAR 1988



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Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board


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“ . . . the current roles and missions of the National Guard and the other Reserve components are the result of the Total Force Policy . . . which integrated the active duty, National Guard and the other Reserve forces into an homogeneous whole. . . . I will continue to adhere to and emphasize the Total Force Policy. Consequently, the National Guard and the other Reserve forces will continue to be relied upon as full partners of the active duty forces in time of need. A Bush Administration . . . will prioritize the manning, training and equipment modernization of the National Guard and the other Reserve components, not on the basis of their peacetime status as forces “in reserve,” but on the basis of their direct and complete integration into the operational plans and missions of the nation.”

George Bush  
President of the United States

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

22 FEB 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board for  
Fiscal Year 1988

The Annual Report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board for  
Fiscal Year 1988 is provided to you in compliance with Title 10,  
United States Code, Section 113(c)(3).

In this report, the Board has reviewed the progress that  
has been made by the Department in improving the readiness of  
the National Guard and Reserve components, and areas where, in  
the Board's judgement, further improvements are required to make  
the Reserve forces more effective members of the Total Force.

While the Department of Defense agrees with many of the  
opinions and recommendations included in the report, it contains  
the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the  
official policy positions of this Department or any other depart-  
ment or agency of the United States government.

I have appreciated the contribution of the Board to our  
efforts to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve are  
adequately manned, equipped, trained, and ready as a part of  
the Total Force.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William H. Taft, IV".

William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
As Stated





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

22 FEB 1989

Honorable Dan Quayle  
President of the Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

The Annual Report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1988 is provided to you in compliance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 113(c)(3).

In this report, the Board has reviewed the progress that has been made by the Department in improving the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve components, and areas where, in the Board's judgement, further improvements are required to make the Reserve forces more effective members of the Total Force.

While the Department of Defense agrees with many of the opinions and recommendations included in the report, it contains the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other department or agency of the United States government.

I have appreciated the contribution of the Board to our efforts to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve are adequately manned, equipped, trained, and ready as a part of the Total Force.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William H. Taft, IV".

William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosure:  
As Stated





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

22 FEB 1989

Honorable James C. Wright, Jr.  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515-4312

Dear Mr. Speaker:

The Annual Report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1988 is provided to you in compliance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 113(c)(3).

In this report, the Board has reviewed the progress that has been made by the Department in improving the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve components, and areas where, in the Board's judgement, further improvements are required to make the Reserve forces more effective members of the Total Force.

While the Department of Defense agrees with many of the opinions and recommendations included in the report, it contains the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other department or agency of the United States government.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William H. Taft, IV", is written over a horizontal line.

William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosure:  
As Stated





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# **Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1988**


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**The Annual Report of the  
Reserve Forces Policy Board**

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-7300





The Reserve Forces Policy Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components (10 USC 175(c)). This Annual Report, as required by law (10 USC 1151(a)(5)), presents the Board's independent evaluation of National Guard and Reserve programs. The report includes recommendations for changes to policies, procedures, or laws which affect the reserve components of the total military force of the United States.

This report represents the collective view of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States government.

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The logo of the Reserve Forces Policy Board represents the total military force as the shield for the nation. The United States is identified by our national symbol, the eagle. The blue field represents the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. (The Marine Corps is a part of the Navy Department and the Coast Guard becomes a part of that department in time of war.) Integrated in that field are three stars depicting the active component, National Guard, and Reserve of the departments. The seven vertical stripes of the shield stand for the seven reserve components - Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

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Photographs in this report are of reserve component personnel, training, equipment, operations, and facilities.



## Reserve Forces Policy Board Members

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### **Honorable Will Hill Tankersley**

Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board; President, Stern, Agee & Leach, Inc., Investment Bankers; Members, New York Stock Exchange; Major General, Army of the United States (Retired); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) 1974-1977; Civilian Aide to Secretary of the Army for Malaysia 1969-1978; Appointed Chairman October 19, 1985.

*Will Hill Tankersley*




### **Major General William R. Berkman United States Army**

Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board; Former Chief, Army Reserve, 1979-1980; Attorney at law, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California, 1957 to 1979; Appointed Military Executive August 1, 1980.

*William R. Berkman*

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**



**HONORABLE DELBERT L. SPURLOCK**

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)  
Washington, DC. Assigned to Board July 18, 1985

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink.



**LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN W. FOSS  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of  
the Army, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board November 1,  
1988

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink.



**MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR.  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED  
STATES**

Adjutant General for the State of Florida, St. Augustine, Florida  
Assigned to Board February 12, 1987

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink.



**BRIGADIER GENERAL GREGORY P. BARLOW**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

Commander, 81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Seattle, Washington; Executive Director, Medina Foundation; President, GPB Incorporated, Seattle, Washington. Assigned to Board August 14, 1987.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Gregory P. Barlow".



**MAJOR GENERAL JACK STRUKEL, JR.**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Mobilization), Department of the Army, Washington, DC; Principal, Chase Middle School, Topeka, Kansas. Assigned to Board April 11, 1988.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jack Strukel Jr".



**MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH G. GRAY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Commander, 97th U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland; Senior Consultant, Financial and Management Services, Richmond, Virginia. Assigned to Board December 9, 1987.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Joseph G. Gray".

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**



**HONORABLE KENNETH P. BERGQUIST**

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)  
Washington, DC Assigned to Board June 17, 1988

A stylized, cursive signature of Kenneth P. Bergquist.



**LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN I. HUDSON**  
**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC Assigned to  
Board December 2, 1988

A stylized, cursive signature of John I. Hudson.



**REAR ADMIRAL JOHN J. SWEENEY**  
**UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Commander, Military Sealift Command, Europe (Mobilization)  
Principal of Mercer-Mendinger-Hansen, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Assigned to Board March 7, 1988

A stylized, cursive signature of John J. Sweeney.



**REAR ADMIRAL TAMMY H. ETHERIDGE  
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Chief of Staff, US COMEASTLANT, London, England. President and Chief Executive Officer, Choctaw Maid Farms, Carthage, Mississippi. Assigned to Board April 25, 1986.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "T. H. Etheridge".



**MAJOR GENERAL JEROME G. COOPER  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Eastern Recruiting Region, Parris Island, South Carolina. Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Western Recruiting Region, San Diego, California. Vice President for Marketing, David Volkert & Associates, Architects & Engineers, Mobile, Alabama. Assigned to Board May 1, 1988.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. G. Cooper".



**BRIGADIER GENERAL G. RICHARD OMROD  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

Deputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia. Consultant, Self-employed, Haddonfield, New Jersey. Assigned to Board August 14, 1987.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. R. Omrod".

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**



**HONORABLE KAREN R. KEESLING**

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs),  
Washington, DC. Assigned to Board October 17, 1988.

*Karen R. Keesling*



**BRIGADIER GENERAL MARALIN K. COFFINGER**  
**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

Director of Personnel Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel,  
Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board  
December 1, 1986.

*Maralin K. Coffinger*



**MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L. MATTHEWS**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

Adjutant General for the State of Utah, Draper, Utah. Assigned to  
Board February 1, 1988.

*John L. Matthews*



**MAJOR GENERAL HAROLD G. HOLESINGER  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

Adjutant General for the State of Illinois, Springfield, Illinois  
Assigned to Board February 28, 1986

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Harold Holesinger". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline.



**MAJOR GENERAL JAMES C. WAHLEITHNER  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE**

Commander, 4th Air Force, McClellan Air Force Base, California  
Assigned to Board October 17, 1986

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "James C. Wahleithner". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline.



**BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN J. CLOSNER, III  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE**

Commander, 10th Air Force, Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas  
Assigned to Board May 9, 1988

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "John J. Closner, III". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline.



## UNITED STATES COAST GUARD



**REAR ADMIRAL PAUL A. WELLING**  
**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**

Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board June 22, 1987.

*Paul A. Welling*

---




**REAR ADMIRAL DANIEL J. MURPHY**  
**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESERVE**

Senior Reserve Officer, Pacific Area, Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California. Deputy Commander, Maritime Defense Zone, Northern California Sector. Assigned to Board February 2, 1988.

*Daniel J. Murphy*

---

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1988, is a reflection of the consensus of the 22 member Board. Although most recommendations and Board positions have unanimous support, neither this report nor the signature of the members purport to indicate that the signers, services, or the Department of Defense concur with every recommended action or position.



# Executive Summary

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## General

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board), acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175(c)). The Board is required by statute to prepare an annual report which the Secretary of Defense provides to the President and Congress, (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report details contributions of the reserve components to the total force and addresses matters pertaining to readiness of National Guard and Reserve units and individual members.

The reserve components are full partners with the active components for the purpose of deterring aggression and, if necessary, waging war. Some National Guard and Reserve units routinely perform operational missions in the United States and overseas.

The Total Force Policy was promulgated in 1973. That policy calls for a mix of active and reserve component forces, utilizing all available assets, to ensure that maximum military capability is achieved at minimum cost. As a result of the implementation of the Total Force Policy, the National Guard and Reserve have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness.

The total force is much stronger now than it was eight years ago. The quality of military personnel is higher and the morale among servicemembers and their families is better. Much of the force is being modernized and more effective training is being conducted. Nevertheless, further increases in readiness are limited by problems in areas such as individual skill qualification, equipment shortages and incompatibility, personnel strength, limited training time, personnel and force structure turbulence, and facility inadequacies.

Reserve component units are an integral part of theater commanders' operational plans. Successful operations could not be conducted without them. The probability of reduced appropriations for the Department of Defense in the next few years will require strengthening National Guard and Reserve forces. Maintaining large, forward-deployed, active component forces may come under close scrutiny. Selected Reserve units and personnel, with increased capabilities, may become an alternative to maintaining a large active component force.

The Department of Defense's "first to fight—first to be equipped" policy is an essential corollary of the Total Force Policy. Increasing resources should be distributed to the National Guard and Reserve since some reserve component units and personnel will deploy, in a national emergency, with or before, some active component units.

### **Resourcing the Reserve Components**

Reduced overall defense funding in recent years threatens the readiness and sustainability of active and reserve component units. This could lead to a return to "hollow", non-ready forces lacking ammunition, spare parts, and training time as was so prevalent at the beginning of this decade.

All reserve components programs may never be fully funded. However, as the role of the National Guard and Reserve in the national defense strategy increases, the percentage of funding for the reserve components in the defense budget should also increase. If budget reductions for the reserve components is necessary, they should not automatically be on an "equal share" basis with active component reductions. An "equal share" policy may not be the most cost-effective or most prudent manner to reduce the defense budget.

### **Force Structure**

The National Guard and Reserve are a significant part of the total force. As budgets permit, force structure is being modernized to support current warfighting doctrine. This entails reorganization of units and unit activations. Although, over time the total force benefits from this, it causes immediate turbulence which impacts many factors such as individual skill qualification, recruiting, retention, facilities, and training. The result may be temporarily reduced readiness. Decreased readiness status does not necessarily mean reduced capability. Overall capability needs to be carefully analyzed when reviewing force structure and readiness evaluations of the National Guard and Reserve.

### **Personnel**

Sufficient numbers of trained personnel in the reserve components are essential. Trained units are required for immediate deployment to meet worldwide contingencies. Additionally, trained individuals must be available to replace casualties and fill other units preparing for deployment.

Several programs have been initiated to enhance recruiting and retention in the reserve components, particularly in some individual specialties which have significant shortages. Excessive attrition of trained personnel from the reserve components adversely affects readiness and results in costly additional training requirements. The Montgomery GI Bill and other bonus programs will support recruiting and retention

programs. The services are addressing inadequate levels of individual skill qualification in the National Guard and Reserve. Increased availability and flexible scheduling of training courses will also help.

The Full-Time Support (FTS) program is vitally important to the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve. For some units, the lack of sufficient FTS is a primary impediment to increasing unit readiness. More personnel are needed in the FTS program as new missions and force structure are added to the reserve components. Unfortunately, the required growth has not been adequately supported by the services, the Department of Defense, or Congress. The Board urges more support.

Individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) are trained individuals who will augment, upon mobilization, various active component organizations, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. As a member of the Selected Reserve, an IMA is subject to involuntary call to active duty by the President. The IMA program has a direct, positive impact on mobilization preparedness and should be enhanced within each service.

Since 1981, the number of women serving in the Selected Reserve has increased 75 percent. The number of women in the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard has grown 198 percent in the same period. Women now comprise 11.8 percent of the Selected Reserve and 13.5 percent of the Individual Ready Reserve. There are 10.4 percent in the active components. Department of Defense and service changes to assignment policies should provide greater opportunities and career challenges for women and enhance recruiting and retention in the active and reserve components.

Policies pertaining to appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the reserve components are addressed in the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA). The Board recommends that the ROPMA legislation be expeditiously considered by the Congress and passed as submitted.

### **Training and Mobilization**

The strategy for reserve component training must be to achieve a satisfactory level of competency prior to mobilization. It is not necessary to train, in all cases, to the levels required for active component forces. Where time is available, accelerated training programs may be utilized to bring National Guard or Reserve personnel or units to required readiness levels during the mobilization process.

The services have initiated several programs to enhance training of units and individual members. Modularizing lengthy military courses is one such program.

The use of training simulators and devices can be a cost-effective means of increasing combat readiness in the reserve components. Limited training time and inaccessible training areas and ranges are two of the most significant training

detractors in the reserve components. The use of training devices to complement training with actual equipment and weapon systems can help solve these problems. Programs to provide the National Guard and Reserve with training devices and simulators need to be fully funded.

Regional training programs have been initiated to accomplish certain types of training. They are particularly effective for training on expensive equipment that cannot be distributed to local unit training sites.

Civilian contract training programs, rather than lengthy resident military courses, can be a cost-effective method of increasing reserve component readiness. Certain skills, such as in the medical field, are effectively and efficiently taught in local community institutions to National Guard and Reserve personnel. This type of training should be funded and expanded, where appropriate.

Overseas training provides excellent training for reserve component individuals and units. In FY 1988, more than 3,536 reserve component units or cells and 82,000 individuals trained in 96 countries outside the United States. Limited budgets in future years, may be used as rationale to reduce this training. Such reductions may adversely affect reserve component readiness. Actions required to prepare for and conduct training overseas closely parallel those required for mobilization and deployment. Civic action and technical assistance to friendly nations, in conjunction with overseas deployment, supports foreign policy and increases United States stature abroad. Increased morale and retention in the reserve components are benefits of overseas training. Additionally, overseas training demonstrates, to allies and potential adversaries, the ability of the United States to execute its forward defense strategy.

The crusade against illegal drugs involved all of the reserve components except the Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve. Current law authorizes indirect military involvement such as equipment loans, personnel support, training, and sharing information. The National Guard in state status (on state active duty or under Title 32 USC) is not limited from performing law enforcement functions authorized by the states concerned.

Reserve component units are expected to maintain readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active component units. The limited time available to reserve components should be dedicated to training to improve readiness. Time spent on administrative functions and other activities that do not contribute to readiness, should be reduced to increase wartime mission training.

The President and Congress have several statutory authorizations which will permit the callup in peacetime, or mobilization in times of national emergency or war, of varying numbers of National Guard or Reserve personnel. The services use several types of exercises to evaluate mobilization preparedness. The Department of Defense and the services are striving continually to improve the mobilization capabilities of all reserve components.

## **Equipment**

Providing modern equipment to National Guard and Reserve units in the 1980s has increased significantly their warfighting capabilities. Most units have had at least familiarization training with equipment they would use upon mobilization.

Although excellent progress has been made in equipping the National Guard and Reserve, significant equipment and spare parts shortages continue. The value of the shortage between the equipment on-hand and wartime requirements amounts to \$14.1 billion. The value of the shortage last year was \$15.6 billion. The Congress and the Department of Defense must provide increasing resources to reduce this shortage and ensure that reserve component units are properly equipped to accomplish increasing numbers of missions.

The services should be cautious in making decisions to remove aging, yet capable, equipment from a unit prior to the arrival of modernized equipment. Unit capabilities, that would be necessary if the reserve components were called upon to go to war, may be sacrificed for uncertain future solutions if equipment distribution plans are not fulfilled. Long range plans and programs to restore capabilities in the future is not an acceptable substitute for national security today.

Department of Defense policy is to equip first those units that will fight first. Under this policy, the reserve components have received great amounts of modern equipment in recent years. National Guard and Reserve units are receiving major systems directly from factories and from the active components.

Special appropriations from Congress, for National Guard and Reserve equipment, have enhanced the equipment status of many reserve component units. These funds, amounting to more than five billion dollars since FY 1982, complement service appropriations and have added to the improvement of training and mobilization readiness in the reserve components.

Maintenance of aging equipment in the reserve components is an increasing problem. Budget reductions and equipment distribution delays may increase maintenance backlogs thereby decreasing capabilities and readiness.

Differing equipment in the active and reserve components causes operational and logistical incompatibility problems upon mobilization. The most significant problem is with electronic equipment. Budgetary constraints are the main cause of incompatibility problems.

Efforts are underway to provide automatic data processing support for management of reserve component personnel, training, and logistics. This support could reduce time spent on administrative duties and result in more training time for National Guard and Reserve members. Automated management systems could also be an excellent tool for mobilization management.

## **Medical**

Upon mobilization, the reserve components will provide approximately two-thirds of the services' health care capability. Three-fourths of the dedicated, military medical evacuation capability is in the National Guard and Reserve. Thus, reserve component health care units will be needed in the early days of any significant conflict.

Medical readiness in the reserve components is impaired by critical shortages of physicians with specialties such as surgery, orthopedic surgery, and anesthesiology; operating room nurses; nurse anesthetists; enlisted health care specialists; medical equipment; and medical support items.

The services and the Department of Defense have developed programs to reduce medical personnel shortages in the reserve components. These include scholarships, loan repayment, credit for civilian experience, adjustments in ages of personnel eligible for recruitment, increases in the numbers of medical recruiters, and direct mailings. It is too early to ascertain the full impact of many of these recruiting initiatives.

*Varying training initiatives are being implemented by the National Guard and Reserve to enhance the skills of health care personnel. Flexibility is being built into training programs and opportunities so that they fit better into medical professionals' schedules. Although some interservice medical training is now being conducted, more needs to be planned and funded for personnel with common medical skills. Budget constraints are limiting the numbers of personnel that will be able to receive medical training.*

## **Facilities**

The reserve components manage more than 5,300 facilities in about 4,800 communities around the nation and overseas. These facilities are necessary for administration, training, and mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve.

As additional missions are given to the reserve components, increasing attention needs to be given to the adequacy of facilities. Although facility improvements have been made in recent years, many armories, reserve centers, training sites, storage areas, and maintenance facilities remain inadequate. Force structure, mission, and equipment changes have caused facilities to become inadequate. Other facilities no longer meet safety or security needs. Overall, 36 percent of reserve component buildings are considered inadequate for assigned purposes.

Funding for military construction and maintenance of reserve component facilities is insufficient. Backlogs of projects in all components continue to increase. Unfunded major construction projects for the reserve components are valued at approximately \$7.4 billion. More than 60 percent of this is in the Army's reserve components.

## Readiness

There is no simple means for measuring readiness. An objective and uniform measuring system for reporting unit readiness does not exist. As a result, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) is used by some as an erroneous and misleading means for measuring readiness. However, a unit, which is resourced fully with personnel and equipment and trained properly in individual and unit skills, should be ready to perform its mission.


SORTS category levels alone do not indicate a unit's readiness. Tangible factors such as numbers of personnel, training, equipment, facilities, and funding all impact on readiness. Intangible factors such as leadership; morale; cohesiveness; skill retention; and physical fitness, strength, and stamina of individual members also affect unit readiness.

In addition to SORTS, the results of mobilization tests, readiness evaluations, operational readiness inspections, and other criteria must be examined to estimate the combat readiness of a reserve component unit. There is no single number that can be pointed to as representing the readiness of a unit, or an entire reserve component.

Readiness, even if completely and accurately evaluated, is only one of many factors that go into determining military capability. Others include force structure, modernization, and sustainability. The ability to mobilize and deploy forces must also be considered when analyzing military capabilities of the reserve components.

Of those National Guard and Reserve units which are required to report under SORTS, 81 percent were rated C/R-3 or better at the end of FY 1988. Last year only 75 percent achieved this rating. The C/R-3 rating means that the unit has required resources and is trained to undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. All reserve components reported that the percentages of units reporting C/R-3 or better increased over FY 1987, except for commissioned units of the Naval Reserve.


Overall limiting factors to Department of Defense reserve component readiness in FY 1988, in order of total number of units affected, were personnel shortages, individual skill qualification, equipment condition, equipment on-hand, and training.

When all indicators are considered, the Board believes that, although there are problem areas, the reserve components are generally ready and in a better posture to mobilize and accomplish wartime missions than during any previous period reviewed by the Board. Resolution of remaining reserve component problems requires continued emphasis and support from all levels of the services, the Department of Defense, and the Congress. The National Guard and Reserve are a vital part of the national security and must be prepared to support national strategy. 





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
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## Preface



### Background of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) traces its origin to the Committee on Civilian Components, established by President Truman's Executive Order 10007 in 1947. That committee became the Civilian Components Policy Board in 1949 and, three years later, was established by statute as the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is "the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components." (10 USC 175(c)).

To fulfill its charter, the Board melds the expertise of members of the reserve components with that of representatives from the active components and secretariat appointees who have responsibility for National Guard and Reserve matters.

The Board considers issues brought to its attention from many sources including: Congress; Office of the Secretary of Defense; the services; service committees, councils, or boards; theater commanders; and individual National Guard or Reserve members. The Board establishes and maintains communications with public and private individuals and agencies outside the

Department of Defense, as necessary, to accomplish the Board's mission.

The Board informally reports each quarter to the Senate and House Armed Services committees. A report is also published following any field study conducted by the Board. Additionally, law requires "a report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the reserve programs of the Department of Defense . . ." (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report covers the Coast Guard Reserve which remains under the Department of Transportation in peacetime. The report is submitted annually, by the Secretary of Defense, to the President and Congress.





## **Organization of the Report**


Mission readiness of the reserve components is evaluated in the Board's annual report by first reviewing the contributions of the individual components to their parent services, and then by analyzing personnel, training, mobilization, equipment, medical, and facility issues. Readiness and mobilization capabilities of the reserve components, addressed throughout the report, are evaluated separately in the final chapter. Recommendations are summarized at the conclusion of each chapter as appropriate. Issues addressed in the report are derived from meetings, committee sessions, field studies, and other reports available to the Board. The report represents the Board's independent review of these issues, and provides a consensus evaluation of reserve component programs.


An appendix briefly outlines the activities of the Board in FY 1988.

## **Comments and Additional Copies**

The Board appreciates the helpful comments and recommendations that followed its previous reports. Comments are again invited on this report. They should be addressed to:

**Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Room 3E330, The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-7300**

Additional copies of this report, or other Board publications, may be obtained at the above address. 





# Introduction **1**

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
## The Total Force Policy

The National Guard and Reserve are full partners with the active components for the purpose of deterring aggression and, if necessary, waging war. As a result of the promulgation of the Total Force Policy in 1973, the reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness. That policy calls for a mix of active and reserve component forces, fully utilizing all available assets, to ensure that maximum military capability is achieved at minimum cost. The policy is fundamental to national security.



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The total force is defined in a directive being coordinated as "The totality of organizations, units, and manpower that comprise the Defense Department's resources for meeting the military strategy. It includes the manpower resources comprising DoD active and Reserve military personnel, DoD civilian personnel, contractor staff, and host-nation support personnel."



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The United States has traditionally relied on its militia and other reserve components rather than on a large active component military force. The active components' size increased during times of "peace" only after World War II.

In early times, because there were insufficient quantities of military materiel to equip both the active and reserve components, Guardsmen and Reservists were forced to drill with wooden rifles, simulated tanks and planes, and "shoot" fake systems. Field training on a regular basis was almost nonexistent. Military systems became increasingly complex. The modern, expensive equipment required full-time care available only from active component personnel.

Those days are gone. The Total Force Policy calls for an integrated military force which will require mobilization of all or part of the reserve components for any major conflict. The Department of Defense "first to fight—first to be equipped" policy supports the Total Force Policy. Effective execution of this policy requires that increasing resources be allocated to the National Guard and Reserve since some reserve component units and personnel will deploy in a national emergency simultaneously with, or even before, some active component organizations.

Today's reserve components are not forces "in reserve" being saved for future use nor are they just a cadre force. Reserve component units are an integral part of theater operational plans. Successful combat operations could not be conducted without them. They are a significant part of our combat, combat support, and combat

service support forces. The National Guard and Reserve are vital to our national defense strategy.

### **Composition of the Reserve Components**

The seven reserve components are the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

All National Guard and Reserve personnel are assigned to one of three categories—the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the Retired Reserve (10 USC 267(a)). All National Guard members are in the Ready Reserve.

- The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve, who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship or disability. These individuals are not required to train and are not in units. The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who could be mobilized if necessary to fill manpower needs in specific skills. The size of the Standby Reserve is decreasing. In part, this results from Department of Defense initiatives emphasizing accession and retention of personnel in the Ready Reserve.
- The Retired Reserve is comprised of all reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retired pay resulting from their active duty and/or reserve service; all reserve officers and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay, have not reached age 60, have not elected discharge, and are not

voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve; and other retired enlisted members who retired with 20 or more years of active duty. When the members in this last category complete a total of 30 years of service they are placed on the appropriate regular or reserve retired list. All retired members who have completed at least 20 years of active federal status (Regular or Reserve), regardless of the retired list to which they are assigned, may be ordered to active duty whenever required as determined by the Secretary of the military department in accordance with 10 USC 688.



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- The Ready Reserve is comprised of military members of the National Guard and Reserve. Some are organized in units. All are liable for recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency (10 USC 268, 269). The Ready Reserve consists of

three subcategories—the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive National Guard. Table 1 provides the numbers of personnel assigned within the various categories of the Ready Reserve.

**Table 1**  
**COMPOSITION OF THE READY RESERVE**  
**FY 1988**

READY RESERVE 1,661,200			
SELECTED RESERVE 1,170,500 <sup>1</sup>			INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE/ INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD 490,700
UNIT AND FULLTIME SUPPORT 1,059,900 <sup>2</sup>		INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES 26,000	
UNITS 927,600 (PAID DRILL STRENGTH ONLY)	FULLTIME SUPPORT 132,300 (AGR, TAR, AND MILITARY TECHNICIAN ONLY) <sup>3</sup>		
MILITARY TECHNICIANS 68,900			

Notes: 1. Includes 84,600 in the training pipeline.

2. Military Technician strength counted only once.

3. AGR—Active Guard Reserve. TAR—Training and Administration of the Reserve.

4. Numbers rounded to nearest hundred.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.



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The Selected Reserve is the most significant element of the Ready Reserve. Many Selected Reservists would deploy simultaneously with the active component in the event of mobilization. The Selected Reserve is comprised of units, personnel in the training pipeline, and trained individuals.

Selected Reserve units may be either operational or augmentation units. Operational units train and deploy as units. Augmentation units train together in peacetime but lose their unit identity upon mobilization. The personnel are absorbed into active component units. Selected Reserve units are manned by drilling reservists and full-time support personnel.

Selected Reservists in the training pipeline are mobilizable but cannot be deployed outside the United States until minimum training requirements are completed.




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Trained individual Selected Reservists are not attached to a Selected Reserve unit. They are either Individual Mobilization Augmentees or full-time support personnel assigned to an active component organization. The Personnel Chapter further explains National Guard and Reserve personnel categories.

National Guard and Reserve partnership in the total force, by service, is displayed in Table 2.

**Table 2**  
**PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE<sup>1</sup>**  
**FY 1988 END STRENGTH PERCENTAGES**



Note: 1. Includes Active Component and Selected Reserve members.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

### Employment of the Reserve Components

The probability of reduced Department of Defense appropriations in the next few years will require a

strengthened National Guard and Reserve system to ensure national security. Maintaining large, forward-deployed, active component forces is likely to come under close scrutiny. Selected Reserve units and personnel,





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with increased capabilities, may become a necessary alternative to maintaining a large active component force.

The importance of the National Guard and Reserve in the total force cannot be overemphasized to the citizens of the United States. A peacetime callup of the National Guard or Reserve, to meet a national emergency, might surprise many U.S. citizens. This would be a new way of meeting threats against national interests. Therefore, the nation must be educated to the possibility of a peacetime callup of reserve component units.


The nature of the threat to U.S. interests helps to determine force employment decisions. The probability of low intensity conflicts requires that active component forces be immediately available. Important special capabilities in the reserve components may also dictate a role in low intensity conflict for the National Guard and Reserve. On the other hand, a major conflict would require mobilization of National Guard and Reserve forces.

The increasing dependence on the reserve components is having a dramatic impact on the way planning, training, and operations are conducted. The National Guard and Reserves accomplish an unprecedented variety of training and operational tasks in locations around the world. Examples include missions flown by the Air Force reserve components to Honduras when the President deployed troops there last spring. More recently, the National Guard and Reserve airlifted United Nations' peacekeeping forces to the Middle East to monitor the Iran-Iraq cease-fire agreement. The Army's

reserve components are providing equipment maintenance support in Europe. The Naval Reserve provided naval liaison officers on reflagged tankers in the Persian Gulf. Such varied and challenging training and operational missions enhance retention in the reserve components. Insufficient fiscal resources prevents the National Guard and Reserves from doing more.

Strategic transportation of reserve component forces to a theater of operation remains a concern of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Airlift and sealift equipment capacities are inadequate to meet mobilization requirements under current operational plans. Sufficient airlift to quickly deploy forces is necessary in the early stages of any major conflict. Strategic sealift is critical to accomplish the surge of unit equipment into a combat theater.

Because of strategic transportation shortages, analysts must carefully review deployment planning for reserve component units. In most cases, personnel will be airlifted to a combat theater. Unit equipment, if not already prepositioned, will be transported by ship. More effort is needed to solve the shortage of airlift and sealift transportation assets.



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### **Change In the Reserve Components**

Technological advances mandate changes in the structure of reserve component organizations. Equipment and methods of training must also change. Advances in electronics have modified the methods of collection and evaluation of intelligence data. Changes in logistical and personnel management systems impact on peacetime and combat operations. These changes are affecting the conduct of warfare. Officers and noncommissioned officers in the National Guard and Reserve must understand and learn to effectively manage changes required by technological advances.

Changes in doctrine, organization, and equipment in the reserve components are approaching the pace that occurred in the active components over the last several years. Modernization programs should be accelerated so that the National Guard and Reserve can be more rapidly integrated into the total force. There must also be an accompanying growth

in full-time support programs to ensure the mobilization readiness of reserve component units.

Equipment and personnel shortages are often directly related to outdated organizational structures defined in authorizing documents. These structures often do not include modernized equipment or appropriate manning. As National Guard and Reserve units convert to newer structures, unit status and total force readiness should continue to improve.

### **Resourcing the Total Force**

The total force is much stronger now than it was eight years ago. This is partially due to defense budget growth from FY 1981-1985 and to effective stewardship of resources exercised by the services and their reserve components. The result has been important modernization of the active and reserve components (mostly in combat units), higher quality of military personnel, better morale among the service members and their families, and a high level of training which probably has not been exceeded in other peacetime periods. For the past four years, however, military spending in real terms has declined.

Determining defense structure and priorities in an era of declining budgets is increasingly difficult. The active components' size may be diminished because of national budgetary priorities. Assuming that United States defense commitments remain stable in an era of reduced active component—and increased reserve component—responsibility, it will be essential to increase National Guard and Reserve appropriations.



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The reserve components provide a cost-effective means for augmenting the active components and maintaining a strong national defense. They are better trained, equipped, and managed than ever before. However, these successes are threatened by budgetary inadequacies. The reserve components must be adequately resourced to support any force structure growth or additional missions.

Due to funding reductions in recent years, some of the services have gradually reduced the strength and capabilities of their active component forces. This was accomplished by gradually increasing personnel and equipment in existing National Guard and Reserve units. This "robusting" of existing units has transferred active component capabilities to the reserve components in a very cost-effective manner. Robusting of reserve component units has resulted in major savings. However, some services are reversing this process by reducing the

same types of personnel and equipment in National Guard and Reserve units. This is being done in the name of "equal cuts" for both active and reserve component forces. It greatly reduces overall capability with relatively small savings. This "equal share of cuts policy" is not cost-effective and may not be prudent.

In addition, the reduced overall funding and the funds already committed in previous years for acquisition of major weapons systems are placing an inordinate squeeze on readiness and sustainability of active and reserve component units. This could lead to a return to "hollow", non-ready forces and lack of ammunition, spare parts, and training time which was so prevalent at the beginning of this decade.

The Department of Defense Authorization Act and the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for FY 1989 did not fully resource reserve



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component programs. Lack of adequate funding will seriously set back previously planned force modernization. Force structure cannot grow because of end-strength caps. Modern equipment cannot be purchased. Military construction accounts are seriously underfunded.

It is fiscally responsible to provide the resources necessary to fill the National Guard and Reserve with people and equipment; provide training support through adequate facilities, ranges, and schools; and provide sufficient ground vehicle hours, flying time, and steaming hours to maintain individual and unit proficiency. Particular attention needs to be given to properly equipping combat support and combat service support units since such a large portion of these assets are in the National Guard and Reserve.

Initiatives to maintain an effective total force—including strengthening the



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National Guard and Reserve—must not be crushed in a fiscal vise or allowed to atrophy while national security requirements are debated. The National Guard and Reserve must have sufficient funding to attain levels of readiness and capability required to meet the ever

increasing responsibilities being placed upon them.

Table 3 displays reserve component appropriations for FY 1989 and provides comparable data for recent years. (P)

**Table 3**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT APPROPRIATIONS**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

		FY 1981 <sup>1</sup>	FY 1987 <sup>2</sup>	FY 1988 <sup>3</sup>	FY 1989 <sup>4</sup>
Army National Guard	Personnel	1175.6	3071.0	3234.3	3334.0
	Operation and Maintenance	951.4	1764.0	1856.5	1801.2
	Military Construction	42.3	141.0	184.4	229.2
Army Reserve	Personnel	870.5	2115.0	2262.9	2261.2
	Operation and Maintenance	521.6	788.0	857.5	794.9
	Military Construction	46.9	87.0	95.1	86.0
Naval Reserve	Personnel	318.8	1395.0	1512.9	1621.4
	Operation and Maintenance	554.2	892.0	929.9	979.2
	Military Construction	33.0	44.5	73.7	60.9
Marine Corps Reserve <sup>5</sup>	Personnel	120.4	278.3	295.4	315.7
	Operation and Maintenance	28.9	64.2	69.5	77.5
Air National Guard	Personnel	387.2	947.0	988.2	1033.7
	Operation and Maintenance	1530.9	1796.0	1958.1	1971.0
	Military Construction	89.7	148.9	151.3	158.5
Air Force Reserve	Personnel	277.4	564.6	615.1	658.0
	Operation and Maintenance	602.0	924.6	1001.0	1033.9
	Military Construction	21.6	58.9	79.3	70.6
Total DoD	Personnel	3149.9	8370.9	8908.8	9224.0
	Operation and Maintenance	4189.0	6228.8	6672.5	6657.7
	Military Construction	233.5	480.3	583.8	605.2
Coast Guard Reserve <sup>6</sup>	Personnel	37.5	39.6	38.4	40.2
	Operation and Maintenance	11.7	26.0	24.5	26.8
Total Reserve Components	Personnel	3187.4	8410.5	8947.2	9264.2
	Operation and Maintenance	4200.7	6254.8	6697.0	6684.5
	Military Construction	233.5	480.3	583.8	605.2

Notes: 1. Source: "The Budget of the US Government," Appendix, 1983. The Coast Guard.

2. Source: FY 1987 DoD Obligational Availability and Obligations as of September 30, 1987.

3. Source: FY 1988 DoD Appropriations Bill.

4. Source: FY 1989 DoD Appropriations Bill.

5. Marine Corps Reserve figures included in Naval Reserve Military Construction.

6. Coast Guard Reserve has no military construction funding.

Data as of September 30, 1988.



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# Force Structure **2**

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## General

National Guard and Reserve units are prepared to rapidly augment active component forces in times of war or national emergency. Warfighting contingency plans cannot be successfully executed without the reserve components.

Over one-third of the combat divisions and more than 80 percent of the aggregate combat support and combat service support capabilities are in the Army's reserve components. Most types of units in the active component are also found in the reserve components. Some types of units are primarily in the Army National Guard or Army Reserve.

The Naval Reserve includes units with a wide variety of mission areas such as surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime patrol, airlift, logistical support, communications, construction forces, and medical support.

The Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team and force service

support group with combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the same type as active component units.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units perform many combat and combat support missions such as tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, strategic and tactical airlift, strategic air defense, aerial refueling, and aeromedical evacuation.

The Coast Guard Reserve provides port security elements and augmentation of the Coast Guard. Upon the declaration of war, or when the President directs, the Coast Guard shall operate as a service in the Navy. This status continues until the President, by executive order, transfers the Coast Guard back to the Department of Transportation.

As evidenced by the following sections and tables, the National Guard and Reserve provide significant, and in some areas, total mission capability of the total force. These capabilities demonstrate the continuing need for



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sufficient manning, realistic training, modernized equipment, and adequate facilities in the reserve components.

### **Army**

The Army relies heavily on National Guard and Reserve units to fill out its wartime organization. The Army National Guard has an assigned strength of 455,900 in 2,108 units. There are 2,406 units in the Army Reserve with an assigned strength of 312,800. Selected Reserve strength in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve will soon be greater than the strength of the active component.

The Army's CAPSTONE program aligns Army reserve component units with their wartime gaining commands. It defines command and control for wartime missions. The program also allows reserve component units to focus training on wartime tasks, defined by gaining commands, in geographic regions where they would deploy upon mobilization.

The roundout program brings an understructured command in one component, up to its authorized configuration, by assigning a specified unit from another component. Under this program, nine of the 18 active component divisions are structured with roundout brigades or battalions from the National Guard or Reserve. Reserve component roundout units are given the same priorities for equipment as their parent active component units. A few reserve component commands are rounded out with active component units.

During FY 1988, the 81st Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Washington Army National Guard, was given a roundout mission to the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Fort Lewis, Washington. An Army National Guard battalion was also formed in Alaska to roundout the 6th Infantry Division (Light).

An equipment maintenance center is being established on a one-year test





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basis in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is being staffed by 10 active component, 10 Army National Guard, and 10 Army Reserve full-time personnel. They will assist National Guard and Reserve maintenance companies which will deploy from the United States to work in the center for three-week annual training periods. The first unit is scheduled to deploy to the center in April 1989. The work done by Army National Guard and Army Reserve units will improve maintenance support of the Army command in Europe and help reduce maintenance backlogs. Additionally, it will enable reserve component units to train with some of the Army's most modern equipment. Under this plan, maintenance costs should decrease since the equipment is currently being maintained through contract services.

If this test is successful, the rotation of National Guard and Reserve units through the center would become permanent. The concept could be extended to other overseas missions besides maintenance. Operational missions provide valuable training experience for the reserve components.

During FY 1988, the Army National Guard activated 49 units and converted 169 organizations. The Army Reserve activated 30 units and had 91 conversions. Organizational changes and equipment modernization over the last five years has caused considerable turbulence in the Army's reserve components. The impact of this turbulence varies depending on unit type. In many cases it changes individual skill requirements within a unit. Such changes require careful oversight to ensure that adequate retraining opportunities are made available to minimize skill mismatch problems.

As part of the modernization program, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have added new tanks, helicopters, radars, trucks, hospital sets, and many other items of equipment mentioned in the Equipment Chapter of this report. During FY 1988, the 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery, Oklahoma Army National Guard, became the Army's first reserve component battalion to receive the multiple launch rocket system. The modernization program has significantly increased the capability of the total Army.

The Army's capability has also been enhanced through leadership training programs initiated during the year. Among these is the establishment of noncommissioned officer academies for reserve component personnel in the five major regional commands in the United States.

Over the next several years, the Army plans to reduce its aviation fleet by approximately 2,000 aircraft. As new aircraft are added to the force, they will

displace less capable aircraft reaching obsolescence. In some Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, older aircraft are being removed as part of this restructuring before the new aircraft are available. This results in decreased reserve component capabilities. In order to maintain capability and required structure in the force, reductions should only take place as new aircraft are given to reserve component units.

The Army remains committed to the establishment of four attack helicopter battalions in the Army National Guard and four in the Army Reserve. Six units are programmed to be established in FY 1989 (four Army National Guard/two Army Reserve), one in FY 1990, and the last in FY 1991.

Contributions to the total Army by the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are reflected in Table 4.



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**Table 4**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL ARMY**  
**FY 1988**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>National Guard Percent of Total Army</u>	<u>Army Reserve Percent of Total Army</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Training Divisions and Brigades	0	100	100
Infantry Scout Groups	100	0	100
TOW Light Anti-tank Infantry Battalions	100	0	100
Heavy Helicopter Units	100	0	100
Pathfinder Detachments	50	50	100
Railroad Units	0	100	100
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	97	97
Psychological Operations Units	0	87	87
Public Affairs Units	58	29	87
Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies	76	10	86
Separate Brigades	73	7	80
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	52	25	77
Hospital Units	8	69	77
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Companies	18	59	77
Engineer Bridge Companies (Non-Divisional)	43	31	74
Corps Support Groups, Headquarters	15	58	73
Chemical-Smoke Generator Units	6	66	72
Supply and Service Companies	31	40	71
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	30	37	67
Truck Companies	37	30	67
Theater Defense Brigades	50	17	67
Military Police Companies (Non-Divisional)	44	21	65
Conventional Ammunition Companies	18	43	61
Field Artillery Battalions	52	9	61
Armored Cavalry Regiments	57	0	57
Military Intelligence Units	4	54	58
Signal Battalions (Corps Area)	43	14	57
Infantry Battalions	50	5	55
Special Forces Groups	25	25	50
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	47	2	49
Armored Battalions	43	2	45
Area Support Groups, Headquarters	30	15	45
Watercraft Companies	14	29	43
Combat Divisions	36	0	36

Note: Percentage determined by counting like-type units.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

## Navy

The Naval Reserve has 149,500 personnel assigned in 3,243 units. They are organized into three types of units for alignment with gaining commands.

- **Commissioned Units (6 percent):** Reserve combat units, with organic equipment, such as aircraft squadrons or construction battalions. These units are tasked to deliver a complete operational entity to the operating force, are commanded by either active or reserve component officers, and manned largely by Selected Reserve personnel.
- **Reinforcing Units (34 percent):** Units which augment active component commissioned units and operating staffs with trained personnel. Such units are tailored to augment designated ships, aircraft squadrons, craft, special warfare commands, and Marine expeditionary forces. Their function is to allow peak operations for an indefinite period of time.
- **Sustaining Units (60 percent):** Units which augment fleet and force support activities with trained personnel. They provide a surge capability and sustain the high level of activity required to support deployed forces. Such units provide augmentation to security groups; intelligence, communications, and meteorological activities; intermediate maintenance units; staffs; naval stations; and headquarters organizations.

Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships belong to the Navy's active component and are under the operational control of the Commanders-in-Chief, Atlantic or

Pacific Fleets rather than the Commander, Naval Reserve Force. The Naval Reserve trains on NRF ships and craft and provides a portion of their mobilization manpower. NRF ships are manned (at reduced strength from normal peacetime levels for these types of ships) by active component personnel, Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) program personnel, and drilling Selected Reservists.

During FY 1988, five NRF ocean minesweepers and two NRF frigates were deployed to support Persian Gulf operations. Drilling Selected Reserve members assigned to the ships at the time of their deployment were not called to active duty. Rather, active component members, TARs, and volunteers from the Naval Reserve filled the crew. Participation in the Persian Gulf operations, by these ships and other Naval Reserve personnel, demonstrated the Navy's ability to integrate NRF ships and Naval Reserve assets into operational missions when required.



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The majority of the NRF is included in the 600-ship Navy. This includes 22 frigates and various landing craft. Also in the NRF, but not included in the 600-ship Navy, are 18 minesweepers, three salvage ships, and 14 craft of opportunity utilized by the Naval Reserve for training in mine warfare operations.

Two of the Navy's 15 carrier air wings are in the Naval Reserve. In the next few years, one out of every 12 ships and nearly one-fourth of the Navy's frigates, are programmed to be in the NRF. Maritime patrol squadrons from the Naval Reserve constitute one-third of the fleet's total requirement.

Over the past five years, many Naval Reserve units have been established. Some were eliminated due to changing demographics. During this time, the number of NRF ships increased by 16 while the number of aircraft squadrons increased by two. Changes in the NRF, scheduled over the next five years, include adding four frigates to the inventory. Eight mine countermeasure ships and one coastal mine hunter ship will replace seven ocean minesweepers scheduled for deactivation. One more amphibious ship will be added to the NRF.

In addition, six existing squadrons transitioned to new types of aircraft. The number of reinforcing or sustaining unit activations averaged 200 annually while the number of deactivations averaged 35 per year. During 1988, 114 units were activated and 70 were deactivated. The number of commissioned units is projected to increase by 25 during the next five years.

The majority of the Navy's mine countermeasures capability is in the Naval Surface Reserve. Eighteen of the Navy's 21 ocean minesweepers are NRF assets. The Naval Air Reserve has one Naval Reserve helicopter mine countermeasure squadron and a second is planned to be added in FY 1989. The total Navy continues to require additional air mine countermeasure capability.

The two Naval Reserve carrier air wings are receiving modern equipment simultaneously with the active component. They will soon be fully supportable aboard the Navy's most modern aircraft carriers. Two Naval Reserve tactical electronic warfare squadrons will transition to more capable aircraft beginning in FY 1989.

The Naval Reserve maritime patrol force has 13 squadrons and contributes substantially to the total maritime patrol



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force. One Naval Reserve squadron is currently flying the P-3C aircraft. The remaining reserve squadrons are scheduled to convert to P-3Cs when the active force acquires a new long range antisubmarine warfare aircraft in the late 1990s.

Naval Air Reserve changes over the next five years include the deactivation of two light attack helicopter squadrons and one combat support helicopter squadron. Two special combat support

helicopter squadrons will replace them. Two aircraft refueling squadrons will be replaced with two new medium attack squadrons that will assume the refueling mission.

Most of the Navy's United States-based organic airlift needs are met by the Naval Air Reserve's 11 C-9/DC-9 squadrons.

Naval Reserve contributions to the total Navy are displayed in Table 5.

**Table 5**  
**NAVAL RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO**  
**THE TOTAL NAVY**  
**FY 1988**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Navy</u>
United States Based Logistic Airlift Squadrons	100
United States Based Composite (Service) Squadrons	100
Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons	100
Combat Search and Rescue Squadrons	100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	100
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams	100
Naval Control of Shipping (Military Personnel)	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	93
Ocean Minesweepers	82
Military Sealift Command (Military Personnel)	85
Mobile Construction Battalions	65
Fleet Hospitals (Medical Support)	53
Intelligence Program Personnel	48
Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons	35
LAMPS MK-I Anti-Submarine Warfare Squadrons	33
Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadrons	25
Frigates (FFG-7s/FF-1052s)	21
Carrier Air Wings	14
Amphibious Warfare Ships	3

Note: Percentage determined by counting like-type units or personnel.  
Data as of September 30, 1988.



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## Marine Corps

The Marine Corps Reserve has 43,600 personnel assigned in 347 units at 193 sites.

Mobilization missions for the Marine Corps Reserve may be:

- Selectively augment the active component in order to field three active Marine expeditionary forces at full wartime structure.
- Selectively reinforce active component Marine expeditionary forces with Selected Marine Corps Reserve units.
- Provide the capability to field a Marine expeditionary brigade (with reduced aviation and limited combat service support capability) to reinforce an active component Marine expeditionary force.

- If augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, provide the capability to field a division, wing, and force service support group.
- If augmentation/reinforcement is ordered, provide a nucleus to reconstitute a division, wing, and force service support group.

Less than 10 percent of units in the Marine Corps Reserve have been reorganized over the past five years. However, major changes are expected in the next five years to support warfighting enhancements directed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Elements of the 4th Light Armored Vehicle Battalion, an antitank platoon, a KC-130 refueling squadron, and an AH-1J attack helicopter squadron were activated in the Marine Corps Reserve in FY 1988. Many units within the Marine Corps Reserve received new equipment. Additional equipment, which will increase the capabilities of the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Wing, and the 4th Force Service Support Group, will be fielded next year.

In FY 1989, the Marine Corps Reserve will activate three bulk fuel companies, two bridge platoons, and one antitank platoon. These units will be transferred from the active component.

The Marine Corps Reserve soon will assign 16 rifle companies to augment 16 active component rifle battalions with a fourth maneuver company. The companies will train with their gaining battalions during annual training duty, and possibly during monthly drills. Artillery units, and some combat service support organizations, will also augment active component units.

During FY 1989 the Marine Corps Reserve will continue to increase its aviation capability through transitions to modern aircraft.

Marine Corps Reserve contributions to the total Marine Corps are displayed in Table 6.

**Table 6**  
**MARINE CORPS RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO**  
**THE TOTAL MARINE CORPS**  
**FY 1988**

<u>Unit Types<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Marine Corps</u>
Civil Affairs Groups	100
Salvage Platoons	100
Force Reconnaissance Companies	50
Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	50
Force Service Support Group Military Police Companies	40
Tank Battalions	40
Beach and Port Companies	40
Heavy Artillery Batteries	35
Division Reconnaissance Battalions	33
Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalions	25
Infantry Battalions	25
Marine Air Control Groups	25
Marine Wing Support Groups	25
Bulk Fuel Companies	25
Force Service Support Groups	25
Forward Area Air Defense Batteries	25
<u>Aircraft Types<sup>2</sup></u>	
Light Attack Aircraft	28
Aerial Refueling Aircraft	28
Observation Aircraft	23
Fighter Aircraft	20
Electronic Warfare Aircraft	18
Helicopters	16

Notes: 1. Percentage determined by counting like-type units.

2. Percentage determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

Data as of September 30, 1988.



## Air Force

There are 115,200 personnel in the Air National Guard and 82,100 personnel in the Air Force Reserve. There are 680 units in the Air National Guard and 533 units in the Air Force Reserve.

Most Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units are aligned with wartime gaining commands and train with them on a regular basis in peacetime. This facilitates integration into the active force upon mobilization. In addition to flying their own component's aircraft, many Air Force Reserve aircrews fly active component aircraft in the associate program. Some units have changed missions and others have transitioned to modern aircraft with increased capabilities.

The 158th Fighter Interceptor Group, Vermont Air National Guard, transitioned from F-4s to F-16s in FY 1988, changing from a tactical fighter to a strategic air defense role.

Activation is planned for three Air National Guard communications

squadrons in FY 1989. Terminals will be placed in North Carolina, Florida, and Kentucky. The squadrons will provide a command and control capability and a logistics link from designated NATO bases. The Air Force is providing ground satellite terminals while European allies are providing satellites. The Air National Guard will provide personnel and funding for operations and maintenance.

The 210th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron will be activated in the Alaska Air National Guard during FY 1990-1993. This action, directed by Congress, will replace the active component air rescue and recovery capability which is being removed from Alaska. Congress provided funds to equip the new squadron with four MH-60G helicopters and two HC-130N aircraft.

In FY 1989, the Air Force Reserve will deactivate 16 mobility support flights. All personnel, and unit assets will be absorbed by combat support squadrons. One security police flight will be activated.

Over the past five years, 42 percent of Air National Guard units and 25 percent of Air Force Reserve units experienced mission conversions or reorganizations. It is expected that over the next five years an additional 34 percent of Air National Guard and 25 percent of Air Force Reserve units will reorganize or convert to other systems.

During FY 1988, many fighter and airlift units in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve converted from older to more capable aircraft. In a few units, missions have been changed. This often requires a different type of



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aircraft. The capability and sustainability of the reserve components have increased because of these equipment and unit conversions.

In the Air Force, fiscal constraints are forcing reductions in numbers of tactical fighter aircraft and in unit structure. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical fighter squadrons are scheduled to be reduced by the equivalent of a tactical fighter wing.

Some units are scheduled to receive more modern but fewer aircraft than they currently operate. This was

planned because of service fiscal constraints. Increased capability due to more modern equipment may be offset by a less efficient equipment package and a consequent reduction in potential combat capability. If active component equipment reductions become necessary due to budget priorities, but the requirement for the capability continues, it may be prudent to transfer that equipment to the reserve components.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contributions to the total Air Force are displayed in Table 7.

**Table 7**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL AIR FORCE**  
**FY 1988**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>National Guard Percent of Total Air Force</u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Air Force</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Air Force</u>
<u>Flying Units</u>			
Aircraft <sup>1</sup>			
Aerial Spraying Capability	0	100	100
United States Based Strategic Interceptor Forces	86	0	86
Theater Airlift Aircraft	34	25	59
Tactical Reconnaissance	50	0	50
Air Rescue/Recovery	17	28	45
Weather Reconnaissance	0	40	40
Tactical Air Support	36	0	36
Special Operations	11	25	36
Tactical Fighters	25	8	33
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	18	4	22
Support Aircraft	18	0	18
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	5	9	14
Aircrews <sup>2</sup>			
Aeromedical Evacuation Crews	24	69	93
Strategic Airlift (Associate)	0	50	50
Tanker/Cargo (Associate)	0	38	38
Aeromedical Airlift (Associate)	0	30	30
<u>Non-Flying Units<sup>3</sup></u>			
Aerial Port	12	59	71
Aircraft Control & Warning	70	0	70
Combat Communications	68	0	68
Engineering Installations	68	0	68
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons	0	59	59
Tactical Control	55	0	55
Civil Engineering Personnel	24	19	43
Strategic Airlift Maintenance Personnel (Associate)	0	40	40
Medical Personnel <sup>4</sup>	13	13	26
Weather	15	1	16

Notes: 1. Percentage determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

2. Percentage determined by counting authorized aircrews.

3. Percentage determined by counting authorized personnel.

4. Excludes aeromedical evacuation crews.

Data as of September 30, 1988.



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### Coast Guard

There are 323 units with 12,100 personnel in the Coast Guard Selected Reserve.

Except for three deployable port security units (351 total personnel), the Coast Guard Reserve augments active component units after mobilization. Since the Coast Guard Reserve is highly dependent upon active force commands for peacetime training, reservists generally are familiar with command structures, missions, and operating areas of the units they would augment upon mobilization.

Reservists also support Coast Guard peacetime operations in search and rescue, aids to navigation, port safety and security, and law enforcement.

Less than one percent of Coast Guard Reserve units have reorganized each year since 1983. The reorganizations were primarily the result of significant changes in training opportunities available to the unit. Coast Guard Reserve units are configured as training

units and do not need to reorganize to accommodate changing mobilization requirements.


Seven Coast Guard Reserve units changed their unit types in FY 1988. The Coast Guard had to reduce its Selected Reserve strength by nearly 10 percent due to budget constraints during FY 1988. It was still able to establish three port security units, one vessel augmentation unit, one support unit, one interservice training unit, and two aviation training units. Aviation units use active component aircraft and operating resources.

The Coast Guard Reserve's 10-year plan projects considerable growth. If the plan is supported by the Administration and Congress, 56 port security units will be established in the next five years. There are no plans to deactivate any units. Generally, Coast Guard Reserve units have no mobilization equipment assigned.


Coast Guard Reserve contributions to the total Coast Guard are displayed in Table 8.



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**Table 8**  
**COAST GUARD RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS**  
**TO THE TOTAL COAST GUARD**  
**FY 1988**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Coast Guard</u>
Deployable Port Security Units	100
Marine Safety Office Units	54
Operational Shore Facilities	32
Repair/Supply/Research	25
Command & Control	21
Vessels	17
Training Commands	10
Air Stations	2

Note: Percentage determined by counting allocated mobilization billets.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

Reserve component reorganizations, activations, deactivations, and equipment modernization cause turbulence in manning, training, and meeting individual skill requirements. Although such changes may result in a temporary degradation of readiness, capability may be increased over time. The ultimate improved capability is welcome, but all must realize the adverse impact of these changes on current force readiness.

### **Special Operations Forces**

Special Operations Forces (SOF) fulfill a vital role in protecting our national security interests. Their capabilities can be employed in peace and at all levels of conflict, independently, or in concert with other forces. SOF are receiving emphasis in the active and reserve

components of all the services. SOF include special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations, civil affairs (except in the Marine Corps reserve), electronic combat, gunship, and special boat units.

Representative SOF missions supporting national objectives include:

- foreign internal defense operations in remote, urban, or rural environments during peace or war to promote national and regional stability.
- training foreign military and paramilitary forces in counterinsurgency techniques.
- conducting unconventional warfare, direct action missions, and psychological operations.

- conducting humanitarian assistance operations, either unilaterally or in conjunction with other forces.
- safeguarding United States citizens and property abroad.
- conducting personnel evacuation operations, or recovery of sensitive items.
- conducting deception operations.
- conducting counterterrorist operations.

Recognizing the contribution SOF make in protecting national security interests, goals are to revitalize SOF capabilities to enable them to perform missions in times of peace, crisis, or war; and to program the sustainment and modernization of these forces.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve special forces units have 6,000 soldiers and comprise four of the eight special forces groups in the Army. One special operations aviation battalion is in the Army National Guard. Three of the Army's four psychological operations groups are in the Army Reserve. More than 4,600 Army Reserve soldiers are in three civil affairs commands, five civil affairs brigades, four civil affairs groups, and 24 civil affairs companies. There is only one civil affairs battalion in the active component.

Peacetime chain of command for Army Reserve SOF units is through a SOF oriented reserve command, in each of the five regional commands, to Forces Command (FORSCOM). 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Army component of United States

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and a major subordinate unit of FORSCOM, has operational control of Army Reserve SOF units. 1st SOCOM was added to the command chain in FY 1988. 1st SOCOM is transitioning to a major Army command and will assume responsibility for all Army Reserve SOF affairs from FORSCOM except post-mobilization deployment responsibilities.

Army National Guard SOF units remain under state control until mobilized or called to federal duty. The Chief, National Guard Bureau and Commander, 1st SOCOM have signed a memorandum of agreement to address command and control issues. 1st SOCOM monitors and coordinates Army National Guard training and readiness in accordance with the agreement.

After mobilization, operation command for all Army reserve





component units is directly through 1st SOCOM to USSOCOM. Administrative chain of command is from 1st SOCOM to FORSCOM. Upon deployment, operational command is passed from the Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM to theater Commanders-in-Chief. Command (less operational command) continues to be exercised through the service components of the respective theater commanders.

The Naval Reserve has two commissioned special boat squadrons (SBR) and four commissioned special boat units (SBU). They comprise 100 percent of all SBRs and 67 percent of all SBU's in the Navy. In addition, there are 15 reserve detachments which augment various SOF units and staffs of the active component. Naval Reserve SOF strength is 347 officers and 1,357 enlisted.

Operational control of Naval Reserve special operations units is through Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, to the Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM. Administrative control is through Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, to Chief of Naval Operations. Post mobilization command

relationships would remain the same until deployment. Upon deployment, command passes to theater commanders.

There is one special operations unit in the Air National Guard. This Pennsylvania unit, the 193rd Special Operations Group, has an electronic combat mission. The unit has 1,040 assigned personnel with over 90 percent of assigned personnel qualified in their individual specialty. There is no shortage of equipment although some of the aircraft are undergoing conversions.

The 193rd Special Operations Group is under the command and control of the state. However, for contingencies not requiring mobilization, an agreement assigns operational control to USSOCOM. During peacetime, the Military Airlift Command establishes training and evaluation standards for the unit. Upon mobilization, command passes to the Military Airlift Command with operational control by USSOCOM until the unit is deployed to another unified command.

The Air Force Reserve SOF consists of one AC-130 gunship unit which is half of the Air Force's gunship capability, and one H-3 helicopter unit which is 100 percent of Air Force H-3 SOF capability. Total Air Force Reserve SOF personnel strength is 1,530. Air Force Reserve SOF units have 100 percent of their authorized support equipment. Almost all of their personnel are qualified in their individual specialty.

The Marine Corps Reserve and the United States Coast Guard Reserve have no special operations units.



## Military Intelligence

The Army National Guard has six military intelligence (MI) organizations. They consist of two aerial exploitation battalions, one combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) divisional battalion, one MI linguist brigade headquarters, and two MI linguist battalions. All of these organizations provide tactical MI support.

The most significant programmed growth in the Army National Guard MI force is the implementation of a new linguist structure over the next few years. Additionally, new systems will be provided to the National Guard's two aerial exploitation battalions.

Military intelligence (MI) in the Army Reserve constituted 54 percent of the Army's MI structure in FY 1988. Within the Army Reserve, the preponderance of MI units are CEWI units that support commanders at corps level and below. There is also significant intelligence structure above corps level. Fifty-nine strategic MI detachments provide valuable scientific and technical intelligence support to the Army.

Naval Reserve military intelligence is composed of two parts—the Naval Reserve Intelligence Program (NRIP) and the Naval Reserve Security Group (NRSRG).

The NRIP provides about 15 percent of the Navy's peacetime intelligence capability and more than 60 percent of its wartime personnel. The program has 5,000 drilling Selected Reservists in 140 intelligence units. Additionally, the intelligence needs of 88 other Naval Reserve units are supported by NRIP.

The NRSRG mission is to train and sustain proficiency of a cadre of cryptologic personnel. This mission is carried out through a cryptologic readiness training program that couples skill development with real-time cryptologic support to fleet commanders and national intelligence agencies. The program uses state-of-the-art equipment at 76 NRSRG units located in reserve centers throughout the country. The program is managed by three reserve units designated as collection management authorities and five units designated regional operational coordinators. The NRSRG provided over 43,000 man days of support in FY 1988.

The Marine Corps Reserve has about 25 percent of all Marine Corps MI assets. These include tactical collection, analysis, and production. The 40 member Intelligence Reserve Augmentation Unit (RAU) and 15 member Cryptology RAU, attached to Marine Corps headquarters, provide quality assistance to both the Marine Corps and other government agencies.



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Additionally, intelligence reservists are available to augment the Fleet Marine Force during major exercises or crises.

The Air National Guard provides approximately 10 percent of Air Force intelligence assets. Intelligence personnel are assigned to 91 Air National Guard flying units, two reconnaissance technical squadrons, one electronic security squadron, and 32 tactical control units. Flying units include tactical fighter/reconnaissance, tactical air support, strategic/tactical airlift, air defense, air refueling, air rescue, and special operations.

The Air Force Reserve has 538 authorized intelligence billets in 58 flying squadrons and two electronic security squadrons. These intelligence resources provide operational support to a wide variety of missions.

Major command requirements have increased Air Force Reserve intelligence manning from 175 positions to 538 over the past five years. During this period, Air Force Reserve intelligence positions have been established in Military Airlift Command associate airlift organizations and Strategic Air Command associate refueling groups.



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Recently approved manning documents for Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve combat rescue units will double intelligence personnel strength in those units by FY 1991.

Approximately 1,400 officer and enlisted members of the Air Force Intelligence Reserve (AFIR) performed two-week annual tours during FY 1988. Additionally, these reservists performed more than 8,000 special tours supporting 27 major commands and separate operating agencies. Air Force Reserve intelligence personnel perform important roles in most major Air Force exercises. Significant initiatives include:

- Establishment of the AFIR Strategic Air Command (SAC) intelligence network. This management initiative realigns 13 intelligence detachments under a SAC-oriented command structure to focus and increase intelligence support to SAC bombardment wings during inactive duty periods. The AFIR SAC network is a prototype for future alignment and utilization of Reserve intelligence reserve detachments and may influence the use of reservists on annual or special duty tours.
- Intensified AFIR Russian linguists' training to prepare for an operational role in strategic treaty verification processes.

Presently, reserve component military intelligence (MI) assets constitute an important resource for the Coast Guard. They increase active component Coast Guard capabilities by approximately 35 percent. At Coast Guard headquarters, Intelligence Coordination Center staffing is increased by 10-20 percent. In Coast Guard area commands, Reserve personnel account for 40-50 percent of



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the wartime intelligence staff requirements. At the district staff level, they boost MI staffing capabilities 20-50 percent.

Most Coast Guard Reserve MI assets perform duties of an analytical nature (both strategic and tactical), with the remainder engaged in watch standing and collection activities.

Over the last several years, MI assets have been focused on Maritime Defense Zone responsibilities, especially for mobilization. This is particularly true of area intelligence staffs. In areas where law enforcement intelligence needs are rapidly increasing, such as in the southeastern United States, Reserve personnel are supporting Coast Guard operations. As the Coast Guard obtains access to more sophisticated types of intelligence gathering capabilities, Reserve personnel will also be used to support these systems. Increased use of Reserve MI resources can be expected to continue for the next several years.

During mobilization, intelligence collection and analysis requirements will be considerably greater than at present. The maritime defense zone areas of responsibility are large, surpass command boundaries, and encompass strategically important port facilities. The volume of intelligence data would multiply dramatically, requiring increased processing. More Reserve intelligence personnel, particularly those performing analytical and collection duties, would be needed to meet the challenge of a full mobilization.

### Summary

The reserve components are increasingly important to the national

security of the United States. In this era of budget constraints, the National Guard and Reserve are being called upon to "provide for the common defense" more often and in more ways. Without reserve component forces, a major conflict may not be won. The contribution of the reserve components to deterrence of war, and execution of war if deterrence fails, may be greater now than anytime in recent history. Many capabilities exist in the National Guard and Reserve which are not in the active components.

The Total Force Policy demands increased preparedness through training and equipping of the reserve components. They must train in peace as they would perform in battle. This requires continual exercising of all reserve components with their active component counterparts and other services.

The reserve components must be compatible with active component elements. This should include unit structure, individual and unit skills, major equipment, spare parts, and weapon systems. There may not be sufficient time after mobilization to recruit and train people or to mobilize industry to start rapid production of hardware systems.

Reorganizations, especially those due to conversions to modern equipment, result in temporary lower unit readiness status. However, this decreased status does not necessarily mean reduced capability. Overall, changes have resulted in a considerable increase in total force mobilization readiness and wartime capability. ☐



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# Personnel **3**

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## General

Sufficient numbers of trained personnel in the reserve components are essential to readiness and a credible total force. Trained units are required for immediate mobilization and deployment to meet worldwide contingencies. Additionally, trained individuals must be available to replace casualties and fill other units preparing for deployment.

One of the most critical factors in achieving force readiness is the ability to meet the Selected Reserve manpower requirements—both in numbers and quality. In recent years, Congress has provided increased recruiting and retention resources to ensure attainment of manpower objectives.



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Management of change in 1989 and into the next decade is a challenge. Changing missions, continued equipment modernization, the shrinking recruiting pool, and increased training demands will impact personnel requirements in the reserve components.

### Personnel Strengths

Increased numbers of drilling Selected Reservists are necessary to meet the expanding roles of the reserve components. Personnel are required for new units and to expand existing capabilities. Mobilization readiness is affected by the personnel strength of any unit.

Table 9 reflects the wartime personnel requirements, authorized personnel, and personnel assigned by component and category.





**Table 9**  
**PERSONNEL STRENGTH**  
**(In Thousands)<sup>1</sup>**

	FY 81 <sup>2</sup>	FY 87 <sup>2</sup>	FY 88 <sup>2</sup>	Percent Change FY 87-88	Percent Change FY 81-88	Projected FY 89 <sup>2</sup>	Percent Change FY 81-89
<b>READY RESERVE</b>							
Selected Reserve							
ARNG (486.1) <sup>3</sup>	389.0	451.9	455.9	0.7%	17.0%	457.3	17.6%
USAR (311.9) <sup>3</sup>	232.0	313.6	312.8	-0.3%	34.8%	324.3	39.8%
USNR (146.1) <sup>3</sup>	98.3	148.1	149.5	0.9%	52.1%	152.6	55.2%
USMCR (42.7) <sup>3</sup>	37.3	42.3	43.6	3.1%	16.9%	43.6	16.9%
ANG (118.2) <sup>3</sup>	98.3	114.6	115.2	0.5%	17.2%	115.9	17.9%
USAFR (88.6) <sup>3</sup>	62.3	80.4	82.1	2.1%	31.8%	82.4	32.3%
TOTAL DoD	917.2	1150.9	1158.4	0.7%	26.3%	1176.1	28.2%
USCGR (27.5)	11.9	13.3	12.1	-9.0%	1.7%	12.1	1.7%
TOTAL Sel Reserve	929.1	1164.2	1170.5	0.5%	26.0%	1188.2	27.9%
<b>IRR/ING</b>							
ARNG	10.5	10.3	9.0	-12.6%	-14.3%	10.3	-1.9%
USAR	205.9	287.5	292.9	1.9%	42.3%	300.9	46.1%
USNR	99.3	78.4	84.0	7.1%	-15.4%	86.0	-13.4%
USMCR	51.4	44.6	42.4	-4.9%	-17.5%	49.0	-4.7%
ANG	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0%	-100.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAFR	43.7	48.3	55.9	15.7%	27.9%	43.9	0.5%
TOTAL DoD	410.9	469.1	484.2	3.2%	17.8%	490.1	19.3%
USCGR	8.1	4.8	6.5	35.4%	-19.8%	6.0	-25.9%
TOTAL IRR/ING	419.0	473.9	490.7	3.5%	17.1%	496.1	18.4%
<b>TOTAL READY RESERVE</b>	<b>1348.1</b>	<b>1638.1</b>	<b>1661.2</b>	<b>1.4%</b>	<b>23.2%</b>	<b>1684.3</b>	<b>24.9%</b>
<b>ACTIVE COMPONENT<sup>4</sup></b>							
Army	781.0	780.8	771.8	-1.2%	-1.2%	771.8	-1.2%
Navy	540.2	586.8	592.6	1.0%	9.7%	593.2	9.8%
Marine Corps	190.6	199.5	197.4	-1.1%	3.6%	197.2	3.5%
Air Force	570.3	607.0	576.4	-5.0%	1.1%	571.0	0.1%
TOTAL DoD	2082.1	2174.1	2138.2	-1.7%	2.7%	2133.2	2.5%
Coast Guard	39.8	38.6	37.8	-2.1%	-5.0%	38.0	-4.5%
TOTAL AC Personnel	2121.9	2212.7	2176.0	-1.7%	2.5%	2171.2	2.3%
<b>TOTAL READY RESERVE &amp; ACTIVE COMPONENT</b>	<b>3470.0</b>	<b>3850.8</b>	<b>3837.2</b>	<b>-0.4%</b>	<b>10.6%</b>	<b>3855.5</b>	<b>11.1%</b>
<b>STANDBY RESERVE</b>							
ARNG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAR	5.0	0.4	0.4	0.0%	-92.0%	0.3	-94.0%
USNR	20.0	11.2	10.8	-3.6%	-46.0%	12.0	-40.0%
USMCR	1.8	1.4	1.5	7.1%	-16.7%	1.4	-22.2%
ANG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAFR	37.1	24.5	21.8	-11.0%	-41.2%	28.3	-23.7%
TOTAL DoD	64.0	37.5	34.5	-8.0%	-46.1%	42.0	-34.4%
USCGR	0.9	0.4	0.5	25.0%	-44.4%	0.6	-33.3%
TOTAL STANDBY RESERVE	64.9	37.9	35.0	-7.7%	-46.1%	42.6	-34.4%

**Table 9 (Cont'd)**  
**PERSONNEL STRENGTH**  
**(In Thousands)**

	<u>FY 81<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>FY 87<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>FY 88<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>Percent Change FY 87-88</u>	<u>Percent Change FY 81-88</u>
<b>RETIRED<sup>5</sup></b>					
20 Years Reserve Component Service (Non-Disabled)					
(10 USC 672(a))					
Army	97.5	110.2	114.0	3.4%	16.9%
Navy	50.3	52.0	114.5	120.2%	127.6%
Marine Corps	5.8	6.6	6.7	1.5%	15.5%
Air Force	69.0	60.0	62.0	3.3%	-10.1%
TOTAL DoD	222.6	228.8	297.2	29.9%	33.5%
Coast Guard	1.6	2.3	2.5	8.7%	56.2%
TOTAL RC (Non-Dis)	224.2	231.1	299.7	29.7%	33.7%
20 Years Active Service (Non-Disabled)					
(10 USC 688(a))					
Army	320.4	348.0	353.0	1.4%	10.2%
Navy	286.6	315.7	310.4	-1.7%	8.3%
Marine Corps	51.8	56.2	57.1	1.6%	10.2%
Air Force	402.2	449.5	458.8	2.1%	14.1%
TOTAL DoD	1061.0	1169.4	1179.3	0.8%	11.1%
Coast Guard	14.9	23.7	24.2	2.1%	62.4%
TOTAL Active (Non-Dis)	1075.9	1193.1	1203.5	0.9%	11.9%
Reserve & Active Components (Disabled)					
Army	104.9	108.4	105.1	-3.0%	0.2%
Navy	43.1	44.4	45.1	1.6%	4.6%
Marine Corps	26.7	26.6	26.6	0.0%	-0.4%
Air Force	60.1	55.3	54.6	-1.3%	-9.2%
TOTAL DoD	234.8	234.7	231.4	-1.4%	-1.4%
Coast Guard	3.8	3.7	3.8	2.7%	0.0%
TOTAL RC & AC (Dis)	238.6	238.4	235.2	-1.3%	-1.4%
<b>TOTAL RETIRED</b>	<b>1538.7</b>	<b>1662.6</b>	<b>1738.4</b>	<b>4.6%</b>	<b>13.0%</b>
<b>MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL</b>					
(Active Component, Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired)					
Army	2146.2	2411.1	2414.2	0.1%	12.5%
Navy	1137.8	1236.6	1306.9	5.7%	14.9%
Marine Corps	365.4	377.2	375.3	-0.5%	2.7%
Air Force	1343.1	1439.6	1426.8	-0.9%	6.2%
TOTAL DoD	4992.5	5464.5	5523.2	1.1%	10.6%
Coast Guard	81.0	86.8	87.4	0.7%	7.9%
<b>TOTAL MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL</b>	<b>5073.5</b>	<b>5551.3</b>	<b>5610.6</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>10.6%</b>

Notes: 1. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

2. FY 1981-1989 data submitted by the services and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, (OASD(RA)). Reserve component end-strength includes personnel in the training pipeline (nondeployable) and Individual Mobilization Augmentees who apply against active component wartime requirements.

3. FY 1988 wartime requirement from FY 1990-1994 Program Objective Memorandum.

4. Active component data from OASD (Comptroller).

5. DoD Directive 1352.1 dated February 27, 1984.

Data as of September 30, 1988.






## Personnel for Mobilization

Table 9 also indicates sources of personnel available for mobilization according to personnel data bank information and by Department of Defense Directive. Table 10 provides percentages of personnel, by category, who are available for mobilization. Current data is compared with FY 1981 information.

There is no assurance that each person in the mobilization pool will be physically fit for duty. However, as discussed later in this chapter, the screening of the Individual Ready Reserve is providing the services with substantial information on that segment of the mobilization pool.

**Table 10**  
**TOTAL MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL**



Data as of September 30, 1988.

### Overall Personnel Shortages

All of the reserve components are experiencing shortages of 10 percent or greater in certain officer and enlisted skills. In some cases, the difference between the authorized strengths and the wartime requirements for personnel, by skill, is equal to or greater than this 10 percent shortage. Although none of the components have stated that these vacancies are "war stoppers", the Board is concerned that, upon mobilization, the war fighting capability of many units would be severely reduced. Examples of personnel shortages, by component, are provided in the next section on critical skill shortages.

As a result of FY 1988 budget reductions, funding for Army National Guard and Army Reserve troop program unit officer strength was held to FY 1987 levels. This occurred at the same time as Congressionally mandated medical recruiting initiatives were being implemented to reduce the shortages of physicians and nurses in the reserve components. Some former active component missions were also being transferred to the reserve components and there was no funding to fill these positions. As a result, most officer assignments to Army Reserve units (except medical) were curtailed during the last half of FY 1988. This caused an adverse impact on unit readiness since only 90 percent of authorized reserve component officer positions were budgeted.

The Army National Guard lists 23 officer and 189 enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) that are more than 10 percent short of required strength. Reasons for these shortages include changing force structure,

geographical strength imbalances, and a lack of technically qualified officers. This adversely impacts readiness. Several innovative programs are being explored to attract soldiers, leaving active duty, into the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Force structure realignments and targeted recruiting should help balance MOS requirements. Most recruiting goals in the Army National Guard are targeted at authorized strength vice wartime strength.

The Army Reserve lists 29 officer, 39 warrant officer, and 53 enlisted MOS's that are more than 10 percent short of wartime strength. The Army Reserve does not program all units at wartime strength. Even though there are some skills that are filled at less than 90 percent of wartime requirements, most Army Reserve units would still be able to perform their wartime mission through cross-leveling and redistribution of total Army manpower and equipment. This includes filling vacancies from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Other initiatives are being implemented at Department of the Army, the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, and at Forces Command to eliminate personnel shortages.





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While some of the specialty shortages are common to both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, many are not. Closer coordination between these two components and elimination of barriers to transfer, such as the requirement to reenlist or be reappointed rather than simple transfer, could help reduce critical personnel shortages, ease enlisted promotion blockages, and reflect more fully the total Army policy.

The Naval Reserve lists 15 officer and 30 enlisted career fields that are more than 10 percent short of wartime strength. For officers, the percentage of fill runs from a high of 84.4 in one field to a low of 8.3 in another. Of the 15 officer fields, nine have less than 200 and two have less than 50 authorized personnel. In warrant officer (WO) and limited duty officer (LDO) programs there will be an increase in promotion selection levels over the next three to five years to fill the shortages and avoid promotion stagnation. In a few WO and LDO programs, only fully qualified prior service personnel may fill these positions.

The percentage of fill for Naval Reserve enlisted personnel fields, ranges from a high of 90 to a low of 23, with most in the 70s and 80s. Reasons for some Naval Reserve enlisted shortages include lack of advancement opportunity, shortage of available school quotas, high overtime wage competition from the civilian sector, no comparable civilian occupation, and inadequate numbers of trained personnel released from the active component. Shortages in non-technical ratings do not significantly impact readiness. Many of these billets are authorized to be filled by personnel with other ratings. Steps being taken to solve the personnel shortage problem include bonus programs, increased school spaces, and increased advancement opportunities in some fields.

The Marine Corps Reserve identifies eight officer, five warrant officer, and 18 enlisted skill areas that are short more than 10 percent of wartime strength. To resolve the shortages, enlisted specialties are being filled through targeted recruiting for both



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prior and nonprior service enlisted personnel. Officer skill shortages are generally resolved through prior service recruiting.

The Air National Guard shows eight officer and 15 enlisted career fields that are more than 10 percent short of wartime strength. This can be attributed to organizational changes and conversions, retirements, eligibility requirements, long technical schools, and recruiting competition. Specialties not previously eligible for incentive bonuses will be added as appropriate. The Air National Guard intends to be more aggressive in officer recruiting and retention.

The Air Force Reserve lists 15 officer and 19 enlisted career fields that are more than 10 percent short of wartime strength. Many of these can be attributed to the same reasons as the Air National Guard. The shortages are not in flying units but are primarily in combat support units such as medical service and civil engineering units. There are shortages in certain geographical areas that affect some units to a greater extent than others. Many of these skill shortages also occur in private industry. Targeted recruiting, bonuses, and the Montgomery GI Bill are being used to help overcome shortages.

Six officer and 10 enlisted career fields have critical shortages in the Coast Guard Reserve. Many of the skills are also inadequately manned within the active component. Intensified recruiting and training efforts are helping to resolve these shortages.

Lack of appropriations severely restricts overall manning of the Coast



Guard Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve requirement is 27,000 personnel, however, it is only funded for 12,100. In FY 1987, the Coast Guard had the resources to meet only 48 percent of its personnel goals. This percentage fell to 44 percent in FY 1988. The Secretary of Transportation has prepared, at the request of Congress, a 10-year plan outlining resources necessary to meet the Coast Guard's wartime mobilization manpower requirements. The Board recommends that Congress authorize and fund significant annual increases for the Coast Guard Reserve in order to eliminate the 15,400 member shortage in mobilization strength and fund the full-time support force required by the Coast Guard Reserve.

The Medical Chapter addresses shortages of health care personnel and describes programs to increase medical personnel recruiting.

### **Critical Skill Vacancies**

Critical skill vacancies vary from one component to another. Managers are reviewing options to overcome the causes for these personnel shortages. Incentives such as the Montgomery GI Bill and enlistment/reenlistment bonuses will help. Some reasons given by the components for the shortages are:



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- high aptitude score requirements for entry into certain career fields.
- foreign language requirements.
- lengthy school requirements.
- lack of promotion opportunities.
- unglamorous occupation and, therefore, competition with more attractive skill areas.
- insufficient school quotas for reserve component personnel.
- security clearance requirements.
- unit not located near good recruiting markets.
- losses to the active component after training.
- heavy workload—low reward.
- no civilian equivalent—skills usable only in military.
- low number of accessions from the active components.
- civilian job conflicts with drill periods.
- force structure changes.

Except for health care specialty shortages which are discussed in the medical chapter, Table 11 shows the most critical skill vacancies as determined by each component.

**Table 11**  
**CRITICAL SKILL VACANCIES**

Army National Guard	Interrogator, Electronic Warfare (EW)/Signal Intelligence Voice Intercept, EW/Signal Analyst.
Army Reserve	EW/Signal Intelligence Voice Intercept, Chemical Operations Specialist, Watercraft Operator.
Naval Reserve	Intelligence Officers, P-3 Flight Engineers, P-3 In-flight Avionics Maintenance Technician, Anti-Submarine Warfare Acoustic System Operator.
Marine Corps Reserve	Marine Aerial Navigator, Airborne Radio Operator/Loadmaster, Interrogation-Translation Specialist, Imagery Interpretation Specialist.
Air National Guard	Aircraft Armament System Technician, Munitions System Technician, Jet Engine Mechanic Technician, Aircraft Systems Maintenance Technician.
Air Force Reserve	Structural Pavement Specialist, Aircraft Fuel Systems Technician, Construction Equipment Technicians.
Coast Guard Reserve	Fire Control Technician, Radarman, Gunner's Mate.

## Individual Skill Qualifications

The services use different terminology when referring to individual skill qualification and occupational specialties. The Army and Marine Corps refer to them as Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The Navy groups its personnel into warfare and occupational fields called officer designators and enlisted ratings. When more specific individual skill qualifications must be identified with a designator or rating, Naval Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) and Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes are used. NOBC and NEC codes are not equivalent to MOS's. The Air Force identifies jobs under the Air Force Specialty Code. The Coast Guard uses the same type of enlisted rating system as the Navy. Coast Guard officer skills are identified by experience indicator codes. For purposes of this report the term MOS will encompass all of these.

Every effort should be made by recruiters and commanders to place individuals in an authorized position commensurate with their rank and skill level. However, this may not always be possible in the reserve components for a variety of reasons. These include:

- no reserve unit with the appropriate MOS in the immediate locale.
- individual does not desire to continue in former MOS or component and is recruited into a different MOS or component.
- reorganization of units or changing of mission or equipment can cause some members to be excess.
- availability of reserve component members to attend schools.

- availability and flexibility of formal service schools.
- increased promotion opportunities.
- personnel turnover.

Many people in these cases must retrain into another MOS. The result may reflect a decrease in unit readiness because the person does not possess all of the skills needed to do that particular job at that point in time. That person must become qualified for unit readiness to increase.

Other reasons given for reserve component personnel not being MOS qualified are that personnel are in training, awaiting training, or have not completed split training options. Completion of training will result in MOS qualification.

Initiatives to increase MOS qualification in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve include creating more courses tailored for Army Reserve Forces Schools; using regional training sites to provide MOS/sustainment training; studying the possibility of using skill qualification testing during inactive duty training to determine how much training is needed; and co-locating Army Reserve Forces Schools, conducting their annual training, with other Army Reserve units requiring MOS instruction.

To reduce the number of skill mismatches, the Marine Corps Reserve instituted a policy, in FY 1988, requiring a higher percentage of MOS matches among prior service recruits, and mandatory retraining (or discharge), within a specified period of time, for those individuals recruited without the proper MOS.



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The Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve do not consider their numbers of skill mismatches as significant.

Coast Guard Reservists may be qualified for an assigned mobilization billet, regardless of the rating possessed, if they possess the required skill qualification codes. Therefore, the number and percentages may not be a true reflection of their actual readiness posture.

Table 12 shows the number of personnel, by component, not MOS qualified or not working in their primary MOS. Others, particularly those recruited from the active components, may not be recruited to fill a vacancy in their MOS and, therefore, need retraining. Some of the services do not track this data. The percentage of personnel not recruited into their MOS may be more than 20 percent in some of the components.

**Table 12**  
**INDIVIDUAL SKILL (MOS) QUALIFICATION**  
**IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS**  
**FY 1988**

	Personnel Not Qualified In MOS		Personnel Not Working In MOS	
	Number	Percent <sup>1</sup>	Number	Percent <sup>1</sup>
Army National Guard	30743	6.8	64436	14.2
Army Reserve	19127	6.1	50307	16.1
Naval Reserve	6683	4.5	2065	1.4 <sup>2</sup>
Marine Corps Reserve	2647	6.1 <sup>3</sup>	6160	14.1 <sup>3</sup>
Air National Guard	3230	2.8	9581	8.3
Air Force Reserve	477	0.6	70	0.1
Coast Guard Reserve	543	4.5	3560	29.4

Notes: 1. Percent of Selected Reserve.

2. Reservists are considered not to be working in a designator/rating if they are qualified but are training for a change of designator/rating status.

3. Percentages based on number of individuals in Selected Marine Corps Reserve, not including FTS/AGR who have completed at least the first increment of Initial Active Duty for Training.

Sources: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

### Full-Time Support

The Full-Time Support (FTS) program is vitally important to the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve. For some units, the lack of sufficient FTS is an impediment to increasing unit readiness. FTS personnel assist in recruiting and retention, managing, and training reserve component members. More personnel, and in some cases higher ranks, are needed in the FTS program as new organizations, missions, and structure are added to the reserve components. Unfortunately, the required growth has not been adequately supported by the services, the Department of Defense, or Congress. The Board urges such support.

The Board supports the FTS program and reaffirms its 1987 recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and Congress:

As the reserve components continue to assume ever-increasing missions and responsibilities and are required to sustain an unprecedented level of readiness for early deployment, the requirement for adequate levels of full-time support becomes critically important.

Growth in the FTS program is essential in order for the reserve components to meet their increased responsibilities and readiness as part of the Total Force strategy. Not only is growth required to support new units being activated within the reserve components, but it is also required for existing units.

The full-time support force of each reserve component is made up of differing combinations of military

technicians, reserve component members on active duty (AGR), active component members, and civilian employees. The Congress has supported these forces as a reflection of the individual mission requirements of each service and the unique operating environments in which each operate. The Reserve Forces Policy Board commends this policy and endorses the concept that each service be allowed to determine the appropriate mix of their full-time support force.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board also opposes any proposal that would mandate the replacement of AGR personnel with those from the active component or reduce the current compensation or benefits provided to AGR members. The AGR force is a dedicated, professional force which makes a vital contribution to overall reserve component readiness by assisting drilling reserve component members to achieve and maintain their readiness requirements.

The categories of FTS personnel are briefly described below. Complete definitions are in Department of Defense Directive 1205.18.



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- **Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Personnel:** National Guard or Reserve members on active duty for 180 days or more who provide full-time support to the reserve components and are paid from the Reserve Personnel Appropriations of the military departments concerned. This classification includes Naval Reserve Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) personnel and statutory tour personnel.
- **Military Technicians (MT):** Civilian personnel who occupy technician positions. They are required to be members of the Selected Reserve in the component which they support and simultaneously maintain civil service status.
- **Active Component (AC) Personnel:** Military personnel on active duty who directly support the reserve components. They are paid from

active component appropriations.

This classification includes all Coast Guard military personnel assigned to full-time support billets.

- **Civil Service (CS) Personnel:** Federal (Title 5) and state civil service personnel (Title 32), other than military technicians, who provide full-time support to the reserve components but do not occupy technician positions. They are not required to be members of the Selected Reserve.

The numbers vary in each category for each component. Differences are based on many service-unique factors which have been carefully analyzed to provide the best program to support readiness.

Table 13 provides a breakout, by reserve component and by category, of full-time support personnel.



**Table 13**  
**FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL**  
**FY 1988**

	Army		Naval	Marine	Air Force		DOD	Coast	
	Guard	Reserve	Reserve	Corps	Guard	Reserve	Total	Guard	Total
				Reserve				Reserve	
AGR/TAR <sup>1</sup>									
Required	35069	26288	22505	2133	Note 2	669	86664	0	86664
Requested	25725	14250	22505	2015	7906	669	73070	0	73070
Authorized	25725	13329	21991	1945	7709	669	71368	0	71368
Actual	25659	13341	21766	1945	7709	626	63337	0	63337
Military Technician									
Required	34843	9881	0	0	34048	9994	88766	0	88766
Requested	28120	8429	0	0	23252	9994	69795	0	69795
Authorized	28120	8429	0	0	23615	9994	70158	0	70158
Actual	28385	8004	0	0	23409	9111	68909	0	68909
Active Component									
Required	90	1299	7222	5066	625	631	14933	850	15783
Requested	90	1299	7222	5066	625	631	14933	599	15532
Authorized	90	1299	7222	5066	625	631	14933	599	15532
Actual	90	1299	7748	5322	625	548	15632	604	16236
Civil Service									
Required	406	5517	3214	352	1957	4495	15941	150	16091
Requested	406	5517	3214	352	1957	4495	15941	112	16053
Authorized	406	5517	3214	352	1957	4495	15941	112	16053
Actual	402	5928	2940	338	1874	5083	16565	106	16671
Total Full-Time Support (FTS)									
Required	70408	42985	32941	7551	36630	15789	206304	1000	207304
Requested	54341	29495	32941	7433	33740	15789	173739	711	174450
Authorized	54341	28574	32427	7363	33906	15789	172400	711	173111
Actual	54536	28572	32454	7605	33617	15368	172152	710	172862

Notes: 1. Includes AGR in Army and Air Force, TAR in the Naval Reserve, and military FTS in the Marine Corps Reserve.

2. Air Guard AGR and MT are combined since positions can be filled by either status personnel.

Sources: Individual reserve components and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Data as of September 30, 1988.

### Growth of the Selected Reserve

Since 1984, the Selected Reserve has experienced substantial growth both in numbers of personnel and in numbers of units. Table 14 compares the growth

of the Selected Reserve with the growth in the FTS program and shows ratios between the two. As noted earlier, the FTS program has not grown to required levels.



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**Table 14**  
**GROWTH OF FULL-TIME SUPPORT AND THE SELECTED RESERVE**  
**(in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>% Change FY81-FY88</u>
Army National Guard						
Full-Time Support	31.2	34.4	47.9	54.2	54.5	74.7%
Selected Reserve	389.0	344.3	440.0	451.9	455.2	17.0%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:12.5	1:10.0	1:9.2	1:8.3	1:8.4	
Army Reserve						
Full-Time Support	9.0	10.9	26.4	25.4	28.6	217.8%
Selected Reserve	232.0	217.0	292.1	313.6	312.8	34.8%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:25.8	1:19.9	1:11.1	1:12.3	1:10.9	
Naval Reserve						
Full-Time Support	N/A	21.6	25.3	31.3	32.5	50.5% <sup>1</sup>
Selected Reserve	98.0	109.1	129.8	148.1	149.5	52.6%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	—	1:5.1	1:5.1	1:4.7	1:4.6	
Marine Corps Reserve						
Full-Time Support	5.3	5.7	6.5	7.4	7.7	45.3%
Selected Reserve	37.3	37.2	41.6	42.3	43.6	16.9%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:7.0	1:6.5	1:6.4	1:5.7	1:5.7	
Air National Guard						
Full-Time Support	24.1	25.7	31.7	33.9	33.6	39.4%
Selected Reserve	98.3	102.2	109.4	114.6	115.2	17.2%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:4.1	1:4.0	1:3.5	1:3.4	1:3.4	
Air Force Reserve						
Full-Time Support	6.8	8.0	14.1	14.8	15.4	126.5%
Selected Reserve	62.3	46.4	75.2	80.4	82.1	31.8%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:9.2	1:5.8	1:5.3	1:5.4	1:5.3	
DoD Total						
Full-Time Support	76.4	106.3	151.9	167.0	172.3	125.5%
Selected Reserve	916.9	856.2	1088.1	1150.9	1158.4	26.3%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:12.0	1:8.7	1:7.2	1:6.9	1:6.7	
Coast Guard Reserve						
Full-Time Support	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	- 12.5%
Selected Reserve	11.9	12.0	12.6	13.3	12.1	1.7%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:14.9	1:17.1	1:18.0	1:19.0	1:17.3	
Total						
Full-Time Support	77.2	107.0	152.6	167.7	173.0	124.1%
Selected Reserve	928.8	868.2	1100.7	1164.2	1170.5	26.0%
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:12.0	1:8.8	1:7.3	1:6.9	1:6.8	

Note: 1. Naval Reserve Full-Time Support compared to 1983 data.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

### Incentive Programs

Incentive programs for the Selected Reserve are a major factor in attracting better qualified and motivated personnel to fill reserve component manpower requirements. Incentives help to fill critical MOS shortages and other hard to fill positions. Two major types of incentive programs are listed below. Incentives for reserve component members in the medical professions are discussed in the Medical Chapter.

- **Montgomery GI Bill.** Offers up to \$140 per month to members of the Selected Reserve, who do not have a college degree, to attend college.
- **Bonus Program.** Offers a cash bonus to eligible persons who agree to enlist or reenlist in the Selected Reserve, or affiliate in the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program or the Individual Ready Reserve. There are a variety of bonus programs for the National Guard and Reserve.

Each of the components also offers other incentives tailored to their particular needs. Without these incentives, the components could not achieve recruiting and retention goals. The Coast Guard Reserve offers only the Montgomery GI Bill.

The Montgomery GI Bill is a major program supporting reserve component recruiting and retention. For the National Guard and Reserve, it is a non-contributory, general entitlement program. Reserve component personnel become eligible for education benefits after obtaining a high school diploma, or its equivalent, and completing initial active duty for training. They are also

required to enlist or agree to serve in the Selected Reserve for six years. Participants who remain members of the Selected Reserve have up to 10 years after becoming eligible for the assistance to use the full entitlement.

Montgomery GI Bill benefits are payable for up to 36 months of education at the rate of \$140, \$105, \$70, and \$35 per month for full-time, three-quarter-time, half-time, and less than half-time study respectively. The maximum benefits that can be paid are \$5,040. Funded study must be at an approved institution of higher learning and is basically for a baccalaureate degree. The Board supports amending the law to provide benefits for reserve component members attending trade or vocational schools.

Participation in the Montgomery GI Bill has shown steady growth since its inception in July 1985. The six-year commitment required of Montgomery GI Bill participants provides for personnel stability which enhances mobilization readiness.






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Table 15 compares the number of reserve component personnel eligible and the number who have applied for entitlements under the Montgomery GI

Bill. Approximately 29 percent of the 3100 eligible in the Coast Guard Reserve applied to use the entitlements.

**Table 15**  
**DOD MONTGOMERY GI BILL USAGE**  
**FY 1988**



Note: 1. Applicants as percentage of eligibles. Eligibles include all of those currently eligible to participate in the program rather than just those who became eligible in FY 1988.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1988.

## Recruiters

Each of the components has a recruiting force to support their Selected Reserve program. Table 16 provides information on the numbers of personnel authorized and assigned to recruiting programs, their annual average accessions, and the approximate recruiting cost per accession. These costs generally include all Operations and Maintenance funding (travel, communications, office space, civilian salaries), military salaries, and advertising costs.

The Marine Corps active component recruiting force must recruit

approximately 8,200 nonprior service personnel for the Reserve each fiscal year.

The Coast Guard's active and reserve component recruiting programs and resources are integrated. The Reserve Training Program funds approximately 20 percent of the Coast Guard's recruiting force.

As with incentive programs, the recruiting forces play a vital role in providing high quality, motivated personnel to their respective components.

**Table 16**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT RECRUITERS**  
**AND ANNUAL AVERAGE ACCESSIONS**  
**FY 1988**

	Recruiters Authorized	Recruiters <sup>1</sup> Assigned	Annual Average Accessions <sup>2</sup>	\$ Cost per Accession
Army National Guard	2445	3718 (2444)	30.9	\$2,488
Army Reserve	1970	1901 (1733)	40.0	\$2,290
Naval Reserve	1700	1558 (1083)	32.7	\$1,889
Marine Corps Reserve	229	229 (109)	42.0	\$1,538
Air National Guard	419	405 (355)	27.6	\$1,779
Air Force Reserve	321	322 (259)	57.1	\$1,336
Total DoD	7084	8133 (5391)	38.4	\$1,887
Coast Guard Reserve	53	53 (44)	31.6	\$1,400
Total	7137	8186 (5435)	37.4	\$1,817

Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate production recruiters. Others are in support.


2. Production recruiters only.

Source: Individual reserve components.


Data as of September 30, 1988.



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Table 17 shows the numbers of accessions into the reserve components during FY 1988. Only the Marine Corps Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve met their enlistment objectives for FY 1988. Overall, the reserve components met 94.2 percent of their goal for enlisted personnel.

**Table 17**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL ACCESSIONS**  
**FY 1988**

	Officer		Enlisted		Enlisted Objective	Enlisted Accessions	Total Accessions
	Prior Service	Non-Prior Service	Prior Service	Non-Prior Service			
Army National Guard	6100	179	38201	37406	81600	75607	81886
Army Reserve	9479	262	45740	30249	77600	75989	85730
Naval Reserve	7497	0	22303	7807	34200	30110	37607
Marine Corps Reserve	977	0	4338	8402	12500	12740	13717
Air National Guard	1098	78	7400	3832	12700	11232	12408
Air Force Reserve	1576	179	10391	2898	13900	13289	15044
Total	26727	698	128373	90594	232500	218967	246392
Total DoD		27425		218697	232500	218967	246392
Coast Guard Reserve	74	0	490	826	1300	1316	1390
Total RC		27499		220283	233800	220283	247782

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

### Reenlistment and Retention

People, particularly trained people, are the reserve components' most important asset. Excessive attrition of reserve component personnel is a serious problem. The loss of experienced personnel reduces unit readiness. Replacement training is time consuming and costly. Therefore, retention of personnel must receive continuous command attention at all levels. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has

convened a task force to address attrition problems and will develop appropriate policies and guidance to help reduce attrition levels.

The reenlistment goals and rates for the reserve components are shown in Table 18. For those with goals, the table shows that four of the components met first term retention goals and four met career retention goals. Goals are based on missions assigned. There is no requirement for all components to have equal objectives.

**Table 18**  
**ENLISTED PERSONNEL REENLISTMENT RATES**  
**(In percent)**

Component	Actual FY 87		Goal FY 88		Actual FY 88	
	FT	CAR	FT	CAR	FT	CAR
Army National Guard	80	68	80	70	76	70
Army Reserve	65	83	60	80	60	78
Naval Reserve <sup>1</sup>	81	89			80	89
Marine Corps Reserve	75	74	77	75	78	74
Air National Guard	82	96	90	90	88	92
Air Force Reserve	81	88	80	85	87	92
Coast Guard Reserve	78	87	79	88	80	88


FT = First Term

CAR = Career Personnel

Note: 1. The Naval Reserve does not establish percentage goals but attempts to retain enough qualified personnel to achieve an overall personnel status to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which a unit is organized or designed.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.







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Personnel turnover in the reserve components has many reasons. Some losses from a particular component may not be losses to the total force because of transfers from one reserve component to another, or to an active component. Other personnel resign, reach retirement, voluntarily transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve, or complete their obligated term of service.

Among the reasons for unprogrammed personnel losses are unfulfilled expectations, lack of meaningful training, family conflicts, pay problems, school conflict, and job conflict. Effective leadership can eliminate some of these reasons.

Commanders are responsible for the effectiveness of their unit's attrition management and retention programs. Supervisors should assist the commander by insuring that each person is made to feel like a key part of the unit, remains challenged, receives appropriate training, and contributes to the unit mission.

### **Palace Chase Program**

The Palace Chase Program is a strength management program that has proven successful for the Air Force.

This program provides a means for personnel to leave the active component by serving additional time in the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve. Certain critical skills are exempted from this program. The following requirements apply.

- Line officers who have completed at least two-thirds of their total active duty service commitment are eligible for the program. Enlisted personnel must have completed at least 18 months in service and must be at least to a specialist level in their assigned skill.
- Applicants must be assigned to the United States, Guam, or the Virgin Islands and be in a position that can be vacated early without reducing mission capability.
- An enlisted member requesting release from active duty must agree to serve in the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve for twice the amount of time remaining on their active duty commitment. Officers must agree to serve triple the time remaining on their active duty commitment.
- The contractual obligation incurred by early release from active duty is strictly enforced. Failure to comply with the participation and performance requirements of National Guard or Reserve membership can result in demotion and return to extended active duty for the period of the waived active duty service.

Palace Chase assists the Air Force in selectively reducing strength by specialty code and grade, and provides

a cost-effective source of trained personnel for the reserve components. This is an excellent program with proven results. It is worthy of serious consideration by the other components.

The Board recommends that the other services study the Air Force's Palace Chase Program for possible application to their reserve components to enhance personnel strength.

### **Individual Mobilization Augmentees**

Individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) are trained individuals who will augment, upon mobilization, various active component organizations, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. As a member of the Selected Reserve, an IMA is subject to

involuntary call to active duty by the President under 10 USC 673b. The National Guard does not have IMAs.

IMAs are trained during peacetime to do their wartime jobs. The IMA program has a direct, positive impact on mobilization preparedness. Most IMAs are eligible for additional professional development and education opportunities to include attendance at intermediate and senior service schools. There may be qualified personnel in the IRR who would be willing to serve in their specialty if made aware of IMA opportunities. Such opportunities should be widely advertised. The Board has recommended, and continues to recommend, that IMA authorizations be expanded and that Congress provide increased funding as required.

Table 19 shows the numbers of IMAs in each service at the end of FY 1988.



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**Table 19**  
**INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE POSITIONS**  
**FY 1988**

	FY 1988		Projected FY 1989	
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
<b>Army Reserve</b>				
Identified	13424	3860	13424	3860
Authorized	11304	3376	11297	3374
Funded	6320	1810	5925	1485
Filled	8816	3110	9000	2660
<b>Naval Reserve</b>				
Identified	628	44	612	44
Authorized	628	44	612	44
Funded	628	44	612	44
Filled	226	22	281	2910
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>				
Identified	1164	1473	1164	1473
Authorized	1164	1473	1164	1473
Funded	836	512	795	505
Filled	836	512	795	505
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>				
Identified	9899	9074	9512	8996
Authorized	9899	9074	9512	8996
Funded	7522	5178	7990	5240
Filled	7578	4898	7990	5240
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>				
Identified	22	0	43	0
Authorized	22	0	43	0
Funded	22	0	33	0
Filled	11	0	33	0

Source: Individual reserve components.


Data as of September 30, 1988.

In FY 1987, the Chief of the Air Force Reserve formed a task force to evaluate and develop recommendations to improve the IMA program. The task force determined that although the Air Force IMA program is making a significant contribution to the active Air Force, several recommendations were appropriate.

- The task force recommended establishing a special staff office at the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) to serve as a "focal point" for IMA management. This office would assist in developing policy, analyzing authorizations and funding, gathering data, and disseminating information on IMA programs.
- The task force also found that there is no central system to identify or use civilian skills of IMAs when making assignment decisions. Many IMAs possess unique and sometimes hard-to-find skills that could be used by the Air Force during emergencies or wartime. A civilian skills data bank is being developed at ARPC to help solve the problem. System design has been completed and is being tested.
- A major finding of the task force concerned mobilization notifications. IMAs are required to report for duty within 24 hours. Many would have to travel great distances by commercial air, without orders, at their own expense. Current directives require a notification using Western Union Mailgrams. The task force concluded that the Air Force would not be able to notify their IMAs through mailgrams, in the event of full mobilization, until the Army had finished their notifications.

The projected delay could be 10 days. To correct these deficiencies, the task force suggested that IMAs be given mobilization orders and travel vouchers that could be activated upon mobilization. Further, regulations should be changed to require phone notification on mobilization day. The use of mailgrams would be eliminated.


Following a review of the task force recommendation and findings, a special staff office was established in February 1988. The civilian skills bank test program for colonels and above has been completed and data is being gathered for the remaining IMAs. The proposed change from the use of mailgrams is being coordinated.



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The IMA Oversight Committee, comprised of active component members, is an Air Force IMA management tool. In FY 1988, while directly involved with the task force, this committee conducted an important review of Air Force joint mobilization augmentation IMA requirements and sourcing for the Joint Staff, unified commands, and other external agencies. The committee developed the Reserve Management Vacancy System to track IMA vacancies and distribute information on these to worldwide commands. It also has prepared a long range plan for the IMA program.

The Board commends the Air Force for its efforts to improve the IMA program. Other components should review the recommendation and findings of the task force for possible application to their IMA programs.

#### **ROTC Graduate Accessions**

The Army plans to assign approximately 3,300 (40 percent) of its annual Reserve Officer Training Corps

(ROTC) graduates directly to National Guard and Reserve units. When assigned, they should be fully prepared for Selected Reserve duty through their ROTC training and a resident 12-17 week basic officer course for their branch or specialty. A significant number of these graduates also have prior active duty enlisted service. Others transferring from the active component provide valuable experience to reserve component units.

The Naval Reserve does not accept ROTC graduates directly into the reserve. ROTC personnel commence active component duty before the end of the year in which they graduate. There are no plans to assign ROTC personnel directly into the Naval Reserve because of the need for all graduates in the active component.

The Air National Guard accepted AFROTC graduates directly into some positions. Lack of experience was not a detriment. A balance of nonprior and prior service accessions is desirable.

The Air Force Reserve was successful in placing 155 out of 301 graduates from 1987 who applied for assignment. As of August 1988, eight out of eight of the 1988 graduates were placed. There has been no appreciable impact on combat effectiveness.


#### **Screening of the Individual Ready Reserve**

The services continued the screening of the Individual Ready Reserve in FY 1988 with excellent results. The screening provides an opportunity to meet individual members, verify physical status, determine skills degradation, and update records. It also serves as a means to inform individual

reservists of their remaining military obligation and about the opportunities to participate in unit and IMA programs. The numbers interested in joining unit or IMA programs range from 40 percent (unit or IMA) to 11.8 percent (unit only) and 5.5 percent (IMA only).

Table 20 shows, by service, the IRR strength, the number ordered to screen, the number screened, and the percentage of the IRR screened in FY 1988. Cumulative screening in the Department of Defense was 30.8 percent.

**Table 20**  
**DOD INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE SCREENING**



Note: 1. Percent of IRR screened in FY 1988.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.


Data as of September 30, 1988.

NO-A210 764

RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 1988(CU)  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE  
 AFFAIRS/LOGISTICS) WASHINGTON DC RESERVE FORCES POLICY  
 BOARD 1988 F/G 15/1 ML

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The IRR screenings have demonstrated that IRR members are ready, willing, and able to serve should there be a need to mobilize. Over 95 percent of those screened met medical standards with the remainder possibly needing medical follow-up.

The Coast Guard Reserve is not resourced to conduct an annual muster of its IRR. It does conduct a random, biennial telephone survey. It also screens the entire IRR annually through a mailed questionnaire.

### **Incapacitation Pay**


On September 29, 1988, the President signed the Authorization Bill which included revised rules on incapacitation pay for reserve component members. Previously, reserve component personnel had to demonstrate a loss of civilian income in order to receive compensation (up to the amount of military pay and allowances) when injured, or otherwise incapacitated, while on military duty. This rule disenfranchised members who could not demonstrate a loss of civilian

income because they did not have any. Examples include students, housewives, and the marginally employed.

The new rule entitles a member who is physically disabled in the line of duty from injury, illness, or disease to receive military pay and allowances. Loss of civilian income need not be proven. The amount of incapacitation pay is reduced, however, if a member receives earned income from nonmilitary employment, including an income protection plan, vacation pay, or sick pay.

Additionally, a member who can perform a military but not the civilian job may still be compensated by demonstrating a loss of earned income from the civilian job. Under the new rules, eligibility to receive incapacitation pay will be tied to a member's ability to perform military duties. The maximum amount payable is equal to military pay and allowances.

The new rules will apply to injuries or illnesses occurring on military training on or after September 29, 1988.



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### Women in the Reserve Components


Since 1981, the number of women serving in the Selected Reserve has increased 75 percent. The number of women in the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard has grown 198 percent in the same period. Women now comprise 11.8 percent of the Selected Reserve and 13.5 percent of the Individual Ready Reserve. There is 10.4 percent in the active components.

Combat exclusion policies of the services define career fields to which women cannot be assigned. Other than those exclusions, women in the reserve components are assigned on an equitable basis with men who possess similar skills and qualifications.

In January 1988, the Secretary of the Navy redefined "combat mission" to allow women to serve on fleet oilers, ammunition ships, and combat stores ships. Women will start serving on these ships when new berthing configurations are completed. Several readiness region and reserve center command billets were also opened to women during the year.

The Marine Corps Reserve permits women to be assigned to any Selected Marine Corps Reserve unit that has a billet requirement for the individual's specialty. Women drilling with Reserve combat units will report to preidentified, noncombat units in the event of mobilization.

In FY 1988, over 6,000 billets were opened up to women in civil engineering and mobile aerial port squadrons within the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.



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It is the policy of the Commandant of the Coast Guard that all female service members be accorded the same career opportunities and responsibilities as male members, limited only by a unit's ability to provide separate berthing and hygiene facilities. Coast Guard cutters and patrol boats are considered combat units. Women are assigned to cutters. They routinely carry out a variety of afloat duties, including law enforcement and drug interdiction.

More than 24,000 positions have been opened to women in the services within the past year. Changes to assignment policies should provide greater opportunities and career challenges for women and enhance recruiting and retention in the active and reserve components.

Table 21 provides data on women officers and enlisted personnel in the Selected Reserve and the IRR for each of the reserve components for FY 1981 and FY 1988. Strength percentages in each of these categories is provided for comparative purposes. Differences between the reserve components may be due, in large part, to the nature of assigned missions and, therefore, positions which are open to women.



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**Table 21**  
**WOMEN IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS**

			<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>Percent of SELRES/IRR</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>Percent of SELRES/IRR</u>
Army National Guard	Officer	SELRES	1653	4.3%	3066	6.4%
		ING	26	3.6%	61	7.6%
	Enlisted	SELRES	17776	5.1%	23718	5.8%
		ING	630	6.4%	590	7.2%
Army Reserve	Officer	SELRES	4354	11.5%	10357	17.4%
		IRR	3025	6.0%	7554	16.2%
	Enlisted	SELRES	30548	16.3%	49440	19.5%
		IRR	11691	7.2%	33322	13.5%
Naval Reserve	Officer	SELRES	651	3.8%	2904	10.4%
		IRR	1558	8.1%	1651	10.4%
	Enlisted	SELRES	4718	6.7%	16770	13.8%
		IRR	1940	2.4%	9369	13.8%
Marine Corps Reserve	Officer	SELRES	51	2.0%	159	4.4%
		IRR	136	3.8%	207	4.8%
	Enlisted	SELRES	968	2.8%	1643	4.1%
		IRR	595	1.2%	2179	5.7%
Air National Guard	Officer	SELRES	619	5.0%	1194	8.6%
		ING	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Enlisted	SELRES	8325	9.7%	13079	12.9%
		ING	40	32.0%	0	0.0%
Air Force Reserve	Officer	SELRES	1282	9.8%	2967	17.9%
		IRR	1139	11.7%	2307	21.6%
	Enlisted	SELRES	7516	15.5%	12016	18.3%
		IRR	1127	3.2%	8229	18.2%
DoD Total	Officer	SELRES	8610	7.1%	20647	12.2%
		IRR/ING	5884	7.0%	11780	15.0%
	Enlisted	SELRES	69851	9.0%	116666	11.8%
		IRR/ING	16023	4.8%	53689	13.2%
Coast Guard Reserve	Officer	SELRES	42	2.8%	96	6.2%
		IRR	22	1.7%	32	5.0%
	Enlisted	SELRES	796	7.7%	1252	11.5%
		IRR	241	3.5%	632	10.8%
Reserve Components Total	Officer	SELRES	8652	7.1%	20743	12.1%
		IRR/ING	5906	7.0%	11812	15.0%
	Enlisted	SELRES	70647	9.0%	117918	11.8%
		IRR/ING	16264	4.8%	54321	13.2%
Total Women	SELRES		79299	8.7%	138661	11.8%
	IRR/ING		22170	5.2%	66133	13.5%
	TOTAL		101469	7.6%	204794	12.3%

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

### **Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)**

The Board is required by 10 USC 113(c)(3) to review Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) policies pertaining to appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the reserve components. The passage of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1981 for active component personnel, is being followed by a Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) for the reserve components. The proposed ROPMA legislative package (DoD 100-25), submitted to Congress by the Department of Defense General Counsel on May 8, 1987, is a replacement for ROPA.

Among other things, ROPMA would:

- provide common statutes for all reserve components regarding appointment, promotion, separation, and retirement of reserve component officers.

- establish a visible, uniform, and improved officer personnel management system for reserve component officers not on the active duty list.
- provide the flexibility to be responsive to changing officer requirements
- provide a balance between management objectives and equitable treatment of individual career expectations, including an attractive career progression for reserve component officers.

In January 1988, Congressman G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery introduced H. R. 3856, the proposed ROPMA legislation. It was referred to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House of Representatives. The first hearing on the proposed legislation was held on September 15, 1988. At that time, Subcommittee Chairwoman, the Honorable Beverly B. Byron stated:



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...Over the last decade... we have seen far greater integration of active and reserve fighting forces with more resources being committed to the Guard and Reserve because of their expanded role in our national defense. During that time, this subcommittee has been the prime mover in giving increased missions to the Guard and Reserve.

Along with the expanded mission of the reserve components comes expanded responsibility and the management discipline needed to bring about effective policy. Because of the very unique demands we make on our reservists, personnel management has developed in unique ways. . . .

Clearly, people are the most important ingredient of reserve force management. Our people resource must be managed wisely. It must be recruited, maintained, trained. Finally, it must be instantly available for integration with the active force. We can no longer afford artificial barriers which inhibit the employment of reserves. We have, during the last few

years, overcome many of these barriers in force structure, and now we must turn this same attention to the personnel structure.

Our objective with ROPMA is to draft comprehensive legislation to do the following:

- ensure that personnel management supports readiness.
- ensure that policies are cost effective.
- bring about fair and equitable policies for our people that will attract, keep, train, and promote the best of our reservists.
- streamline reserve personnel management policies and, where possible, reduce both interservice and active/reserve component differences. . . .

The Board recommends that the ROPMA legislation (H. R. 3856) be expeditiously considered by the Congress and passed as submitted.

### **General and Flag Officer Accountability**

Certain general and flag officer active duty positions were created by Congress in order to permit self-administration by the reserve components. At present, these positions are counted against active component grade ceilings. National Guard and Reserve officers below general and flag rank are not counted against active component ceilings under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).



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Since 1982 the Board has recommended that legislation be passed to exclude positions, which may be filled by National Guard/Reserve general or flag officers on active duty, from active component grade ceiling accountability. The Board reaffirms this position.

### **National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve**

The Veterans' Reemployment Rights (VRR) Law (Public Law 93-508, December 3, 1974, as amended by Public Law 94-286, May 14, 1976), gives reserve component members the right to take time off from their civilian jobs to participate in military training. This legislation, and the activities of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) concerning this law, are important to all reserve component members. NCESGR states:

The Veterans' Reemployment Rights Statute (Chapter 43 of Part III, 38 United States Code) requires that other than temporary employees be excused from their civilian jobs to perform active or inactive military duty, whether voluntary or involuntary, and reinstated upon return from such duty to the same position or one of like pay, status, and seniority. The law sets no limit on the frequency and duration of reserve training. Also, employee-reservists may not be denied retention in employment, promotion, or any incident or advantage of employment because of military obligations.



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Since July 1987, a VRR Interagency Task Force, formed at the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Veterans' Employment and Training, has been engaged in efforts to update and increase the effectiveness of the VRR law. As of September 1988, proposals advocated by the Defense and Labor Departments were being reviewed by senior officials of those agencies.

The Veterans' Benefits Improvement and Health-Care Authorization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-576) amended provisions of Subsections 2021(b)(3) and 2024(g) of Title 38 to include nondiscrimination against National Guard or Reserve members in hiring.



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The 55 State Committees of Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve continue to grow in size and effectiveness. There is increased involvement at the senior military level of all reserve components which greatly increases the value of state committees. They become an integral player in retention programs. There is a need for increased involvement at the lower command levels.

In an effort to improve overall effectiveness at the reserve component unit level, NCESGR has initiated a new program entitled "Mission One." The mission of this operation is to eventually place a knowledgeable ESGR volunteer at every National Guard and Reserve training location. It is projected that NCESGR's current volunteer strength of 3,500 will increase substantially.

The NCESGR Ombudsman Directorate provides advice and counsel concerning employer obligations as defined in the VRR and other pertinent laws and regulations. In addition, each state committee has trained ombudsmen

to serve as liaisons at the unit level. They provide guidance and information assistance, and refer personnel to an appropriate agency.

NCESGR Ombudsmen received 6,194 inquiries in 1988. This is an increase from 5,448 in the previous year. Over half of the calls were for additional information about the VRR and other related laws. Fifteen percent of the questions concern specific requirements about time off for training.

Inquiries from military personnel decreased from 81 percent in 1987 to 75 percent in 1988. Calls from employers increased from 13 percent in 1987 to 21 percent in 1988. This is a positive trend and indicates that employers are becoming increasingly aware of their obligations to employees who are members of the reserve components.

The Board commends the excellent support of the National Guard and Reserve provided by the NCESGR Chairman, the Executive Director and staff, and the state committees.



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### **Survey of the Selected Reserve**

The first comprehensive survey of members of the 1.1 million member Selected Reserve was released in March 1988 by the Department of Defense. More than 52,000 enlisted personnel and 12,000 officers participated in the survey. The results provide a profile of members of the reserve components and reflect attitudes toward major features of service in the National Guard and Reserve.

A major purpose of the project, begun in 1985, was to produce empirical data to assist in developing policies that help recruiting and retention in the National Guard and Reserve. The information gained from the survey provides a better understanding of the needs, attitudes, and desires of members of the reserve forces.

Reports based on the 1986 reserve component Surveys are available from:

Defense Manpower Data Center  
Survey and Market Analysis Division  
1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

In June 1988, the Department also released the results of a survey of spouses of National Guard and Reserve members. More than 32,000 spouses of personnel who participated in the member survey responded.

The results of the spouse survey provide a profile of reserve families as well as their knowledge of, and attitudes toward, major features of reserve component service. The findings are consistent with those of the member survey. Overall, these surveys



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demonstrate the need for continued attention to policies which recognize the importance of the family in decisions concerning National Guard and Reserve duty.

### **Resolutions of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

During its 1988 meetings, the Board adopted the resolutions on subjects indicated below. They were included in quarterly meeting reports that are sent to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees which have oversight responsibility of the Board.

### **Budgetary Support for the United States Coast Guard**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) is concerned about the lack of budgetary support given the United States Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve in Fiscal Year 1988 and the resulting adverse impact on this nation's war on drugs and national security. The Coast Guard, as part of the Department of





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Transportation, has national security functions that are especially vulnerable as a result of budget cuts. The Coast Guard, the nation's smallest armed force, is an integral part of our national defense structure, both in terms of peacetime military readiness and as a bulwark to stem the flow of illegal drugs into this country. At a time of growing awareness of the drug threat facing the youth of our nation, it is unacceptable to disable one of the key agencies in the fight against drug smuggling. Lack of Coast Guard capabilities to secure our shores against illegal drugs, save lives, and protect the environment in peacetime also results in the inability to protect our ports and coastal waters in time of military threat.

The failure to provide the Coast Guard with the financial resources requested in the President's FY 1988 Budget has resulted in the real loss of four percent to the active service appropriations and twelve percent to the Reserve training appropriation. Losses of this magnitude cut into the

muscle and bone of the Coast Guard's ability to conduct vital peacetime missions and to prepare for critical national defense efforts. The Board believes disproportionate reductions to the Coast Guard Reserve are unwise especially when Reserve training efforts are closely integrated with the active service's peacetime missions. The Board urges the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation join together with Congressional leadership to prevent further severe degradation to the Coast Guard's ability to conduct its vital missions.

Some FY 1988 funding was restored to the Coast Guard active component but not to the reserve component.

#### **Minimum Grade Requirements for General and Flag Officers**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) opposes proposals to repeal the minimum grade requirements for



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the Chief of The National Guard Bureau (10 USC 3030(c)); Chief, Air Force Reserve (10 USC 8038(c)); Chief, Army Reserve (10 USC 3038(c)); and Military Executive of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (10 USC 175(a)(9)) currently provided in law. The intent of Congress in establishing minimum grades for those positions is clear. The Board recommends to the Secretary of Defense that those proposals be withdrawn from the legislative proposal relating to general and flag officers that was submitted to the 100th Congress on 21 April 1987 (DoD 100-9). The Board recommends that those positions not be included in active component general or flag officers allocations or grade ceiling accountability.

#### **Sixth QRMC Proposed Changes to Reserve Retirement System**

The Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (6th QRMC) was organized to "conduct a complete review of the principles and concepts of the compensation system for members of the uniformed services" and to "report . . . options and recommendations for improving the

current reserve compensation system."

Many of the recommendations will, if adopted, benefit members of the reserve components. Many of these will correct inequities in current laws and policies. Subject areas of some recommendations include:

- longevity credit for delayed entry program participants.
- timeliness of reserve pay
- pay entitlement for reservists' travel time.
- reserve component incentive programs.
- educational assistance programs.
- allowances.
- civilian employment.
- health care, disability, and survivor benefits.
- non-pay benefits for retired reserve component personnel.



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The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) has expressed its concern to the Secretary of Defense about two recommendations being made by the 6th QRMC.



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First, the Board is unable to support the extensive changes in reserve component retirement proposed in the alternative retirement system being recommended by the 6th QRMC because:

a. Recent surveys of the reserve components indicate the current system is effective, is generally supported by the members of the reserve components and needs no changes.

b. The Board does not believe that promotion stagnation or an aging force is a problem in the reserve components, yet the alternative system appears developed on the basis of such allegations.

c. The Board believes the reserve components have in their personnel management systems the requisite flexibility to achieve and maintain their objective force profiles, yet the claim is made that the alternate retirement system would provide flexibility

d. The Board believes the cost analysis of the alternate system inadequately considered the costs of recruiting and training replacements when earlier retirement is encouraged.

e. The Board believes that the current retirement system in the reserve components is cost effective and has been instrumental in providing a high quality force.

Second, the Board is opposed to the proposal of the 6th QRMC to eliminate the 15 retirement points that reserve component members currently receive for membership. The elimination of the 15 membership points represents an unjustified reduction in reserve component retirement compensation for a substantial number of reserve component members. The Board agrees with the proposal to increase the maximum retirement points that may be earned by reserve component members.

The views of the Board were considered but not adopted by the Secretary of Defense who approved the report of the 6th QRMC.

#### **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs**

The Board, in 1983, supported the creation of the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs with authority to exercise statutory responsibility in the areas of reserve component manpower, logistics, budget, programs, force structure, procurement, personnel, legislation, administration, facilities, training, mobilization, readiness, liaison, and other related aspects of

reserve component matters. It was the position of the Board then that such an office would provide an equal voice for the reserve components at the highest levels within the Department of Defense secretariat and provide direct access to the resource allocation councils. At its December 1988 meeting, the Board passed the following resolution.

The Board reaffirms its long-standing view on the importance of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) and recommends to the Secretary of Defense that no change be made in the relation of the ASD/RA to the Secretary of Defense; the ASD/RA continue to report directly to the Secretary of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the ASD/RA continue to be a member of the Defense Resources Board.

### Other Issues

The Board, in previous years, has adopted formal positions on other personnel related issues. Those of continuing interest to the Board are:



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
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### Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (As Amended)

This act provides, among other things, protection from eviction of dependents without a court order upon a service member's activation or mobilization for military duty. In today's economic environment, many reserve component members would suffer severe cuts in total income if mobilized. The nation's support of these individuals is needed.

The limitation on monthly rental was last updated in 1966, raising the amount from \$80 to \$150. Rental rates have greatly increased since then. In October 1986, the Board made a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs that a legislative package be developed to amend the act to raise the monthly rent to a realistic level, with a provision for automatic adjustment so that frequent legislative updates will not be required. The matter was forwarded to the 6th QRMIC for study.

The 6th QRMIC recommended that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act be amended to establish in the law that



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the dependents of a member of a uniformed service on active duty may not be evicted from any premises occupied as a dwelling, without the permission of a court, as long as the agreed rent does not exceed an amount equal to the member's housing allowance (the member's basic allowance for quarters and the variable housing allowance).

The Board supports the recommendation of the 6th QRMG.

### **Survivors' Benefit Plan**

The Survivors' Benefit Plan Amendment of 1985 has an impact on reserve component members. Under the revised plan, for example, the surviving spouse of a reserve component noncommissioned officer in pay grade E-7 would receive about \$1,000 a year less than under the previous plan. National Guard and Reserve members previously eligible under the plan are grandfathered. The adverse impact was certainly not intentional. The Board urges that corrective legislation be enacted.

### **Summary and Recommendations**

Success of the reserve components in attaining and maintaining desired personnel strength and unit readiness levels is partly attributable to the support provided by the Congress in funding the full-time support program and incentive programs. All components still have some personnel problems. Fully funded and flexible incentive programs, targeted recruiting, increased retention efforts, consideration for family and job concerns, and maximum use of drill time for training will assist in maintaining personnel goals.

The Board recommends:

- Congress authorize and fund significant annual increases for the Coast Guard Reserve in order to eliminate the 15,400 member shortage in mobilization strength and fund the full-time support force required by the Coast Guard Reserve.
- fund programmed growth in the full-time support programs.




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
- continue funding for incentive programs and that the Montgomery GI Bill be amended to provide benefits for attending trade or vocational schools.
- other services study the Air Force's Palace Chase program for possible application to their reserve components to enhance personnel strength.
- expand individual mobilization augmentee authorizations and that Congress provide increased funding as required.
- the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) be expeditiously considered by the Congress and passed as submitted.
- enactment of legislation to exclude certain positions filled by National Guard or Reserve general/flag officers from active component grade ceiling accountability.
- withdrawal of portions of DoD Legislative Proposal 100-9 that would eliminate general and flag officer grade requirements from certain statutory positions in armed forces.
- retention of the current retirement system of the reserve components versus the two tiered system recommended by the 6th QRMCI.
- retention, rather than elimination, of the 15 retirement points for reserve membership as recommended by the 6th QRMCI.
- increase the maximum retirement points that may be earned by reserve



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component members as recommended by the 6th QRMCI.

- no change be made in the relation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) to the Secretary of Defense, the ASD/RA continue to report directly to the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the ASD/RA continue to be a member of the Defense Resources Board.
- amend the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 to establish in the law that the dependents of a member of a uniformed service on active duty may not be evicted from any premises occupied as a dwelling, without the permission of a court, as long as the agreed rent does not exceed an amount equal to the member's housing allowance (the member's basic allowance for quarters and the variable housing allowance).
- enact legislation to correct the unintended adverse impact on reserve component personnel which is caused by the Survivors' Benefit Plan Amendment of 1985. 



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# Training and Mobilization

# 4



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## General

The primary peacetime mission of the reserve components is to train to be ready to execute assigned wartime missions upon mobilization. Under the Total Force Policy, accomplishment of this mission is vital to United States national security. Reserve component units must be prepared for the same combat missions as active component units. However, reserve component units are expected to attain this readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active component units.



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The strategy for training of reserve component personnel must be to achieve a satisfactory level of competency prior to mobilization. It is not necessary to train, in all cases, to the levels required for active component forces. Where time is available, accelerated training programs may be utilized to bring reserve component personnel or units to required readiness levels during the mobilization process.



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## Service Training Initiatives

During FY 1988, an Army-wide task force developed a long term training strategy for the Army's reserve components. Entitled "Reserve Component Training Strategy", it includes a comprehensive statement of strategy and an action plan to strengthen reserve component training. Several key initiatives recommended by the task force have or will soon be implemented. However, full implementation will require increased resources to improve the overall training status of National Guard and Reserve units and individual members. Budget decisions for FY 1990 and 1991 have added \$94.5 million and \$105.8 million respectively. This resourcing will permit the Army to improve training, leader development, and individual skill qualification.

The initiatives are aimed at reorienting Army thinking about the reserve component training environment; increasing training, professional development, and readiness of junior officers and noncommissioned officers; enhancing training management and evaluation; enhancing collective training and individual skill development; and increasing mobilization training to improve Army mobilization preparedness.

The Army has initiated the JUMPSTART program in an effort to increase the effectiveness of its readiness groups. Readiness groups are located throughout the United States and assist National Guard and Reserve units in their training efforts. Under the program, captains and majors with at least two years of experience in active component troop units are assigned to



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the readiness groups. The objective is to use the skills and experience of well-trained active component officers to improve the capabilities of reserve component units.

In FY 1988, the Army National Guard expanded the regional training concept to include additional maintenance sites and a medical training site at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. A High Technology Training Center has been established at Fort Dix, New Jersey. This center provides individual and team training utilizing state-of-the-art simulators and devices.

During the year the Army National Guard began using plastic ammunition. Actual cost savings on the ammunition are minimal. However, more training ranges and areas can be safely used, and larger caliber weapons can be fired without violating environmental restrictions. Additionally, weapons can be zeroed with plastic ammunition in an armory. A standard correlation factor can then be applied to individual weapons which will provide the actual battle sight zero without having to go to a remote, outdoor range. Additional testing of plastic ammunition will be completed in FY 1989. This development combined with the



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Marksmanship Center Program should improve marksmanship training in the Army National Guard.

The Army Reserve is testing a program, entitled "School House to the Soldier". Under this program, an Army Reserve Forces school joins a brigade undergoing annual training. The school conducts selected individual skill qualifications training for brigade personnel.

The Army Reserve is also testing a teleconferencing system called Reserve Component Instructional Information Management System (RIMS). RIMS integrates three systems—interactive televideo, audiographic, and computer-based teleconferencing. The Army Reserve is encouraged by initial testing and intends to conduct additional tests. This type of training can enhance readiness by increasing skill proficiency and reinforcing previous training. The Air Force Reserve intends to review the Army RIMS for possible use.

An important effort in the Naval Air Reserve has been to identify billet training requirements. Emphasis is being placed on determining reasons for skill degradation. Once specific training requirements have been identified, an



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aggressive effort will be made to develop innovative training methods within budgetary constraints. The current method of training Naval Air Reservists is to use active component schools to ensure that contemporary technology is being taught to Selected Reservists.

A number of training programs were initiated in the Naval Surface Reserve Force in FY 1988. School curricula are being acquired from Chief of Naval Education and Training in support of the On Board Training (OBT) program. The OBT program is designed to provide refresher training in weak areas identified by pretesting, and to maintain previously acquired skills.

The Train The Trainer (TTT) program is an initiative that trains trainers at basic, intermediate, and advanced levels of Naval Reserve instruction. TTT courses provide information to improve the knowledge and performance of Naval Reserve leaders and managers.

The Naval Surface Reserve is planning to increase the quality of its training by

sending two training assistance teams to readiness commands, readiness centers, and reserve centers to help solve training problems arising out of implementation of the Surface Reserve Training Program. The teams will begin their visits in early 1989.

The Air National Guard is installing its first Aerial Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation complex at Gulfport, Mississippi. This system provides the capability of monitoring air-to-air battles and allows for a comprehensive debriefing of aircrews.

The Air National Guard has signed an agreement with the Air Training Command establishing a policy for operation of joint maintenance training facilities. This will allow the Air National Guard to properly plan and manage maintenance training for their unique weapons systems.

During FY 1988, the Air Force Reserve began procuring small arms marksmanship simulators for classroom training. The system hones the tactical and marksmanship skills in a controlled environment by providing realistic shoot/no shoot scenarios. Immediate feedback is provided to the user. Simulator training should increase success rates when qualifying at the range.

The Coast Guard Reserve introduced the Shipboard Control and Navigation System in FY 1988. It is a modern shipboard simulator used to train deck officers in radar navigation, rapid radar plotting, docking, ship stability, and rules of the road. Preliminary results are impressive. In a two-week active duty period, 14 reservists were trained in officer of the deck duties. Five weeks



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of underway training would have been required to accomplish the same task.

The Coast Guard Reserve also initiated a review of all resident training to develop alternate means of presentation. Training videotapes with accompanying workbooks are in production. They will serve as training outlines and document skill attainment.

### **Training Simulators and Devices**

In a time of reduced budgets, the use of training simulators and device can be a cost effective means of increasing combat readiness in the reserve components. Limited training time and inaccessible training areas and ranges are two of the most significant training detractors in the reserve components. The use of training devices to complement training with actual equipment and weapon systems can help solve these problems. The use of training devices is particularly useful for improving individual skills. There has been some progress in recent years in equipping the reserve components with training simulators and devices.

Flight simulators are available for aircrew proficiency training in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. However, simulator shortages were reported in areas of ground training. Although the Army National Guard has identified a six-year (FY 1990-1995) requirement of over \$310 million for training simulators and devices, funding constraints preclude development of a realistic plan to fill the requirement.

The Army believes that the use of interactive videodiscs (IVD) is an important training medium for the future. The Electronic Information Delivery System (EIDS) is the IVD system being purchased by the Army. It will be supplied to its reserve components. The system consists of a videodisc player, microprocessor subsystem, and a display subsystem which are compatible with a variety of off-the-shelf peripherals. Although 5,000 systems have been purchased, this does not begin to fill the requirements of the reserve components.

An even more pressing problem than the purchase of hardware is the



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development of the software for reserve component courses. Presently, there are not enough courses available to allow EIDS to be widely used. The developmental process for EIDS and courseware linkup is moving so slowly that second generation EIDS is on the market while first generation systems have not been fielded. IVD has great potential for increasing individual skills. Development of reserve component courses, coupled with the immediate distribution of EIDS to the reserve components, would help eliminate military skill mismatch problems. The EIDS program is a cost-effective means of increasing the readiness of the Army reserve components through more efficient use of training time.

The Naval Air Reserve is generally satisfied with the status of its training

device and simulator program. The Naval Surface Reserve is formulating requirements for training devices required to support Navy training plans. Additionally, courses are being developed for IVD training. Courses are planned for technical, mechanical, medical, administrative, and leadership training. IVD training will be substituted for simulators and other training devices to reduce costs and avoid obsolescence. IVD technology will permit training to be accomplished at reserve training centers in subject areas previously limited to hands-on training at gaining commands.

The Naval Reserve IVD program uses EIDS. The system is well suited to applications in computer-aided learning, simulation, and data storage. The Naval Surface Reserve is procuring 2,200 units via an Army EIDS contract. These systems will be placed in Naval Reserve centers around the country.

The Marine Corps reserve has sufficient funding available to meet identified requirements for training devices and simulators. The Marine Corps Reserve is acquiring an IVD tank trainer, gunnery training systems, and simulated marksmanship trainers.

Simulators are not available in sufficient numbers to support Air National Guard aircrew proficiency training. In many cases, fighter aircrews must train in out-of-date and/or limited capability simulators. C-130 aircrews must share five simulators for 22 units. C-5 and C-141 aircrews must travel to active component units for simulator training. This results in increased travel and per diem costs and, more importantly, the loss of limited training time.

The Air National Guard has distributed 430 IVD trainers. These trainers are well suited for almost any type of training requiring one-on-one or self-paced study. The Air National Guard intends to expand the use of these trainers.

Contracted training has significantly enhanced simulator capability in some areas for the Air Force Reserve. However, the Air Force Reserve is short of modern C-130 simulators. State-of-the-art C-130 weapon system trainers are needed to accomplish quality training. The Air Force Reserve now has a training device used by F-16 crews for air-to-air simulation and training.

The Air Force Reserve will field IVDs in FY 1989. This program will enhance the combat arms mechanical training requirement for eight different weapons. Further applications such as medical training, aircraft maintenance, and computer operations are being reviewed.

The Coast Guard Reserve does not own any training simulators, devices, or IVDs and has no plans to procure any. Training is accomplished with active component equipment and with Naval Reserve shipboard simulators for fire fighting and damage control training.

Training devices and simulators provide savings in overall equipment procurement costs, operating costs, and repair and replacement costs. The most critical training detractor is time to train. In order to take full advantage of time available to reserve component personnel, it is important to place as many training devices and simulators in armories and training centers as

possible. This is a cost effective means of achieving and maintaining desired readiness levels.

The Board recommends that programs to provide the reserve components with training devices and simulators be fully funded.

### **Modularized Training**


A major area of concern for the reserve components is providing their personnel with formal training and education in the limited time that the members are available. One solution to this problem is to use modularized training. This reduces lengthy courses to shorter periods of instruction that may be accomplished over several *inactive or active duty periods*. The courses provide initial skill and refresher training in occupational fields that normally require longer schools. The services have made considerable progress developing modularized training courses for use in the field.



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The Army has fielded 240 modularized courses to date and expects to field an additional 318 courses by early FY 1990.

Under the Naval Reserve course modularization program, existing curricula are divided into modules to provide Selected Reserve personnel the opportunity to complete formal Navy skill qualification training, at Naval Education Training Command facilities, during periods of active duty for training and drill periods. Civilian resources are also being used to augment Naval Reserve training resources. Through FY 1988, the Naval Reserve has modularized nine courses and expects to expand the program to 14 by FY 1992.

The Marine Corps has 43 two-week courses designed specifically for Reserve participation.

Air Force programs center on two distinct areas—field training (maintenance-related activities) and support-related activities. The field training program tasks all field training detachments to develop and implement compressed courses to support the limited training time available to reserve component students. Where compression would be detrimental to education, modular instruction is being developed and implemented. Modular instruction is being applied to support related specialties to the greatest extent possible. Lengthy technical staff officer courses are also being modularized.

The Coast Guard is evaluating the possibility of creating modules of several long-term resident courses into two week segments to allow greater flexibility in scheduling reservists into formal courses.

## Regional Training Programs

Some services are turning to regional training centers as a cost effective means to accomplish certain types of training. The use of regional training is efficient when the cost of individual systems cannot be justified for local training. Using regional training centers can also help ensure that training is current and consistent.

Regional training sites provide sustainment and transition training programs in specific military skills. This results in individual skill training and refresher training in skills that cannot be easily taught at the unit level. Regional training programs increase mobilization readiness by decreasing skill mismatch.

The Army reserve components have established regional training programs to support training in maintenance and medical occupational skills. Plans are to create 21 regional maintenance training sites. Of these, almost half will be operational by the end of FY 1989. The Army Reserve also provides five consolidated training facilities for training intelligence personnel in specific areas.

Seven regional medical training sites will provide individual and unit training on Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) for the reserve components. The first of these sites is operational at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

The Naval Reserve has identified a need for 40 regional training sites, to be designated "Readiness Centers". Training areas of concentration will be assigned to each center. Examples of training areas of concentration are maintenance, engineering, medical,

control of shipping, damage control, supply, amphibious operations, and security. The advantage of readiness centers is that scarce assets can be concentrated to provide economical training which will be superior to that received in smaller reserve centers. Eight readiness centers began operation in FY 1988. All 40 are scheduled to be in operation by the end of FY 1991.

Some Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircrew simulator training for the C-130 is accomplished at regional sites. Expensive aircrew training systems cannot be justified at each small unit. Additional regional aircrew training centers are being planned. Regional aircrew training centers to support new aircrew training systems for the C-141 and C-17 should be cost effective and provide maximum training with minimum lost time for travel.


Formal school training for Coast Guard Reserve members is generally combined with active component

training at four training centers. Conducting combined, regional training of both reserve and active component personnel provides consistency and standardization, and promotes better integration of reservists into mobilization billets.

The other reserve components have not utilized regional training programs to any great extent. In most cases, training is accomplished at the unit of assignment or attachment.

### **Civilian Contract Training**

In recent years, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have contracted with local colleges and technical schools to provide some individual skill training. Savings in travel and per diem expenses mean that the cost for such training is about 50 percent less than equivalent training at Army schools. The Army Reserve is conducting test programs for civilian contract training in critical medical specialties.



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Due to the diverse missions and composition of Naval Reserve units, local civilian training resources are sometimes required to supplement training. Civilian Augmented Training (CAT), implemented in FY 1988, is a Naval Reserve program which provides access to certain types of civilian training. First priority for CAT instruction is to enhance mobilization readiness. The two factors that make the program useful are cost advantage and availability. It may be less expensive to contract with a local facility than to export instructors temporarily to a site or to station them there permanently.

A computerized system has been developed that matches Naval Reserve training needs with related civilian educational programs. The system can be used to find programs at nearby schools, colleges, and hospitals that offer training needed to satisfy billet training requirements. It can also identify institutions that can provide instructors to teach existing Navy courses. For certain types of courses, civilian instructors are more available than military instructors. An example is the Reserve Allied Medical Program

training which satisfies training requirements of 12 hospital corpsmen and one dental technician skill specialties for the Naval Reserve.

The Naval Air Reserve uses civilian contractors to train pilots for C-9, T-39, C-131, and C-20 aircraft. Additionally, about 55 percent of formal enlisted training at the squadron level, for F-14 transition training, is provided by contract civilian personnel.

The Marine Corps Reserve uses civilian contract instruction for the Vocational and Technical Education (VOTEC) program. The Marine Corps pays tuition and fees for a reservist to attend courses. In FY 1988, 135 reservists were enrolled in various courses. VOTEC courses primarily teach critical combat service support skills. Expansion of the program is desirable to improve skill match. Some factors that limit enrollment are availability of both courses and reservists, as well as convenient class schedules.

Civilian contract training is utilized by the Air National Guard for initial and refresher aircrew training in the C-12, C-130H, and T-43 aircraft. All KC-135 simulator training is conducted by civilian contractors.

The Air Force Air Training Command provides most of the skill training and initial flight training for the Air Force Reserve. The Air Force Reserve is currently exploring the feasibility of using civilian community colleges and vocational schools to augment existing Air Force technical courses. Availability and quality of training, and cost effectiveness will be the deciding factors.

There is no Coast Guard Reserve training by civilian contractors.

Civilian contract training programs can be a very cost effective method of increasing reserve component readiness. Skill qualification, and therefore mobilization readiness, is directly improved by making quality instruction more readily available to National Guard or Reserve personnel. Quality education serves as an incentive to recruiting and retention which results in overall savings in training costs. Members of the reserve components are also more exposed to the local community which can enhance the image of the reserve components and further help recruiting.

The Board recommends that reserve component use of civilian contract training be fully funded and expanded where appropriate.

### **Ammunition and Ordnance— Training Allowances**

Realistic training increases morale, improves retention, and increases readiness. Nothing can replace the realism of actually firing live rounds downrange. Therefore, it is vitally important to ensure that sufficient live ammunition is available for training reserve component personnel.

The Army's reserve components shared equitably in an Army-wide shortage of DRAGON missiles. The shortage stems from a decision not to procure any additional DRAGON missiles pending the fielding of the Advanced Antitank Weapons System Medium. The impact on readiness will be minor.

The Naval Reserve experienced numerous ordnance shortages in FY 1988. The shortages were experienced throughout the Navy. There were not enough MK-46 exercise torpedoes due to funding shortages at intermediate maintenance activities. This had a substantial negative impact on proficiency of aviation ordnance personnel and aircrews. Production problems caused shortages of MK-70 practice bombs and MK-23 impulse cartridges.

An ordnance related problem is that there is a Navy and Marine Corps-wide shortage of aerial targets for air-to-air missiles. Lack of sufficient aerial targets to support training with air launched missiles reduces readiness.

Marine Reserve aviation experienced training shortages of laser guided munitions, SHRIKE missiles, MK-70 practice bombs, and 2.75" white phosphorous rockets.





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In FY 1988, Air National Guard training and readiness were adversely impacted by shortages of various types of bombs and three types of ammunition—.20 millimeter, .38 caliber, and 5.56 caliber. Some training deployments were cancelled due to lack of ammunition.

The Air Force Reserve also suffered some shortages of ordnance and ammunition. The shortages were shared with the active component. To ensure that training was not adversely affected, the Air Force authorized a reduction of war reserve munitions and ensured that each component received a fair share of existing stocks. The shortages have not yet affected readiness. However, continued funding shortages and production problems will adversely impact both training and readiness.

The Coast Guard Reserve did not have any ammunition shortages in FY 1988.

Training with live ordnance increases readiness by improving skill levels, and by improving retention through realistic, motivating training.

The Board recommends that sufficient levels of ordnance and ammunition for training be provided to the National Guard and Reserve.

### **Overseas Training**

Overseas training provides excellent training for reserve component individuals and units by:

- exercising mobilization, deployment, and redeployment plans.
- increasing awareness of wartime mission requirements.
- tailoring peacetime training to wartime missions in actual wartime environments.
- enabling training to be conducted to gaining command standards.
- strengthening wartime command relationships.
- increasing readiness by providing realistic exercise scenarios.

Actions required to prepare for and execute an overseas training mission closely parallel those required for mobilization and deployment. Civic action and technical assistance to friendly nations, in conjunction with

overseas deployment, supports foreign policy and increases United States stature abroad. Increased morale and retention in the reserve components are benefits of overseas training. Additionally, overseas training demonstrates, to allies and potential adversaries, the ability of the United States to execute its forward defense strategy.

Table 22 shows that the number of personnel training overseas in FY 1988 decreased by about 13 percent overall from FY 1987. Some of this decrease is because of reduced participation in Joint Staff exercises. Some may also be due to the biennial nature of certain

exercises such as BRIGHT STAR. Additionally, budget constraints have mandated a reevaluation of overseas exercise requirements and the numbers of personnel required in units or cells deploying overseas for training. Unit or cell participation was, in some components, reduced because of funding constraints. The major additional cost is for transportation of personnel and equipment to an overseas area rather than to a training site in the United States. Military transportation provides aircrew training that must be accomplished in any event. The Board encourages continued scheduling and funding of current levels of overseas training.

**Table 22**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT OVERSEAS TRAINING**

	ACTUAL							PROJECTED	
	FY 1981		FY 1987		FY 1988		Personnel Percent Change FY 1981-1988	FY 1989	
	Cells/ Units	Pers	Cells/ Units	Pers	Cells/ Units	Pers		Cells/ Units	Pers
Army National Guard	99	5785	1195	30014	1091	29310	406.7%	494	25251
Army Reserve	200	3500	2169	25518	1447	19175	447.9%	1308	20660
Naval Reserve	127	3422	228	9523	246	5467	59.8%	249	5280
Marine Corps Reserve	4	186	18	2580	28	1591	755.4%	28	1589
Air National Guard	0	0	363	10572	218	10674	+ 1000.0%	258	14760
Air Force Reserve	141	6931	670	15722	506	15796	127.9%	420	14575
Coast Guard Reserve	0	0	0	301	0	9	900.0%	0	288
Total	571	19824	4643	94230	3536	82022	313.8%	2757	82403


Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.



Table 23 indicates the types of units deploying overseas for training in FY 1988.

**Table 23**  
**TYPES OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS**  
**TRAINING OVERSEAS**  
**FY 1988**




Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

During FY 1988, overseas training was conducted by one or more reserve components in 96 overseas areas as well as over and on the world's oceans and

seas. Countries, outside the United States, in which reserve component members trained are shaded on the following map and listed.



Antarctica	Denmark	Honduras	Norway	South Korea
Antigua	Diego Garcia	Hong Kong	Okinawa	Spain
& Barbuda	Djibouti	Iceland	Oman	Sri Lanka
Argentina	Dominica	India	Panama	Sweden
Australia	Ecuador	Indonesia	Papua,	Thailand
Azores	Egypt	Israel	New Guinea	Tokelau Islands
Bahamas	England	Italy	Peleliu	Tonga
Bahrain	Fiji	Jamaica	Peru	Tunisia
Bangladesh	France	Japan	Philippines	Turkey
Barbados	German	Jordan	Portugal	Tuvalu
Belgium	Democratic	Kiribati	Puerto Rico	Union of Soviet
Bermuda	Republic	Kuwait	Saint Johns	Socialist
Bolivia	German	Madagascar	Saint Kitts—	Republics
Brunei	Federal	Malaysia	Nevis	Uruguay
Cameroon	Republic	Maldives	Saint Lucia	Vanuatu
Canada	Greece	Marshall Islands	Sardina	Venezuela
Chile	Greenland	Mauritius	Saudi Arabia	Wake Island
Colombia	Grenada	Mexico	Scotland	Western Samoa
Comoros	Guam	Micronesia	Seychelles	
Cook Islands	Guantanamo	Nepal	Singapore	
Costa Rica	Bay, Cuba	Netherlands	Solomon Islands	
Crete	Guatemala	New Zealand	Somalia	

Reserve component participation in operational missions and in joint exercises, both overseas and in the United States provides realistic training and increases readiness. Wartime missions are executed with other components (active and reserve) and foreign militaries, just as would occur upon mobilization. Joint exercises train reserve components to face the challenges of extended and integrated battlefields within a combined environment. Virtually every facet of warfare was practiced and every weapons system exercised in numerous joint exercises during FY 1988.



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### **Training With Wartime Commands**


Frequent training with wartime gaining commands, whether overseas or in the United States, enhances a unit's ability to mobilize, deploy, and perform wartime missions. In many cases, equipment and expert instruction is most readily available at the gaining command. The gaining command becomes involved and interested in training the reserve component unit and

ensures that training is directed toward the mobilization mission. Readiness is improved when reserve component members are able to train in the operations environment in which they are expected to fight. The extent that the reserve components currently train with gaining commands varies.

CAPSTONE is an Army program that aligns active and reserve component elements to meet wartime operational requirements. This allows the reserve components of the Army to increase mobilization readiness by focusing peacetime training on wartime missions. In FY 1988, approximately 33 percent of Army National Guard and Reserve battalions, separate companies, and detachments trained with their wartime gaining commands. That percentage only includes units which deployed for training with at least 50 percent of assigned personnel. In addition to those units, 2,229 cells deployed overseas to conduct wartime planning and training with their gaining commands.

The Naval Surface Reserve Force conducts approximately 53 percent of Selected Reserve training with wartime gaining commands. The Naval Air Reserve Force is composed of approximately one-third commissioned units (stand alone combat units with equipment) and two-thirds reinforcing/sustaining units. Reinforcing/sustaining units conduct about 50 percent of their training with wartime gaining commands.

Marine Corps Reserve ground units conduct about 13 percent of their training with wartime gaining commands. A substantial number of sorties flown by Marine Reserve aviation units are in support of active units.





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Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve unit training is conducted directly with, or under the wartime tasking of, the gaining command. All flying units and many support elements participate in deployments and exercises that are controlled by wartime gaining commands.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve fighter and tactical airlift units deploy overseas to wartime theaters for training once every three years for a two-week period. Air refueling units also deploy every three years for annual training. Additionally, they deploy annually for one to two weeks to augment U.S. Air Force Europe, and Pacific Air Force air refueling requirements. U.S. Southern Command fighter and airlift requirements are fulfilled by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. Reserve component strategic airlift aircrews regularly fly worldwide missions. Air National Guard combat communications and tactical air control units deploy for two-week periods, normally every three years, in support of Joint Staff and major command exercises in wartime theaters. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are exploring ways to expand

training in wartime theaters. Due to funding limitations, deployments now normally only involve about 25 percent of the personnel assigned to a deploying unit.

The Air Force Reserve trains some of its individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) in overseas gaining commands. IMAs must be prepared to assume operational missions. An example is the assignment of 15 security police IMAs to support the 377th Security Group at Ramstein Air Base in the Federal Republic of Germany. IMAs were on duty with that unit at the time of the disastrous air show accident there in August, 1988. Their professional training, both civilian and military, helped stabilize crowds and reduce suffering at Ramstein.

The entire Coast Guard Reserve training program is designed to augment active commands in peacetime. About 30 percent of the force regularly trains with their wartime gaining command while most of the remaining force train with active units that provide training experiences similar to those of wartime gaining commands.





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### Aviation Training

Reserve component aircrew proficiency training requirements are the same as active component requirements in all services except the Navy. Major factors affecting aircrew proficiency training for the National Guard and Reserve are availability of flight hours, aircraft, training areas, simulators, and additional flying time periods.

All reserve components, except the Naval Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve, reported that sufficient flight hours were available to accomplish proficiency training and mission support goals in FY 1988. The Army National Guard's initial authorization was not sufficient because of budget limitations. However, this was rectified during a midyear budget review. Due to budget reduction requirements, the Coast Guard Reserve had insufficient flight hours allocated during the 1st and 2nd quarters. The FY 1988 Naval Reserve shortage was 29,000 flight hours valued at \$29.8 million.

Aircraft availability in the reserve components was not a major problem

in FY 1988. However, the Air National Guard did experience some nonavailability of KC-135 aircraft due to a depot level maintenance backup. The Naval Reserve experienced shortages in F/A-18 aircraft due to required engine modifications, and E-2C aircraft which were restricted due to wing cracks.

Army reserve components and Naval Reserve aviation units indicated that the availability of ranges and training areas was sufficient in FY 1988. Adequate facilities are not available locally to all Marine aviation units. Those units must deploy about once per quarter to locations with adequate training facilities to accomplish required training. This is expensive and adversely affects time available for training. This proximity problem was also experienced by the Air Force reserve components.

The Air National Guard operates 15 air-to-ground gunnery ranges that support the majority of units with air-to-ground missions. Most were constructed to accommodate ordnance delivery using simple delivery patterns. Due to size and environmental issues, these ranges are no longer adequate for modern tactical ordnance delivery methods. Environmental issues are also a stumbling block to obtaining required supersonic air-to-air combat airspace and low altitude airspace.

The Air National Guard has contracted for an independent study to assess current and future training area requirements. Based on projected requirements, the study will prioritize major expenditures at existing facilities and define the needs for additional ranges and areas.



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Reserve component aviation is a vitally important part of the total force not only in the event of mobilization, but also for accomplishing operational missions in peacetime. Viable reserve component aviation programs enable the services to get the greatest return on investment in highly trained, valuable aircrew assets that chose to leave active duty.

### **Training the Individual Ready Reserve**

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members have a military service obligation and may voluntarily participate in training for points and promotion with or without pay. The services have differing philosophies and policies for training IRR members. Funding levels mentioned in this section do not include costs associated with screening the IRR. The IRR screen is discussed in the Personnel Chapter of this report.

The Army offers three types of training designed to help IRR soldiers maintain proficiency in their military specialty—professional development training, readiness training, and exercises. Over 20,000 IRR training tours were completed in FY 1988. The goal for FY 1989 is over 27,000 tours. However, due to the reduced budget and required funding for active duty special work tours which are not training duty, sufficient funds are not available to meet the training goal. An additional \$32.4 million is required. The lack of mobilization training funds reduces the readiness of the IRR and reduces their effectiveness upon mobilization.

The Navy paid for 2,228 IRR training tours in FY 1988. However, 764

applications for training duty were not processed due to lack of funding.

The Marine Corps spent \$2.4 million in FY 1988 to train 1,434 members of the IRR. Training is conducted with the active component mainly through the reserve counterpart training program. A new program was initiated in FY 1988 that sent IRR Marines to a two-week small unit leader course. IRR members also participated in Selected Marine Corps Reserve exercises. IRR training for FY 1989 is budgeted at \$1.73 million.

The Air Force position is that refresher training for all IRR members would divert limited reserve training



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funds from more effective Selected Reserve training programs resulting in an overall reduction in readiness. An analysis is underway to define Air Force IRR refresher training requirements. When complete, appropriate programs will be implemented.

Due to budget constraints, the Coast Guard Reserve provides no funded training opportunities for IRR members.

The IRR is vitally important for rapidly filling trained manpower needs in the event of any major mobilization. IRR personnel should be trained to, and maintained at, reasonable skill levels to reduce training requirements upon mobilization.

#### **Drug Interdiction—Impact on Training**

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, and subsequent legislation, directly affects the extent to which military forces (including reserve components) can participate in law enforcement activities. The Posse Comitatus Act

prohibits the use of federal military forces to perform internal police functions. The Act does not pertain to the Army and Air National Guard when they are in state status.

Public Law 97-86, passed in 1982, amended the Posse Comitatus Act. The law, as amended, now authorizes indirect military involvement such as equipment loan, personnel support, training, and sharing information. Indirect support must be incidental to a military mission, or provide substantially equivalent military training. Further, it cannot degrade combat readiness nor the capacity of the Department of Defense to fulfill its defense mission. The law does not limit the National Guard in state status (on state active duty or under Title 32 USC) from performing law enforcement functions authorized by the states concerned. The extent of drug interdiction activity varies considerably between the reserve components.

Army and Air National Guard units in 29 states participated in 370 missions



involving the crusade against illegal drugs in FY 1988. For the most part, these missions were accomplished incidental to training and required no additional funding. Additionally, the National Guard supported 26 requests from civil authorities for the loan or lease of unit equipment. Support included 3,694 flight hours flown and 3,478 mandays expended.

Joint National Guard and civilian law enforcement operations resulted in the eradication or confiscation of large amounts of marijuana plants, processed marijuana, cocaine, and other illegal drugs.

A one-month test was conducted in August 1988 to determine the effectiveness of using National Guard personnel with the Customs Service to combat drug smuggling. Guardsmen involved were trained military police who received additional training from the Customs Service. The federal government paid the additional cost for military personnel. The test was conducted in Florida, Texas, and Arizona. Approximately 100 National Guard personnel checked cargo moving by ship into Florida ports and truck-borne freight crossing the U.S. southern border. The test program was conducted with no significant problems. The involvement of National Guard in ground-based drug interdiction programs along the U.S./Mexican border may be the first time since the Mexican Revolution that U.S. military personnel have performed land border duty.

The FY 1989 National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts have assigned an enhanced drug interdiction and enforcement role to the National Guard. The Secretary of



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Defense may provide to the governor of a state, who submits an approved plan, sufficient pay and allowances and operation and maintenance funds to support that plan. The operations are to be conducted when Guardsmen are under the command and control of state authority and are serving in addition to annual training. A minimum of \$40 million has been allotted by Congress.

The governors' plans have been developed in coordination with the various law enforcement agencies at the local and state levels and support operations that are planned by those agencies. The primary focus in FY 1989 will be the southern land and water border states where the greatest need has been identified.

The Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve were not involved in direct support for drug interdiction in FY 1988. The Army Reserve maintains that



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the diversion of personnel and mission essential equipment to support a drug interdiction program would adversely impact unit readiness.

The Naval Reserve supported drug interdiction efforts with 27,823 mandays at a non-reimbursable cost of over \$5.8 million. An increase of at least 10 percent in drug interdiction operations is anticipated in FY 1989. This is due to increased availability of E-2C aircraft, and helicopter support of Naval Reserve Force frigates involved in drug interdiction. Efficient use of training time is vital to maintaining readiness. The use of active duty and special duty for training allocations for drug interdiction operations provides

minimal readiness enhancement for Naval Reservists. Drug interdiction operations provide minimal readiness training in warfare areas such as antisubmarine and antiair warfare which are the primary mission areas for Naval Reserve frigates, P-3s, SH-2s, and E-2s. The use of ships and aircraft on a not-to-interfere basis allows more flexibility and less damage to readiness. There was no adverse impact on mobilization readiness resulting from the level of drug interdiction activities in FY 1988.

The Air Force Reserve conducted four drug interdiction missions in support of civilian law enforcement officials. All missions were compatible with scheduled training requirements and the Air Force Reserve absorbed the \$27,500 cost.

The Coast Guard Reserve's primary means of training is augmenting active duty commands with Reserve personnel. Since the Coast Guard is a major drug interdiction agency, reservists are very much involved in the effort. Reservists contribute directly by performing such duties as port security, surface interdiction, investigations, boardings, and surveillance. Reservists contribute indirectly by temporarily replacing active duty personnel who can then conduct drug enforcement activities. In either case, the reservists are receiving valuable training in their mobilization billets and mobilization readiness is increased.

The Board believes that the reserve components should continue to be used in the crusade against illegal drugs, if adequately funded, to the extent that their support coincides with appropriate training and does not degrade unit training and readiness.

### **Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Training**

An adequate level of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training is necessary for a high state of readiness and to prevent many unnecessary casualties in any future major conflict. The reserve components must be well trained in NBC defense prior to mobilization. To send undertrained troops into a hostile NBC environment is not acceptable. Upon mobilization, unprepared units would have to be trained in NBC defense to make them fully combat ready. This could delay deployment and result in losses on the battlefield.

The NBC training status of Army reserve component units lags that of the active component. There are two major inhibitors to the conduct of individual NBC defensive training. The most critical is training time. The myriad of tasks required of units conflict with the requirement for training in mission essential tasks while in protective equipment, and with the maintenance

of individual NBC protective skills. The second inhibitor is an inadequate understanding of the chemical threat and the training techniques required to train soldiers to perform their missions in an NBC environment.

Approximately 72 percent of the Army's chemical units are in the Army reserve components. The majority of these units have had major personnel changes within the past few years. The personnel turmoil resulted both from unit activations, where personnel need to be acquired and trained in their new specialty, and from the conversion of all enlisted chemical personnel to one specialty which requires additional training.

Several continuing programs should help to raise the overall status of NBC training in the Army reserve components. Generally, these parallel efforts in the active component to improve training. A new NBC training regulation, which emphasizes training to perform unit missions in a NBC environment, is being disseminated.



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Emphasis is being directed to improving the reserve forces school system to enhance the quality of NBC training. Fielding of new training devices should enable commanders and trainers to present a more realistic depiction of the NBC battlefield to their soldiers.

The Naval Reserve trains Selected Reservists in NBC defense at both active facilities and Naval Reserve readiness centers. The ultimate goal is to merge both active and reserve training plans to produce a total Navy document that will increase NBC training effectiveness.

Training in NBC defense in the Marine Corps Reserve is regularly incorporated into field exercises and individual skill testing. Additionally, a mobile training team is available to provide units with a comprehensive NBC package during their drill periods. Training is inhibited by limited availability at drill sites of chemical protective suits. This, in part, is due to insufficient storage facilities. Shortages of chemical protective boots and gloves

exist throughout the Marine Corps. Training for some units is also restricted by the limited number of qualified NBC training personnel. Steps are being taken to resolve this problem. However, about seven weeks of formal school training is required to qualify for the NBC specialty.

The only inhibitor to NBC training in the Air National Guard is a shortage of protective masks. This problem should be alleviated with the receipt of 25,000 additional masks during FY 1989.

The Air Force Reserve also has a shortage of NBC training equipment. This shortage should be alleviated in 1989. Failure to receive all of the NBC equipment which has been ordered will affect the ability of personnel to operate and survive in combat. Currently, training is being conducted with equipment drawn from war stocks.

The Coast Guard Reserve does not generally provide its members with NBC training because most have



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mobilization assignments to United States port facilities.

All of the reserve components indicate that proper equipping and training of the force to survive and fight in a hostile NBC environment is essential to combat readiness.

The Board recommends that funding be made available, on an expedited basis, to eliminate equipment and other inhibitors to effective reserve component NBC defensive training.

### Training Detractors

The most significant training detractor for reserve component personnel is time available to train. Reserve component units are expected to attain readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active units. The limited time available to reserve components should be dedicated to training to improve readiness.

The Board recommended in the FY 1987 Annual Report, and continues to recommend, that the following actions be taken to reduce time spent on administrative functions and other activities that do not contribute to readiness.

- review all reporting requirements and eliminate those that do not contribute directly to mission readiness.
- review and revise inspection and testing policies to reduce interference with valuable training time.
- consolidate administrative functions at the highest level practical in order to relieve subordinate units of administrative burdens.



- provide sufficient full-time support personnel to handle peacetime administrative functions.
- require increased flexibility to ensure that training support personnel and facilities are available when the reserve components can use them.
- streamline equipment check in/out procedures to involve National Guardsmen and Reservists for the shortest time possible.
- provide adequate training facilities, ranges, and simulators close to drill sites to reduce nonproductive travel time.
- encourage all active and reserve components to share training facilities.

In an effort to resolve some of the increasing administrative burden placed on units, the Army Reserve has proposed a test of a Command Support





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The test can be implemented with no additional funding and is to last two years. It should be approved by Congress.

### **Mobilization and Callup Categories**

Mobilization of the armed forces includes, but is not limited to, the following categories.

- Selective Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency resulting from action by the President and/or Congress (10 USC 331, 332, 333; 14 USC 172).
- Partial Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces by not more than 1,000,000 individuals and the resources needed for their support, up to the attainment of full mobilization, resulting from action by the President or Congress (10 USC 673).
- Full Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces by mobilizing all reserve component units in the existing, approved force structure; all individual reservists; all retired military personnel; and the resources needed to support the above, resulting from action by the President and Congress (10 USC 672).
- Total Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure and the resources needed for their support, resulting from action by the President and Congress (10 USC 672).



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Center concept. Under the concept, readiness should improve by centralizing administration and technical support to Army Reserve units. The concept calls for:

- a technical/administrative cell at Army Reserve centers for mobilization and post mobilization support to tenant units.
- full-time manning of selected positions in tenant units to support wartime training, mobilization planning, and peacetime operations.
- unit and reserve center structure streamlined to support mobilization and post mobilization requirements.
- relief of the administrative burden for Army Reserve unit commanders during peacetime.

The proposed test, which needs Congressional approval before implementation, would use geographically dispersed commands, and employ both military technicians and Active Guard/Reserve personnel.

- **Presidential Callup**—The President may activate up to 200,000 Selected Reserve members involuntarily, for not more than 90 days, without declaring a national emergency (10 USC 673b). The President may use this authority when he determines it necessary to augment active component forces for an operational mission. The President, in cases where he determines such action necessary, may extend the original 90-day period for not more than an additional 90 days. Whenever the President exercises this authority, he must immediately notify Congress and provide reasons for the action. The service of units so ordered to active duty may be terminated by order of the President or law.

### **Mobilization Preparedness**


Mobilization exercises (MOBEX) are vital to the mobilization process. They validate mobilization plans and identify problem areas that need to be rectified prior to an actual mobilization. The services exercise and evaluate reserve component mobilization capabilities through various systems. The entire mobilization command and control system is tested through periodic Joint Staff exercises.

Major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC) and Army National Guard State Area Commands (STARC) are exercised through scheduled command post exercises which test their ability to provide adequate command, control, and support to their respective subordinate headquarters during mobilization. Evaluations include both objective and subjective measures of performance and are provided to participating

commands. MUSARCs participate in MOBEXs once every three years while STARCs participate annually. Army reserve component unit level MOBEXs vary in scope and frequency by component and organizational level.

Mobilization and deployment plans/procedures exercises are required for all Army Reserve units scheduled to participate in overseas deployment training (ODT). All Army National Guard units that participate in ODT undergo a Mobilization and Deployment Readiness Exercise (MODRE) which tests all phases of mobilization and deployment.

High priority Army National Guard units undergo a Readiness for Mobilization Exercise (REMOBE) every three years. All other Guard units are tested every five years. A REMOBE tests all phases of mobilization through the movement preparation portion. Selected high priority Army National Guard units also periodically undergo an Emergency Mobilization and Deployment Readiness Exercise (EMDREX). An EMDREX is similar to a REMOBE except that it is a



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no notice exercise while the REMOBE is a scheduled event. In addition to the above mentioned mobilization specific exercises, all reserve component units participate in other inspections and exercises that test aspects of the mobilization process.

Several new initiatives are now being developed by the Department of the Army that will supplement the above programs. The following initiatives are scheduled for implementation in FY 1990.

- No notice alert tests will be given to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units which are subject to the Presidential callup.
- Mobilization command post exercises will exercise the ability of mobilization stations to accomplish their mobilization responsibilities. All stations will be tested biannually.


- Mobilization field training exercises will further test the ability of mobilization stations to accomplish mobilization responsibilities by surging selected installations to 100 percent of post-mobilization capacity. All units scheduled to mobilize at the selected site will simultaneously report for annual training. Between FY 1990 and FY 1994, one mobilization station per year will participate. Thereafter, multiple stations per year will be exercised.

Naval Selected Reserve units' ability to mobilize is tested through inspections at least once every three years, and by annual mobilization exercises. Additionally, there is an annual alert exercise which tests all units' recall plans.

The 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing test the ability of their subordinate Selected Reserve units to mobilize through biannual Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Tests (MORDTs). MORDTs are no notice tests that usually occur in conjunction with a unit's drill weekend. They begin 72 hours prior to the drill period. Inspectors examine recall plans, mobilization plans, command and control, administration, personnel and equipment readiness, security, and embarkation capabilities. Units are tested through the pack-up phase of embarkation. In many cases a unit's equipment will actually be loaded for transportation. In some cases a short deployment of the entire unit occurs. MORDTs are an effective tool in monitoring unit preparedness and identifying and correcting problem areas.



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Participation in the Marine Corps Readiness Evaluation System is another important feature of the training program and is one method used to evaluate combat readiness. Reserve units are routinely assessed with the same criteria used to evaluate their active component counterparts.

The ability of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units to mobilize is tested by their gaining major air commands through operational readiness inspections. The test covers timely arrival and processing of personnel and the embarkation of equipment. Units are inspected every two to three years.

The ability of the Coast Guard Reserve to mobilize is tested through a computerized readiness evaluation system which is administered monthly. The test measures personnel strength, whether qualified personnel are properly assigned to mobilization billets, and whether the unit acknowledges the mobilization order. Test results show that the Coast Guard Reserve is ready to mobilize.




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Mobilization tests are necessary and effective and have demonstrated the capability of all the components to mobilize rapidly when called.

### **Summary and Recommendations**

The reserve components' most important peacetime mission is training to be ready to fight in the event of mobilization. Training and mobilization readiness of the reserve components continues to improve.



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Innovative training programs are being developed and implemented within the reserve components to enhance training in individual and unit skills. Some of these programs are using very cost-effective training devices and simulators or other highly technical systems. Regional training programs are designed to train Guardsmen and Reservists on the most modern equipment in service inventories.

Overseas training of reserve component personnel is important to achieving mobilization readiness. The training often is conducted under realistic and environmental conditions not available to United States based units. Mobilization, deployment, and redeployment plans can be exercised and gaining command relationships strengthened. Budget constraints may reduce the levels of overseas training which have been conducted in recent years.

Limited time available to train to established standards and increasing administrative requirements are training detractors for the reserve components. The reduction of administrative burdens would increase time available to train for wartime missions.

Varying mobilization and callup categories provide latitude to the President or Congress to meet contingencies. The services use several types and levels of exercise to evaluate mobilization preparedness. The Department of Defense and the services are striving continually to improve the mobilization capabilities of all reserve components.

The Board recommends:

- that programs to provide the reserve components with training devices and simulators be fully funded.
- reserve component use of civilian contract training be fully funded and expanded where appropriate.
- sufficient levels of ordnance and ammunition for training be provided to the National Guard and Reserve.


- funding be made available, on an expedited basis, to eliminate equipment and other inhibitors to effective reserve component NBC defensive training.
- review all reporting requirements and eliminate those that do not contribute directly to mission readiness.
- review and revise inspection and testing policies to reduce interference with valuable training time.
- consolidate administrative functions at the highest level practical in order to relieve subordinate units of administrative burdens.
- provide sufficient full-time support personnel to handle peacetime administrative functions.
- require increased flexibility to ensure that training support personnel and facilities are available when the reserve components can use them.
- streamline equipment check in/out procedures to involve National Guardsmen and Reservists for the shortest time possible.
- provide adequate training facilities, ranges, and simulators close to drill sites to reduce nonproductive travel time.
- encourage all active and reserve components to share training facilities. (M)



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
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# Equipment **5**

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## General

Providing modern equipment to National Guard and Reserve units in the 1980s has increased significantly their warfighting capabilities. Equipment modernization has reached the point where many early deploying reserve component units are now fully compatible with active component units. Most units have had familiarization and hands-on training with equipment they would use upon mobilization. This training increases the confidence of both the user and the theater commanders who will employ National Guard and Reserve units.

The effect of equipment modernization may not always be accurately reflected in readiness evaluations. The impact on unit structure, manpower, training programs, or facilities, may not be felt for years and cannot be directly linked to fiscal year equipment acquisitions.

Although excellent progress has been made in equipping the National Guard

and Reserve, significant equipment and spare parts shortages continue. The value of the shortage between the equipment on-hand and that required for war amounts to \$14.1 billion. The Congress and the Department of Defense must provide increasing resources to reduce this shortage and ensure that reserve component units are properly equipped to accomplish additional missions being given to them each year. Delays in planned equipment programs, because of budget constraints and reductions, will adversely affect National Guard and Reserve contributions to the total force.

The overall equipment capability of the reserve components does not match that of the active components even though some National Guard and Reserve units will deploy simultaneously with active component units. However, because of the experience that reserve component members have on their present equipment, most units can still accomplish their mission.


## Modernization

Department of Defense policy is to equip first those units that will fight first. Under this policy, the reserve components have received great amounts of modern equipment in recent years.

The modernization effort covers the total spectrum of reserve component equipment systems. Reserve component units are receiving major systems directly from production sources and through redistribution from the active components. Modernization programs will upgrade the capability of the reserve components in areas such as airlift, antisubmarine warfare, ground



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transportation, firepower, communications, and management. Modernization enhances unit readiness.

Examples of items that are being acquired by the reserve components are shown in Table 24.



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**Table 24**  
**RECENT RESERVE COMPONENT**  
**EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS**

Army National Guard

AH-64 Apache helicopters  
Deployable medical systems (DEPMEDS)  
Mobile subscriber equipment  
Wheeled vehicles  
Radios

Naval Reserve

Antisubmarine warfare helicopters  
AN/SQQ 89 ASW system for guided missile frigates  
SEABEES trucks and forklifts  
Frigates integrated shipboard tactical system  
Mobile inshore undersea warfare vans

Air National Guard

HC-130N and C-130 aircraft  
MH-60G helicopters  
Communications equipment  
Aircraft support equipment  
Medical equipment  
Oil analysis machines (F-16)

Army Reserve


DEPMEDS  
Light howitzers  
Recovery vehicles  
Chemical agent alarms  
Wheeled vehicles  
Teletype terminals

Marine Corps Reserve

Tactical airfield fuel dispensing systems  
Communications equipment  
Cranes and forklifts  
Radar systems  
Wheeled vehicles  
Howitzers

Air Force Reserve

Defensive avionics  
Electronic countermeasure pods  
Air combat maneuvering instrumentation  
Machineguns  
Grenade launchers  
Night vision goggles  
Vehicles  
Self contained navigation system  
C-130H aircraft  
C-5 training devices




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An important mission of Naval Reserve Force (NRF) frigates is convoy escort of cargo ships. The Reserve Forces Policy Board has expressed concern over shortages in both sealift and airlift capabilities for the last several years. NRF frigates are extremely important for protecting our limited sealift capability. They should be equipped with the most modern and capable systems available to protect shipping in a hostile environment. NRF guided missile frigates will be receiving the same sophisticated antisubmarine warfare combat system as their active component counterparts. This system has better antisubmarine warfare sensors, signal processing, fire control, and battle management technologies. Installation began on two frigates in FY 1988. Completion is expected for all 16 frigates by FY 1997.

Within the next few years, most of the reserve components' equipment

should be of the same type as that being used by the active components. However, compatibility problems between the forces will continue in some areas because of significant differences in hardware systems. Some units may have different models. Equipment modernization should significantly increase the capability of the National Guard and Reserve.

Delays in modernization programs for the National Guard and Reserve are caused by production problems, budget reductions, active force unit deactivation or conversion delays, or higher priority needs. Modernization delays adversely impact reserve component unit training and readiness, and may cause equipment compatibility problems with other units. This may hamper the overall capability of the total force.



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**Modification/Conversion Programs**

Many reserve component units are going through organizational changes to accommodate new equipment systems

and tactical doctrine. Table 25 provides examples of modern equipment systems purchased or programmed for reserve component unit conversions or activations in FY 1988 or FY 1989.

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**Table 25**  
**MODERNIZED EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS PURCHASED OR**  
**PROGRAMMED FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS**

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Army National Guard

2 assault helicopter battalions  
with AH-64  
4 armor battalions with M1 tanks  
1 multiple launch rocket system  
battalion

Naval Reserve

10 P-3C replacements for P-3A  
8 F/A-18 replacements for A-7B  
12 F-14 replacements for F-4  
10 A-6E & 4 KA-6D replacements  
for A-7E  
4 EA-6B replacements for EA-6A  
4 HH-60H replacements for HH-1K  
and HH-3A

Air National Guard

Convert squadrons:  
2 F-106 to F-15/F-16  
1 RF-4 to C-130B  
5 F-4 to F-16  
1 OA-37 to OA-10  
1 A-10 to F-16

Coast Guard Reserve

21 Port Security Boats

Army Reserve

1 assault helicopter battalion  
with UH-60  
24 M60A3 tanks modified

Marine Corps Reserve

Activate AH-1J & KC-130T  
units  
Activate 1 TOW platoon  
Activate 2 LAV companies  
Activate 2 bridge platoons  
Activate 3 bulk fuel companies  
Conversion to M198 155mm  
howitzer  
Conversion to F/A-18 & A-4M

Air Force Reserve

Conversions of aircraft:  
42 F-4D to 42 F-4E  
16 C-130A to 16 C-130H  
42 F-4D to 36 F-16A/B

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Some flying units are scheduled to receive more modern but fewer aircraft than they currently operate. Although modernization generally provides an increase in capability, a large reduction in airframes may actually reduce overall unit combat capability. The total impact must be carefully considered before unit equipment authorizations are changed. If force structure in an active component is reduced because of budget constraints, the equipment of that force should be provided to a reserve component unit, if a requirement for that capability continues.

### **Budget Reductions**

Some reserve components did not reach modernization goals and may experience further equipment distribution delays in FY 1989 because of budget reductions.

Table 26 displays some programmed items that have not been and may not be acquired by the reserve components in FY 1988 and FY 1989. Additionally, some spare parts and test equipment will not be available. This, in turn, delays equipment repairs which may ultimately lead to future failures and inability to accomplish missions.

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**Table 26**  
**EXAMPLES OF EQUIPMENT NOT PURCHASED**

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#### Army National Guard

26 M198 155mm howitzers  
142 120mm mortars  
365 5-ton trucks  
1,038 SINGARS radios

#### Naval Reserve

12 earthmoving equipment  
19 trucks  
13 trailers  
35 forklift trucks

#### Army Reserve

1 Bradley fighting vehicle  
6 120mm mortars  
156 5-ton trucks  
11 SINGARS radios

#### Air National Guard

Hydraulic test sets  
AIM 9L/M test sets  
F100 engine support equipment  
C-5 landing nose gear trailers  
C-5 ISO platform stand


#### Air Force Reserve

Electronic countermeasures pods  
Support and test equipment  
Aircraft defensive systems

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Warfighting capability and aircrew survivability may be impaired when modifications and upgrades of weapon systems are delayed because of budget reductions.


### **Dollar Shortages**

The total value of equipment in the reserve component is displayed by component in Table 27. Wartime requirements vary from year to year as adjustments are made in force structure to meet changing missions. Although there were improvements in most of

the reserve components in on-hand equipment, the overall dollar shortage in National Guard and Reserve equipment, at the end of FY 1988, was \$14.1 billion. This is about a \$1.5 billion decrease from adjusted FY 1987 figures. Wartime requirements increased seven percent over the totals reported in FY 1987. Due to authorization increases and receipt of equipment, the dollar value of on-hand equipment grew by 11 percent. Overall, the Department of Defense reserve components have 84 percent of the value of wartime requirements for equipment compared to 74 percent in FY 1984.



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**Table 27**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT DOLLAR VALUES**  
**FY 1987 VS FY 1988**  
**(In Millions of Dollars or as a Percent)<sup>1</sup>**

	Wartime Requirement	Authorized	On-Hand	\$ Short On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On-Hand vs Authorized
<b>Army National Guard</b>						
FY 1988	\$ 34008	\$ 34024	\$26227	\$ 7781	77%	77%
FY 1987	\$32460	\$31093	\$23324	\$ 9136	72%	75%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 1548	\$ 2931	\$ 2903	(\$1355)		
Percent Change	5%	9%	12%	- 15%		
<b>Army Reserve<sup>2</sup></b>						
FY 1988	\$8096	\$7389	\$4802	\$3294	59%	65%
FY 1987	\$7304	\$6717	\$4368	\$2936	60%	65%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 792	\$ 672	\$ 434	\$ 358		
Percent Change	11%	10%	10%	12%		
<b>Naval Reserve<sup>2,3</sup></b>						
FY 1988	\$7095	\$7066	\$6726	\$369	95%	95%
FY 1987	\$6182	\$6153	\$5773	\$409	93%	94%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 913	\$ 913	\$953	(\$40)		
Percent Change	15%	15%	17%	- 10%		
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>						
FY 1988	\$3523	\$3523	\$3248	\$275	92%	92%
FY 1987	\$3958	\$3958	\$3339	\$619	84%	84%
Difference (+/-)	(\$435)	(\$435)	(\$91)	(\$344)		
Percent Change	- 11%	- 11%	- 3%	- 56%		
<b>Air National Guard</b>						
FY 1988	\$25067	\$25067	\$23284	\$1783	93%	93%
FY 1987	\$22699	\$22699	\$20984	\$1715	92%	92%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 2368	\$ 2368	\$ 2300	\$ 68		
Percent Change	10%	10%	11%	4%		
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>						
FY 1988	\$9726	\$9725	\$9335	\$391	96%	96%
FY 1987	\$9181	\$9181	\$8624	\$557	94%	94%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 545	\$ 544	\$ 711	(\$166)		
Percent Change	6%	6%	8%	- 30%		
<b>DoD Reserve Components</b>						
FY 1988	\$87515	\$86794	\$73622	\$13893	84%	85%
FY 1987	\$81784	\$79801	\$66412	\$15372	81%	83%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 5731	\$ 6993	\$ 7210	(\$1479)		
Percent Change	7%	9%	11%	- 10%		
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>						
FY 1988	\$211	\$0	\$7	\$204	3%	0%
FY 1987	\$205	\$0	\$9	\$196	4%	0%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 6	\$0	(\$2)	\$ 8		
Percent Change	3%	0%	- 22%	4%		
<b>Total Reserve Components</b>						
FY 1988	\$87726	\$86794	\$73629	\$14097	84%	85%
FY 1987	\$81989	\$79801	\$66421	\$15568	81%	83%
Difference (+/-)	\$ 5737	\$ 6993	\$ 7208	(\$1471)		
Percent Change	7%	9%	11%	- 9%		

Notes: 1. Figures rounded to nearest whole million or percent

2. FY 1987 data has been corrected from previously reported information

3. Figures do not include values of ships, \$5.9 Billion

Source: Individual reserve components

Data as of September 30, 1988

There is great disparity between the reserve components in the percentages of the dollar value of equipment on-hand versus the wartime requirement. The percentages for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are 77 and 59 percent respectively. The other four components are in the 90s. The Coast Guard Reserve has minimal equipment. The severity of shortages in the ground forces should be specifically addressed by the Department of Defense and the Congress.


Table 27 shows that the Naval Reserve has the largest percentage growth in wartime requirements, authorized equipment, and equipment on-hand. It should be noted that the Naval Reserve figures do not include the value of Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships and craft since they belong to the active component. NRF ships had a value of \$5.9 billion.

The Marine Corps Reserve showed a decrease in the value of wartime

required equipment from FY 1987 data. A computer software equipment module, in development by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is being tested by the Marine Corps. This module is part of the Reserve Unit Priority System. It will eventually be offered to all the services. The system should enable better management of equipment by providing timely status on requirements, availability, condition, and prices down to the unit level within each reserve component.


The Coast Guard Reserve data reflects updated plans and definition of requirements for mobilization. Their wartime requirement for equipment is valued at \$211 million. Their equipment on-hand is valued at \$7 million.

Comparisons of Department of Defense reserve component equipment values in the categories used in Table 27 are graphically displayed in Tables 28 and 29.



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


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
**Table 28**  
**DOD RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT VALUES**  
**FY 1988**

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Source: Individual Reserve Components  
Data as of September 30, 1988.

**Table 29**  
**DOD RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT**  
**DOLLAR SHORTAGES**  
**(FY 1988 - BILLIONS \$)**



Source: Individual Reserve Components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

Table 30 breaks down equipment, by reserve component, into three categories—Major Items, Spare Parts, and Other Items. Data for FY 1987 is provided for comparison. The value of on-hand spare parts of the Air National Guard has diminished 13 percent. The inventory requires replenishment. The FY 1988 Marine Corps Reserve shortage reflects a reevaluation of requirements.



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**Table 30**  
**VALUES OF RESERVE COMPONENT**  
**MAJOR ITEMS, SPARE PARTS, AND OTHER ITEMS**  
**(In Millions of Dollars or as a Percent)<sup>1</sup>**

		Army <sup>2</sup>		Naval <sup>2,3</sup>	Marine	Air Force <sup>2</sup>		Coast
		Guard	Reserve	Reserve	Corps Reserve	Guard	Reserve	Guard Reserve
<b>MAJOR ITEMS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 88	\$32,230	\$7,508	\$5,982	\$3,225	\$19,468	\$8,744	\$177
Wartime Reqmt	FY 87	\$31,000	\$6,747	\$5,326	\$3,839	\$17,037	\$7,887	\$193
Difference		\$1,230	\$761	\$656	(\$614)	\$2,431	\$857	(\$16)
Authorized	FY 88	\$32,206	\$6,801	\$5,982	\$3,225	\$19,468	\$8,744	\$0
Authorized	FY 87	\$29,600	\$6,160	\$5,326	\$3,839	\$17,037	\$7,887	\$0
Difference		\$2,606	\$641	\$656	(\$614)	\$2,431	\$857	\$0
On-Hand	FY 88	\$24,945	\$4,379	\$5,982	\$3,045	\$19,468	\$8,744	\$6
On-Hand	FY 87	\$22,300	\$4,000	\$5,326	\$3,220	\$17,037	\$7,887	\$7
Difference		\$2,645	\$379	\$656	(\$175)	\$2,431	\$857	(\$1)
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 88	77%	58%	100%	94%	100%	100%	3%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 87	72%	59%	100%	84%	100%	100%	4%
Percent Change		8%	- 2%	0%	13%	0%	0%	- 7%
<b>SPARE PARTS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 88	\$336	\$25	\$147	\$185	\$1,287	\$269	\$0
Wartime Reqmt	FY 87	\$338	\$20	\$151	\$6	\$1,376	\$270	\$0
Difference		(\$2)	\$5	(\$4)	\$179	(\$89)	(\$1)	\$0
Authorized	FY 88	\$336	\$25	\$147	\$185	\$1,287	\$269	\$0
Authorized	FY 87	\$338	\$20	\$151	\$6	\$1,376	\$269	\$0
Difference		(\$2)	\$5	(\$4)	\$179	(\$89)	\$0	\$0
On-Hand	FY 88	\$221	\$16	\$58	\$91	\$924	\$251	\$0
On-Hand	FY 87	\$222	\$12	\$58	\$6	\$1,170	\$229	\$0
Difference		(\$1)	\$4	\$0	\$86	(\$246)	\$22	\$0
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 88	66%	64%	39%	49%	72%	93%	0%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 87	66%	60%	38%	100%	85%	85%	0%
Percent Change		0%	7%	3%	- 51%	- 16%	10%	0%
<b>OTHER ITEMS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 88	\$1,442	\$563	\$966	\$113	\$4,312	\$713	\$34
Wartime Reqmt	FY 87	\$1,122	\$537	\$705	\$113	\$4,286	\$1,024	\$12
Difference		\$320	\$26	\$261	(\$0)	\$26	(\$311)	\$22
Authorized	FY 88	\$1,482	\$563	\$937	\$113	\$4,312	\$712	\$0
Authorized	FY 87	\$1,155	\$537	\$676	\$113	\$4,286	\$1,024	\$0
Difference		\$327	\$26	\$261	(\$0)	\$26	(\$312)	\$0
On-Hand	FY 88	\$1,061	\$407	\$673	\$112	\$2,892	\$340	\$1
On-Hand	FY 87	\$778	\$356	\$393	\$113	\$2,777	\$508	\$2
Difference		\$283	\$51	\$280	(\$1)	\$115	(\$168)	(\$1)
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 88	74%	72%	70%	99%	67%	48%	3%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 87	69%	66%	56%	100%	65%	50%	\$13%
Percent Change		6%	9%	25%	- 1%	4%	- 4%	- 78%

Notes: 1. Figures rounded to nearest whole million or percent.

2. Change to previously published 1987 data.

3. Figures do not include value of ships (\$5.9 Billion).

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

### National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA) are funds specifically designated by Congress for the purchase of reserve component equipment. These funds are in addition to those requested in the President's budget. Some of the NGREA are designated by Congress for specific items of equipment. The remainder may be used by the components for discretionary purchase of equipment.

NGREA complement service appropriations to improve training and mobilization readiness in the reserve components. The funds have been used

to reduce the most critical equipment shortages. Survivability, capability, and compatibility have been improved through use of these specially appropriated funds.

In FY 1988, the Department of Defense reserve components acquired many items through NGREA which were required for support, transportation, defensive systems, communications, improved detection systems, and test equipment. In fiscal years 1982-1989, Congress appropriated approximately \$5.13 billion in NGREA.

Table 31 displays the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations from FY 1982 through FY 1989.

**Table 31**  
**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE**  
**EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATIONS<sup>1</sup>**  
**(Millions of Dollars)**

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	Total
Army National Guard	50	50	100	150	532	146	273	256	1,557
Army Reserve	0	15	0	150	365	90	85	30	735
Naval Reserve	0	15	51	20	100	61	259	145	651
Marine Corps Reserve	0	15	0	30	70	60	40	82	297
Air National Guard	0	15	25	20	255	50	341	400	1,106
Air Force Reserve	0	15	0	10	180	150	202	227	784
DoD Total	50	125	176	380	1,502	557	1,200	1,140	5,130

Note: 1. Supplemental Congressional appropriations to DoD budget request. Numbers rounded to nearest million.

Sources: Individual reserve components and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.


Data as of September 30, 1988.



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### Equipment Shortages

Shortages of equipment for the reserve components adversely affect mobilization readiness of the total force. While all of the equipment required for full mobilization does not need to be immediately available to the reserve components, equipment for training must be available.

Shortages in training equipment reduce the ability to properly train individuals on equipment they may use in conflict. Some of the impact of training equipment shortages can be lessened through the use of training simulators and devices. Simulators and weapon system trainers, although excellent for some training, cannot provide the "hands on" training so necessary to attain and sustain proficiency. As new equipment is assigned to units, the availability of weapon systems trainers or simulators for that equipment must keep pace with the modernization effort.

Equipment for maintenance crews to train on is essential. Familiarity must be developed with equipment that National

Guard and Reserve members will support upon mobilization. Additional equipment for training such as interactive video gunnery trainers, simulators, and weapons systems trainers, are a cost effective means of enhancing initial and sustainment training for most reserve component personnel. However, such equipment does not directly contribute to wartime equipment requirements, or reduce equipment shortages.

In FY 1984, the Army established a program call Minimum Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) to provide particular items of equipment to units for training. This was necessary because some units would not normally be issued newer equipment due to their low deployment priority. MEET has provided nearly 600 items of equipment to help in unit training programs. The MEET program allows units to train when they would not otherwise be able to because of equipment shortages.

In the Army Reserve, some authorized items of equipment are not procurable. This matter reduced equipment-on-hand status for many units. Following corrections to equipment authorization documents, the number of nonprocurable line items, that have not had adequate substitutes provided, has been reduced by 75 percent since last year. Efforts are underway to obtain replacement equipment for the remaining line items which are nonprocurable. The Army will soon implement a policy to preclude listing nonprocurable items on unit authorizing documents. With that effort, no units will be in a reduced status solely because of nonprocurability of equipment.



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Significant shortages of equipment classed as major end items exist in each of the reserve components. While definitions may vary slightly, a composite definition of "major end items" might be—an item comprised of various components, ready for its intended use, with a designated minimum value, subject to centralized management and control during its lifetime, and appearing on a unit's equipment authorization list. Examples are an aircraft or a vehicle.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve major end item shortages include tactical and support vehicles, aircraft, and artillery pieces. There are also shortages of communications and electronic, support, materiel handling, maintenance, and medical equipment.

The Naval Reserve reports critical shortages of updated antisubmarine warfare equipment for Naval Reserve Force frigates and electronic warfare aircraft. Modern combat search and rescue aircraft have been authorized and funded but not received. The Naval Air Reserve is waiting for redistribution of newer models of attack aircraft from the active component. Engineering and

support equipment comprise the bulk of the remainder of the shortages.

Significant shortages in the Marine Corps Reserve include communications and electronics, support, and engineering equipment.

The Air National Guard needs jet engine intermediate maintenance equipment, munitions support equipment, and automated test and maintenance equipment for newly assigned aircraft. As identified later in this chapter, the Air Force Reserve requires aircraft defensive systems for nearly all of its tactical and airlift fleets. It also has limited amounts of backup aircraft and support equipment. Other critical shortages exist in chemical warfare equipment.

The Coast Guard reported shortages of boats and vehicles as its most critical end item equipment deficiencies.


Shortages of equipment degrade training and mobilization readiness. Eliminating equipment shortages should greatly enhance the interoperability of the active and reserve components. Until the equipment is available,



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substitute items such as M60 tanks in lieu of M1 tanks, 2½ ton trucks in lieu of 5-ton trucks, or older models for upgraded aircraft, provide some capability to accomplish unit missions.

The services must exercise deliberation and caution before making decisions to remove aging, yet capable, equipment from a unit prior to the arrival of modernized equipment. Unit capabilities, that would be absolutely necessary if the reserve components were called upon to go to war as part of the total force, may be sacrificed for uncertain future solutions if modern equipment distribution plans are not fulfilled. The reduction of equipment and force structure is especially apparent in the aviation programs of the services. Long range plans and programs to restore capabilities in the future is not an acceptable substitute for national security today.

### **Maintenance**

Maintenance of aging equipment in the reserve components is an increasing problem. Limited availability of

experienced personnel who are familiar with the older equipment exacerbates the situation. As a result, maintenance backlogs have developed. Budget reductions and equipment distribution delays may increase the maintenance backlogs, thereby decreasing capabilities and mobilization readiness. In some instances, routine maintenance must be performed on older equipment at more frequent intervals thus reducing training time on other equipment.

In the Army National Guard, aggressive management of resources to meet maintenance requirements has slowed the rate of growth of the backlog. Adding maintenance technicians, increasing productivity during training periods, and using commercial contractors are programs aimed at eliminating the backlog of equipment maintenance.

The Naval Reserve reported costs to eliminate the equipment maintenance backlog amounted to \$12.9 million in FY 1988. Recent increases in maintenance requirements are expected to double the backlog in FY 1989.

Aircraft rework delays, along with increased modifications to maintain compatibility with the active component, contribute to the backlog. Increased flying hours with fewer aircraft also increase scheduled and unscheduled maintenance requirements.


The Marine Corps Reserve equipment maintenance backlog is cyclical in nature and not a result of budget allocations. Availability of personnel from the reserve components to perform maintenance during active duty training (ADT) periods and the heavy use of equipment during ADT which subsequently requires maintenance, contribute to the cyclical nature of the problem.

Maintenance in the Air Force is done at three levels—organizational, field, and depot. The first two are accomplished by the unit possessing the equipment. Critical maintenance is performed at the depot level. Funding of depot level maintenance activities is crucial to the effectiveness of maintenance programs. Aircraft are

distributed from repair depots based upon first ordered and highest priority requirements, regardless of component. Anticipated budget reductions are expected to impact adversely upon depot level maintenance operations and spare parts availability. This unfortunate situation could result in an increase in the maintenance backlog. There are no significant problems with unit level maintenance.

While the other components did not report any equipment maintenance backlogs, there are indications that such backlogs may be developing. Backlogs may occur because equipment modifications require work by maintenance personnel who would otherwise be assigned to routine or preventive maintenance duties.

More modern and sophisticated equipment in the reserve components generally requires more expensive spare or replacement parts. Rising parts costs require increases in funding to maintain current levels of maintenance.



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## Equipment Incompatibility

Significant equipment and logistical incompatibility problems will exist between the reserve and active components upon mobilization. The most significant problem is with electronic equipment. Budgetary constraints are the main cause of incompatibility problems.

A significant area of incompatibility between components lies in the communications field. This "communication gap" exists in the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air National Guard.

Other electronic incompatibility problems are highlighted by the Army. Test measurement and diagnostic equipment in the reserve components does not meet the requirements of the units or equipment that the National Guard or Reserve will be supporting in wartime. Thus, the ability of the reserve components to support the total force is impaired. In an attempt to familiarize more units with newer equipment, personnel are able to train on the

required equipment on a limited basis by rotating new testing and diagnostic equipment to various units for training. This procedure will continue until sufficient equipment is obtained.

Air National Guard use of analog tactical communications and electronics equipment while the active component employs digital equipment makes interoperability impossible between those two components. This degrades joint exercises and would hamper operations upon mobilization.

Reserve component aircraft are generally older models and are not as supportable or capable as active component aircraft. They are, therefore, more dependent on a steady flow of spare parts. Recent reductions in funding for spares procurement and repair is beginning to be reflected in lower rates of filling war readiness spares kits. In the Air Force Reserve, this will eventually mean that the units will have to mobilize and deploy without required parts. Wartime capability will be adversely affected unless supplies are increased and transportation, both to and within the theater of operation, is available.

The Marine Corps Reserve (as well as the other reserve components) has some models and series aircraft which are not in active component inventories. Contingency support packages peculiar to these aircraft must be procured and maintained. These packages constitute the bulk of the increase in the value of spare parts and support equipment requirements indicated in Table 30. This value rose from \$6 to \$185 million between FY 1987 and FY 1988.



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
The Naval Reserve currently flies A and B models of P-3 aircraft for maritime patrol. The service life of these aircraft will soon expire. Even though they have received tactical navigation modernization kits, they are no longer compatible with the P-3C aircraft flown by the active component. The Naval Reserve aircraft do not have high speed digital link equipment so are unable to transmit tactical data to cooperating units. Self-defense against a surface threat is lacking in a majority of Naval Reserve aircraft. Magnetic anomaly detection equipment on Naval Reserve antisubmarine warfare aircraft is not effective against the capabilities of today's submarine threat.

Naval Reserve electronic warfare aircraft are equipped with outdated electronic systems which cannot be maintained or supported on aircraft carriers. In the next few years, it is planned to replace the EA-6A Prowler aircraft with the same model (EA-6B) flown by the active component.

### **Aircraft Defensive Systems**

In the effort to modernize the reserve components, consideration must be given to the threat that forces might face. Generally, National Guard and Reserve aircraft have not been provided with adequate defensive systems to meet the threat. In part, this stems from the hope for early transfer of aircraft with defensive systems from the active component to replace existing National Guard and Reserve aircraft. Any aircraft acquired for or transferred to the reserve components should have adequate defensive systems when received.

The Army is attempting to provide all its aircraft, irrespective of component,




with adequate defensive systems by FY 1994.

The Naval Reserve lacks adequate aircraft defensive systems but has plans to properly outfit its current aircraft. These defensive systems will be on new aircraft to be acquired by the Naval Reserve.

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve fighter, attack, and gunship aircraft are equipped with radar warning receivers, and in some cases, with passive countermeasures on a basis comparable to the active component. As such, some of the potential threats can be detected

Active component aircraft have more active countermeasure systems than the reserve components. Active countermeasures and better detection systems need to be installed in reserve component aircraft. To equip an aircraft with radar and missile warning systems and a complete countermeasures pod package, properly supported by test equipment and spares, may well exceed three million dollars per aircraft. However, lesser systems, such as those to defeat heat seeking missiles, cost only about \$400,000 and would provide some defense for the reserve component airlift fleet which regularly flies missions around the world.



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Survivability of aircraft in a high-threat, electronic environment is doubtful when adequate equipment to counter the threat is not available. Plans have been made by the services to equip reserve component aircraft with defensive systems when economically feasible. Active and reserve component aircrews will be placed at risk simultaneously. National Guard and Reserve aircraft should be provided with modern defensive systems to enhance survival of aircrews in a high threat electronic environment. At a minimum, sufficient numbers of National Guard and Reserve aircraft should be provided with modern defensive systems to allow aircrew members to conduct effective training with these systems.

### **Automated Management Systems**

The administrative workload in the reserve components is a serious training inhibitor. Providing automated management systems to the reserve components greatly reduces time spent on administrative duties resulting in more training time for National Guard and Reserve members. These systems can also be an excellent tool for mobilization management.

A major effort is underway, within the reserve components, to provide automatic data processing support for management of personnel, training, and logistics. The goal is to provide a capability, using microcomputers at the local level, to interface with large centrally located systems. On-line communication and interaction with these larger systems are essential to reduce delays, improve efficiency of operation, and make current information available to various levels of command.

The Army provided more than 4,100 computers and associated software to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in FY 1988. The greatest need for the Army's reserve components is the completion of a mobilization planning system.

The Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) is being developed to meet this requirement. It is designed to support the decisionmaking needs of all commanders, staffs, and functional managers responsible for reserve component forces. RCAS will use state-of-the-art office automation, telecommunications, distributed data bases, and distributed information for planning, and execution of mobilization

activities. It should improve command and control, unit level administrative activities, and classified document processing.

RCAS will interface with unit level automated management processes and will permit integration of active and reserve component systems.

In compliance with the FY 1988 Defense Appropriations Act, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau manages RCAS resources and has established a program management office headed by an Army Reserve general officer. RCAS is fully funded for development and distribution. Critical elements of the system are programmed for distribution in FY 1992.

The Naval Reserve consolidated all personnel and training automated information systems into a single program and began to implement Reserve Standard Training Administration and Readiness Support (RSTARS) in FY 1988. RSTARS allows the data base to be updated at reserve centers rather than restricting this function to headquarters levels. This new system should improve timeliness and accuracy in reservists' pay and personnel records and eliminate large amounts of paperwork. RSTARS can support work on fitness reports, evaluation worksheets, security access lists, files, distribution lists, and other rosters. The system will assist in training programs by tracking individual training requirements and accomplishments. It also can be used to develop training plans and readiness reports. Initiatives are underway to support logistics requirements, personnel accounting, and financial records.

In FY 1988, the Marine Corps Reserve distributed the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System software, REAL FAMMIS—an intermediate headquarters retrieval system, SASSY—which provides automatic requisitioning of clothing, and the Marine Integrated Maintenance Management System for maintenance transactions.

The Air Force continues to make progress in implementing automatic management systems. Development of a single data base with a single retrieval language will enhance these systems. Distribution of the Combat Personnel Control System and the Contingency Operation Mobility Planning and Execution System software to the reserve components of the Air Force will allow reserve component access. Problems in obtaining access to personnel data will be solved with improved data processing and on-line capability when these systems are distributed. Logistics are also being automated for the Air National Guard in the areas of maintenance, supply, and transportation. Networks are being established to allow the total Air Force to better manage all resources.



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The Coast Guard Reserve personnel system is being automated. Merger of the Reserve Personnel Management Information System with the active component Personnel Management Information System was accomplished in FY 1988. This personnel data base should help the Coast Guard Reserve integrate into the active component upon mobilization. Direct access to the Defense Manpower Data Center for maintenance of personnel data is being explored. Systems for direct order writing for active duty training and training qualification tracking may be implemented soon.

All of these automation efforts by the reserve components have a positive affect on readiness. Data can be better tracked and analyzed at various levels. Time saved from administrative chores can be dedicated to effective training. Better planning and preparation for mobilization will be a by-product of this effort. Mobilization processing time should be reduced.

Improved information processing and display systems are needed in armories, training centers, on board ships, on aircraft, and in tactical organizations. More rapid, effective management of administration, training, operations, and logistics can be accomplished using automation systems.

### **Summary and Recommendations**

Equipment modernization of the reserve components is critical to meeting compatibility, commonality, and capability standards for the total force. Delays in modernization will adversely impact unit training and readiness.

Budget constraints will hamper improvements in the equipment on-hand status of reserve component units. Although many units are receiving some new equipment for training, sufficient equipment is not being procured to fill wartime requirements. These requirements include major end items, other equipment, and spare parts.

Reserve component equipment shortages vary greatly. However, many types of wheeled vehicles and communications/electronics equipment are critical shortages in several components. Special Congressional appropriations have helped to reduce the equipment shortages which hamper unit readiness.

Because much of the reserve component equipment is older than that in the active components, maintenance requirements are increased. Not only does this demand additional time and skill, but it also requires increasing numbers of spare parts. Inventory management is also time consuming. All of this reduces the time available for training on more modern

equipment which is programmed into reserve component units.

Automated information systems to manage peacetime and mobilization activities are critically important to the reserve components. These systems should reduce time spent on administration and make more time available for meaningful individual and unit training.

The Board recommends:

- the disparity between reserve components in the percentages of the dollar value of equipment on-hand versus wartime requirements be addressed by the Department of Defense and the Congress. The disparity is greatest for the ground forces and the Coast Guard.
- National Guard and Reserve aircraft be provided with modern defensive systems to enhance survival of aircrews in a high threat electronic environment. (M)



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# Medical 6

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
## General

Assurance that adequate medical care is available for wounded personnel, during times of conflict or national disaster, increases the confidence of all civilian and military personnel. It is also a significant factor in the overall readiness and sustainability of our military forces. Upon mobilization, the reserve components will provide approximately two-thirds of health care capability of the services. Therefore, proper staffing, training, and equipping of National Guard and Reserve health care units is essential.

Health care units are organized to provide comprehensive medical care for personnel both in and out of the combat zone. An objective of military health care is to conserve the trained personnel of the services. Theater commanders, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish medical evacuation policy and schedules for their areas of responsibility. Generally, sick or wounded personnel are examined and treated as far forward as conditions in the battle area permit, so



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that they can be returned to duty with minimum delay. As a casualty is moved farther from the fighting, longer term and higher levels of care are available. Each component determines the amount and level of care required by its medical units—whether they be forward aid stations, clinics, evacuation hospitals, hospital ships, or stateside facilities.

Patients must be properly managed and treated. In the past, limited equipment and facilities forced medical units to place an inordinate amount of attention to the management of patients. Recently, however, training has been reoriented to the medical care of casualties. An effective balance between management and treatment is being achieved.

In addition to the requirement for battlefield medical care, the Department of Defense is concerned about the quality of health care available in stateside hospitals when military health care personnel must deploy overseas. In July 1988, the Defense Department signed an agreement with the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) which provides for several hundred USPHS officers to replace active duty and reserve component health care personnel in the event of their overseas deployment.

Even with this agreement, there could be a significant shortage in the availability of medical care in military stateside hospitals, since the theater requirements will have a higher priority for resources. Additional stateside hospital beds would be made available to the Department of Defense from Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals



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and from civilian hospitals participating in the National Disaster Medical System, for patients who cannot be returned to duty within a reasonable period of time.

During peacetime, the U.S. Public Health Service provides health care services to the Coast Guard. Should these personnel be transferred to meet Department of Defense medical needs, the Coast Guard could experience a severe decrease in its medical support. In wartime, upon the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense, the Navy will assume the primary responsibility for providing health care support to the Coast Guard.

To increase wartime medical readiness, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs provided to the services a Medical Readiness Strategic Plan which should be fully implemented by FY 1992. This plan identifies actions necessary to ensure that current and future medical

readiness plans, programs, and budgets are consistent with the needs of the Department of Defense and the theater commanders. The joint development and implementation of this plan integrates medical resources of various components to support wartime forces. The primary goal of this plan is to attain the fullest level of medical readiness mission integration within the Department of Defense health care system.

### **Medical Personnel**

Previous analyses have estimated total Department of Defense wartime medical shortages at 7,100 physicians, 31,000 registered nurses, and 73,000 enlisted personnel. Within these totals, Ready Reserve shortages approximate 30,800 physicians and registered nurses and 48,550 enlisted health care personnel.

Critical shortages include specialties such as general surgeons, thoracic



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surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, operating room nurses, nurse anesthetists, aidmen, and hospital corpsmen. Requirements for these personnel would be critical in time of a national emergency. Recruiting of new personnel into these skill areas and retention of those already in the services are absolutely essential if the medical readiness of the total force is to be improved.

The percentage of current shortages in the National Guard and Reserve vary between the services as shown in Tables 32 and 33. The data in these tables compare FY 1987 Ready Reserve personnel available with Ready Reserve wartime requirements derived from earlier requirements' analyses. The statistics illustrate the limited capabilities of the Ready Reserve to meet wartime health care personnel requirements.

**Table 32**  
**READY RESERVE HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL**  
**FY 1988**

Service	Ready <sup>1</sup> Reserve Required	SELRES Authorized	Ready Reserve Available			Ready Reserve Percent Filled
			SELRES	IRR	TOTAL	
PHYSICIANS AND REGISTERED NURSES						
Army	37,140	13,580	10,140	4,800	14,940	40%
Navy	8,350	3,860	2,960	1,440	4,400	53%
USAF	9,760	4,820	4,580	550	5,130	53%
TOTAL	55,250	22,260	17,680	6,790	24,470	44%
ENLISTED HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL						
Army	86,700	51,860	36,380	14,190	50,570	58%
Navy	25,860	11,920	10,910	3,420	14,330	55%
USAF	13,710	11,920	11,310	1,520	12,830	94%
TOTAL	126,270	75,700	58,600	19,130	77,730	62%

Note: 1. Ready Reserve requirements as shown here were derived from previous analyses of medical manpower requirements and staffing.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

**Table 33**  
**READY RESERVE PERSONNEL IN SELECTED SPECIALTIES**  
**FY 1988**

Service	Ready <sup>1</sup> Reserve Required	SELRES Authorized	Ready Reserve Available			Ready Reserve Percent Filled
			SELRES	IRR	TOTAL	
ANESTHESIOLOGISTS						
Army	765	200	115	80	195	26%
Navy	270	100	75	50	125	47%
USAF	340	40	40	5	45	13%
TOTAL	1,375	340	230	135	365	27%
SURGEONS						
Army	3,885	1,815	880	575	1,455	38%
Navy	755	370	290	205	495	66%
USAF	860	400	380	35	415	48%
TOTAL	5,500	2,585	1,550	815	2,365	43%
NURSE ANESTHETISTS						
Army	1,310	850	325	95	420	32%
Navy	390	85	40	10	50	12%
USAF	320	105	100	10	110	36%
TOTAL	2,020	1,040	465	115	580	29%

Note: 1. Ready Reserve requirements as shown here were derived from previous analyses of medical manpower requirements and staffing.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

Data as of September 30, 1987



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Most of the Air National Guard's medical mission is to provide aid stations, patient decontamination, triage, and return to duty type support, or to stabilize patients for evacuation. Although some of its health care personnel possess surgical specialties, the Air National Guard has few authorizations for those skills which

have critical shortages in the other components.

### **Medical Recruiting and Retention**

The reserve components place a high priority on recruiting of health care personnel. Increased efforts by the



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services and the Department of Defense have helped to reduce medical personnel shortages in the reserve components. Reserve component accession programs need to be made more effective. Some progress is being made although it is too early to ascertain the full impact of many of these recruiting initiatives.

The mission of the Selective Service System was expanded in December 1987, when as part of the FY 1988-1989 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized that agency to develop, and maintain ready for immediate operation, a system for the registration, classification, and delivery for induction of health care

personnel. In times of national emergency, the Selective Service System, along with volunteers, should provide sufficient health care manpower to sustain the mobilized forces. The plan should provide integration of procedures for registration, selection and induction, evaluation of licenses, claims and appeals processing, compliance, and alternative service. This capability will be implemented only upon a directed mobilization.

The following are some steps taken by the Department of Defense to enhance recruiting. It should be noted that health care professionals are not eligible for either of the first two programs if they have incurred active duty obligations through participation in some other program.

- The Health Professions Scholarship Program for Reserve Service (Stipend Program), has been restructured and expanded to offer an additional option for payback of service commitment in the Individual Ready Reserve. It also allows students in the third and fourth years of certain baccalaureate programs to participate in the program. Under the program, physicians and nurses who are training to practice in a critically short wartime specialty and undergraduate students receive monthly payments if they join one of the reserve components.

Stipends vary from \$100 to \$678 per month depending on the status of the recipient. There are seven Army National Guard, 254 Army Reserve, and 65 Naval Reserve participants in the program.

The Stipend Program is open to those currently serving in the reserve

components, those who apply for appointment and are offered a commission as Medical Corps or Nurse Corps officers, and to undergraduate students who would be eligible for a commission upon completion of their baccalaureate programs. Full implementation of the program has been delayed due to some recent legislative changes by Congress.

- The Education Loan Repayment Program for Health Professionals Who Serve in the Selected Reserve (Loan Repayment Program) has been extended to cover individuals who received loans for their nursing education under Title VII and Part B of Title VIII of the Public Health Service Act. To qualify, a doctor or nurse must be appointed to, or commissioned in, the Medical Corps or Nurse Corps before October 1, 1990. They must be in good professional standing and have a current license or certification. Participants must also be qualified and serving in a critical skill that has been determined to have a wartime shortage. *Maximum reimbursement is \$5,000 for each year of satisfactory service. Total program repayments may not exceed \$20,000.* There are 59 Army National Guard, 33 Army Reserve, six Naval Reserve, three Air National Guard, and four Air Force Reserve members in the program.
- Credit for civilian health care experience may now be granted to qualified nurses if that experience is in a skill needed by the service they are joining. This allows them to enter a reserve component at a rank more appropriate to their civilian background and experience.

- The maximum age for joining the reserve components has been raised for doctors and nurses in critically short specialties. Retirement age also needs to be increased so that full careers can be achieved.
- Last spring, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs sent more than 181,000 personalized letters to civilian doctors and nurses trained in critically short wartime specialties. The purpose of the mailing was to increase awareness of reserve component opportunities for health care professionals and to provide reserve component recruiters with viable leads to help them fill positions in the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve. The response to the direct mail campaign has been encouraging. The high volume of responses is a strong indicator of the civilian professional communities' heightened interest in and awareness of National Guard and Reserve participation options.





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Medical Corps officers—more than 35 percent of the wartime requirement.

The medical recruiting force in the Naval Reserve did not change significantly from FY 1987. There were 5,048 medical personnel recruited in FY 1988 vice the 6,201 accessed last year. Of 13,062 Naval Reserve hospital corpsman billets, 11,272 (86 percent) are filled. The Naval Reserve expects to fill the remaining vacancies by the end of FY 1989. There is no shortage of dental technicians.

The Naval Reserve exceeded its goal of 1,008 medical officers, for the year, by 26 percent. This is the first year that the physician goal has been achieved. Nurse recruiting achieved 90 percent of the goal. Two programs have been particularly effective for Naval Reserve medical recruiting and retention. REFLEX (Reserve Flexibility) allows doctors and nurses to schedule drill periods for as short as one hour increments. PRIMUS (Physician Reservists in Medical Universities and Schools) permits doctors and nurses to fulfill their inactive duty for training obligation at their universities or medical schools.

The Air National Guard also had a successful year as recruiting and retention efforts resulted in an overall gain in the number of medical service officers. The Air National Guard has approximately 300 medical officer vacancies out of nearly 2,000 authorized. Of 3,649 enlisted medical specialty positions, 3,484 (95.5 percent) have been filled.

The Air Force Reserve accessed 116 medical officers and 231 nurses during the year. In addition, 1,261 enlisted



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Each of the reserve components have programs oriented towards meeting their own medical recruiting needs. For FY 1988, the Army Reserve was authorized significant increases in full-time Active Guard/Reserve officer and enlisted personnel who would be directly involved in recruiting of medical personnel. These increases, plus other programs, caused the accession of approximately 500 more enlisted soldiers in FY 1988 than in FY 1987. Nurse recruiting goals were met and 90 percent of the physician recruiting goal was achieved.

The National Army Medical Department Augmentation Detachment (NAAD) and Specialized Training for Army Readiness (STAR) programs, discussed later in this chapter under "Training Initiatives", are excellent Army Reserve tools for recruiting and retention of medical personnel.

There were 842 medical officers recruited into the Army National Guard in FY 1988. This was an increase of 142 over the previous year. Both Medical Corps and Nurse Corps officer goals were exceeded during the year. The shortage is still approximately 500

personnel were recruited to fill medical unit vacancies.

The Coast Guard does not recruit medical officers. All are obtained through the U.S. Public Health Service or from within through the warrant officer physician assistant specialty. Enlisted health services technicians may join the warrant medical administration program. These individuals are not medical officers but are qualified to perform the same duties as a senior health services technician. Enlisted medical personnel are obtained through active component recruiters. The majority of reserve medical personnel have prior service. The reserve requirement is for 244 enlisted health service technicians. Only 177 (72.5 percent) are currently assigned. When the Coast Guard is transferred to the Department of Defense, in times of national emergency, the Navy Department will provide most of the Coast Guard's medical needs.

### **Impact of Budget Reductions**

Continuing health education (CHE) in civilian or military institutions is necessary for credentialing, licensing, and for refresher and proficiency training of military medical personnel. In some cases, it is used to build skills emphasizing trauma, emergency medicine, and care of battlefield wounded.

For many enlisted medical personnel in the reserve components, CHE is the only pure medical training received to sustain skills learned during initial entry training and inactive duty training periods. Some surveys indicate that the opportunity to attend CHE is a prime

reason for joining and remaining with a National Guard or Reserve unit. CHE is a valuable recruiting tool and enhances mobilization readiness.

However, the Army Reserve reports declines in funding for CHE of approximately \$2.9 million in FY 1988 and \$6.1 million in FY 1989. Funding is available for only 10 percent of unit medical personnel and members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Programmed funds are insufficient to meet required personnel increases into FY 1992.

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve provide approximately 50 and 26 percent respectively of the total Air Force second echelon (triage and initial medical care beyond self help and buddy care) medical service mission. FY 1988 budget cuts reduced manpower authorizations to cover 50 percent vice 66 percent of the wartime requirements for second echelon hospitals by Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel. Approximately 1,200 positions were deleted from Air National Guard and 3,100 from Air Force Reserve medical units. Additional personnel cuts will occur in FY 1989. Existing medical capability and projected growth have been hampered.



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Budget reductions forced the Coast Guard Reserve to reduce the frequency of physical examinations for its members. In addition, dental panoramic radiographs (used for casualty identification) have not been performed on reservists because resources are not available.

### **Training Initiatives and Limiters**

Due to a lack of available military schools, the Army National Guard initiated a civilian education program in FY 1988 to reduce its critical shortage of nurse anesthetists. The program will qualify Nurse Corps officers as nurse anesthetists through training at accredited civilian institutions. Although this program is an excellent means to reduce the skill shortage, budgetary limitations are expected to impact adversely on the number of students accepted into this program.

The Army Reserve initiated a program to enhance recruiting, retention, and training of Army Medical Department professionals by establishing a National Army Medical Department Augmentation Detachment (NAAD).

Officer and enlisted soldiers with critically short specialties, as determined by the Army Surgeon General, will be eligible for NAAD attachment.

Physicians and nurses will be assigned to vacancies in Army Reserve units without regard to geographical location, attached to NAAD, and become mobilization assets of their assigned units.

Removal of geographic restraints enables recruiters to take full advantage of the civilian market place by offering a nationwide program for those in the Army Reserve health care fields. For example, if a medical unit in the central United States cannot be filled because of a shortage of civilian medical professionals in that area, doctors and nurses from the east coast may be assigned to that unit.

NAAD participants are allowed 24-48 paid inactive duty training (IDT) periods annually and an option of fragmenting their 17-day annual training (AT). IDT is tailored to the individual's specialty and may be performed in a variety of military or civilian settings. In addition,



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NAAD members may attend advanced military education and continuing health education courses while in AT/IDT status. Soldiers joining NAAD will be required to perform a period of training with their parent unit every three years. This concept of flexible training could possibly be used in other fields, besides medical, to meet training requirements.


Twelve Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are being assigned to the NAAD, headquartered in Atlanta, for administrative and training support.

Another Army Reserve initiative is the Specialized Training for Army Readiness (STAR) program which uses civilian schools, rather than traditional Army programs, to train enlisted medical personnel. This program is patterned after a Naval Reserve initiative, Reserve Allied Medical Program (RAMP). It overcomes the inability of the Army training base to provide the large number of training spaces necessary to meet Army Reserve requirements. It also enhances recruiting by allowing reserve soldiers to attend long-term training near home. A prototype program for 200 reserve soldiers will

begin in selected locations in March 1989.

A soldier in the STAR program completes basic training and then enrolls in a civilian school to complete an associate degree or technical diploma program in a particular medical specialty. During this time, the individual is in Reserve status attending inactive duty for training and annual training periods. Qualified soldiers receive full tuition, books, and fees for their training as long as they meet school requirements and are working toward certification. Soldiers must serve in the Selected Reserve, in the specialty in which they are trained, one year for each full or partial year of their STAR education.

The STAR program allows an Army Reserve enlistment option in one of eight medical technician fields which have critical personnel shortages. It provides a cost effective and attractive method of providing lengthy skill training for enlisted medical personnel. Retention and skill sustainment of these soldiers should be excellent since participating soldiers choose their career specialty prior to enlisting and will



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probably seek civilian employment in the same field after graduation.

In FY 1988, four Naval Reserve Fleet Hospital Operations Courses (FHOC) were dedicated to reservists as part of a 12-day annual training period. During FY 1989, additional training, in conjunction with the FHOC, will include preventive medicine and environmental health; and chemical, biological, and radiological defense.

During the year, the Air National Guard established new requirements for the training of enlisted mental health specialists. Medical readiness squadrons are now authorized this position. Training is provided by the Army's Academy of Health Sciences.

There is a significant shortage of qualified flight nurses and aeromedical evacuation technicians in the Air National Guard. Training quotas at

schools are sufficient; however, the length of initial training precludes many from volunteering for this specialty. Additional recruiting manpower would greatly assist recruitment of qualified medical personnel to fill some of these positions. Limitations on promotions in aeromedical evacuation units adversely impact retention, which in turn impacts the ability of these units to conduct sustainment training to meet wartime requirements.

The Air National Guard acquired the Survivable Collective Protection System-Medical in FY 1988. This is a large, airtight shelter capable of surviving sustained combat shocks. It will be placed at a permanent training site to allow medical personnel to train in a simulated nuclear, biological, chemical scenario.

A concept for joint service sustainment training for enlisted medical personnel has been approved by the Reserve Component Medical Council. A preliminary draft of the plan of instruction has been prepared. A test training program is to commence in FY 1989. The Board recommends that this type of interservice training be conducted for common medical skills and that initial test programs be funded and evaluated.

The availability of the Combat Casualty Care Course (CCC) from the Joint Medical Readiness Training Center at Camp Bullis, Texas, has been expanded. The expansion plan improves reserve component health care personnel participation in CCC training by increasing the number of training spaces in the resident CCC course, and by exporting the resident CCC curriculum via joint service Mobile



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Medical Training Teams to National Guard and Reserve units. This enables C4 completion during weekend inactive duty training periods. The plan to expand C4 will be implemented in FY 1989. Course graduates receive Advanced Trauma Life Support certification and recognition from the American College of Surgeons.

Ineffective use of training time to enhance wartime medical skills is cited as one factor adversely affecting medical personnel retention in the reserve components. The National Guard and Reserve are striving to overcome such training detractors.

### Medical Exercises

Department of Defense reserve component medical personnel participated in a variety of exercises around the world during FY 1988. The Navy provides medical support for Marine Corps Reserve exercises. The services reported their National Guard and Reserve medical personnel involvement as follows:

● Army National Guard	1824
● Army Reserve	2130
● Naval Reserve	2030
● Air National Guard	720
● Air Force Reserve	1603
Total	8307

Participation in exercises provides training in battle casualty treatment, as well as invaluable experience in general medical support of troops in a field environment. Training is conducted in general field skills and survival, litter bearing, triage of casualties, emergency care, field sanitation, deployment and mobilization planning, air and ground

evacuation procedures, exercise of command and control systems, and interservice and intercomponent coordination.

Unique opportunities exist for medical training in many parts of the world. National Guard and Reserve personnel provided medical support to engineering exercises in Central America. They simultaneously gained valuable experience by treating local civilians with various diseases and medical conditions not seen in the United States. Physicians gain excellent knowledge about tropical medicine from these training tours. Instruction in preventive medicine also was provided in many remote areas.

The Army Reserve provided a medical assessment team to Bangladesh during the year. The team's evaluation of health services in that country was very helpful to that government and provided an excellent training opportunity for medical personnel.



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Many reserve component units participated in national disaster readiness exercises during the year. These exercises require close coordination between the services, local emergency medical services, fire departments, ambulance services, and local civilian hospitals in the National Disaster Medical System.

### **Human Immunodeficiency Virus Policy**

In August 1988, the Secretary of Defense issued a policy directive on the identification, surveillance, and administration of personnel infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). The policy applies to military members, candidates for accession, and military health care beneficiaries with serologic evidence of HIV infection.

Policies specifically pertaining to the National Guard and Reserve include:

- Individuals with serologic evidence of HIV infection, who are required to meet accession medical fitness standards in order to enlist or be commissioned, are not eligible for

military service with the reserve components.

- Reserve component military personnel will be screened for serologic evidence of HIV infection. Those members not on extended active duty are ineligible for medical evaluation and treatment in military medical facilities. These individuals will be counseled regarding the significance of a positive HIV antibody test and referred to their private physicians for medical care and counseling.
- The Secretaries of the Military Departments are to provide for the notification, either through local public health authorities or by Defense Department health care professionals, of the spouses of reserve component members found to be HIV infected. Notifications must comply with the Privacy Act. The Secretaries are to designate all spouses, who are notified under this provision, to receive serologic testing and counseling on a voluntary basis from medical treatment facilities under the Secretaries' jurisdiction. The names of individuals identified to be at risk who are not eligible for military health care are to be provided to local civilian health authorities unless prohibited by the appropriate state or host-nation civilian health authority.
- The Secretaries of the Military Departments may restrict individuals with serologic evidence of HIV infection to nondeployable units or positions within the United States for purposes of force readiness.





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- Reserve component members with serologic evidence of HIV infection are ineligible for extended active duty except under conditions of mobilization. Reserve component members, who are not on extended active duty or on extended full-time National Guard duty, and who show serologic evidence of HIV infection, will be transferred involuntarily to the Standby Reserve only if they cannot be utilized in the Selected Reserve in nondeployable units.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) has recommended a different policy. Excerpts from its position are:

... the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) strongly recommends to the Secretary of Defense, as DoD policy, that members of the Ready Reserve tested and determined to be HIV positive, if not discharged, be transferred to the Standby Reserve (Inactive Status List)...

Some reasons for these recommendations follow. Current



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military regulations, as well as disparate State Public Health Laws make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain required confidentiality when a member of the reserve components tests HIV positive. Once tested positive, the service member no longer is deployable. Reserve component members, unlike active component personnel, who test HIV positive are ineligible for military medical treatment. Finally, there is considerable concern about whether these members could ever be called to active duty upon mobilization...

The active components have great latitude concerning nondeployable units. In the reserve components, however, that is not the case. Nondeployable units or positions are practically nonexistent. The Board feels that this places an undue burden on the reserve components and, therefore, these people should not be allowed to remain in the Selected Reserve



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The Board has been informed recently of the opinion of the Department of Defense General Counsel that an automatic transfer to the Standby Reserve is not currently permitted by law. Therefore, the Board further recommends a change to the law in order to permit implementation of the Board's recommendation.

The number of HIV infected personnel in the reserve components is small. Approximately 80 percent of the Army's reserve component personnel have been screened for HIV. Of these, .13 percent have tested positive. The initial testing of reserve component members in troop units was completed in FY 1988. Beginning in FY 1989, HIV screening will be conducted at least every other year for most Guardsmen and Reservists.

In early FY 1988, the Army's policy for its reserve components required that all HIV positive Army reserve component soldiers be transferred to the Standby Reserve if they did not request honorable discharge or, if eligible, elect voluntary retirement. That policy has now been modified to allow HIV infected reserve component soldiers to prove fitness for duty (at their own expenses). If fit, and qualified, these soldiers could be utilized in nondeployable Selected Reserve positions, if available.

The Naval Reserve has screened 66 percent of its unit personnel and found .04 percent to be HIV positive. The majority of Naval Reservists will be screened annually except when mobilization assignment to an overseas deployable unit requires screening within six months of the member actually deploying.

HIV screening in the Marine Corps Reserve will be conducted annually for unit members and when physicals are given members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Approximately 85 percent of unit members have been screened with less than .01 percent testing positive.

Beginning in FY 1989, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve members will be screened every two years. More than 88 percent of Air National Guard members have been screened to date with .08 percent testing positive. Ninety three percent of Air Force Reserve unit personnel have been tested with .17 percent showing HIV positive results.

The Coast Guard screens 100 percent of its Selected Reserve for HIV annually. Very few have tested HIV positive. Members who test positive are

considered not fit for duty. If the condition is service connected, the member is afforded the same administrative and medical procedures as active component members. If not service connected, the member will be separated and granted an honorable discharge unless a lesser discharge is warranted for some other reason.

With approximately 491,000 personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve, HIV-screening will have a major impact upon mobilization since many of these individuals will require screening at mobilization sites. Programs are being developed to ensure that this screening can be accomplished. The Board recommends that consideration be given to conducting HIV testing simultaneously with the required Individual Ready Reserve screening. This would reduce the heavy impact of screening upon mobilization.

The services are concerned about the loss of any trained individuals because of HIV infection. Conversely, retention of significant numbers of HIV infected members could have a negative impact on force readiness.

### **Dental Panoramic Radiographs**

One of the most important means for identifying casualties is through the use of dental panoramic radiographs—a film record of teeth. Department of Defense policy requires two radiograph copies for each member. One is retained in the individual's dental record and the other is forwarded to a Central Panoramic Storage Facility (CPSF) so that the films can be properly stored, catalogued, and retrieved if required.

Some of the reserve components report that nearly 80 percent of their personnel have the dental panoramic radiographs in their dental health records. Nearly 50 percent of these have the radiographs on file at the CPSF. Personnel are ineligible for overseas deployment without a suitable dental record on file.


In the initial years of the panoramic program, the reserve components experienced difficulty in having the films taken because of the lack of equipment and facilities. Additionally, there was a problem having the records stored at the CPSF because all members



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were not enrolled in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) and funds were not available to meet the requirements. Although full DEERS enrollment still has not been accomplished in several of the reserve components, other automated systems



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are being used to assist the storage of National Guard and Reserve members' records. The program for the Coast Guard Reserve remains unfunded. Very few Coast Guard Reserve personnel have dental panoramic radiographs in their dental health records. The Air National Guard has given priority emphasis to the acquisition of panoramic machines in the last two years and expects to greatly improve its records program in FY 1989.

### **Medical Evacuation**

The reserve components of the Army and Air Force provide 74 percent of all Department of Defense dedicated medical evacuation crews. This



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percentage includes dedicated crews for ground and helicopter ambulance units, as well as crews on Air Force aeromedical evacuation aircraft. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard do not assign medical evacuation crews

to their reserve components. However, any vehicle or aircraft may be called upon for medical evacuation missions when necessary. Table 34 displays information on medical evacuation crews in the reserve components.

**Table 34**  
**MEDICAL EVACUATION CREWS**

		FY 1981	FY 1988	Projected FY 1989
<b>Army</b>	Total # MEDEVAC Crews	1826	1910	2005
National Guard	MEDEVAC Crews	772	820	832
	Percent of Total Crews	42%	43%	41%
Reserve	MEDEVAC Crews	420	534	582
	Percent of Total Crews	23%	28%	29%
	RC Percent of Army MEDEVAC Crews	65%	71%	71%
<b>Navy</b>	Total # MEDEVAC Crews	135	135	135
Naval Reserve		0	0	0
Marine Corps Reserve		0	0	0
<b>Air Force</b>	Total # MEDEVAC Crews	536	762	768
National Guard	MEDEVAC Crews	134	182	182
	Percent of Total Crews	25%	24%	24%
Reserve	MEDEVAC Crews	352	530	530
	Percent of Total Crews	66%	69%	69%
	RC Percent of Air Force MEDEVAC Crews	91%	93%	93%
<b>Total DoD</b>	Total # MEDEVAC Crews <sup>1</sup>	2497	2807	2908
	Total # RC MEDEVAC Crews	1678	2066	2126
	RC Percent of Total DoD Crews	67%	74%	73%

Note: 1. Coast Guard has no MEDEVAC crews.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.



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## Medical Equipment

### Deployable Medical Systems

The Deployable Medical System (DEPMEDS) equipment consists of standardized modules such as operating rooms, laboratories, x-ray facilities, and patient wards. It can be used by all services and can be configured to varying types or sizes of hospitals or clinics. The system uses the latest medical technology, expendable supplies, and non-medical support equipment. It is fully transportable by military systems.

The Army plans to provide 25 DEPMEDS sets to the National Guard and another 94 sets to the Army Reserve by the end of FY 1996. Good progress is being made on the DEPMEDS distribution plan. The total number of beds fielded by the end of FY 1988 was 4,320.

By the end of the year, the Army National Guard had received one evacuation hospital set for a medical regional training site and three training sets for stateside medical units. In

addition, two evacuation hospital sets, designated for Army National Guard units, were fielded to Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) and one evacuation hospital set was fielded to the active component and then aligned as POMCUS Unit Residual Equipment (PURE) to a National Guard unit.

The Army Reserve has received eight sets for stateside medical units. In addition, one combat support hospital set and two evacuation hospital sets designated for Army Reserve units were fielded to POMCUS. One mobile army surgical hospital set and two evacuation hospital sets were fielded to the active component and then aligned as PURE for Army Reserve Units.

POMCUS equipment is stored in overseas theaters for use in the event of mobilization. PURE equipment is on-hand in active component units but will be transferred to a reserve component unit upon deployment of the active component unit overseas. Army National Guard and Army Reserve units are preassigned to PURE DEPMEDS equipment.

Six additional DEPMEDS sets will be provided to medical regional training sites. In FY 1989, a set will go to Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, for the Army National Guard. The Army Reserve will receive one set at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts, and another at Camp Parks, California. In 1990-1992, training sets will be available at Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas; Ft. Gordon, Georgia; and Ft. McCoy, Wisconsin.

Four Army National Guard and eight Army Reserve medical units have received training on DEPMEDS. An



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additional seven National Guard and 15 Army Reserve units are scheduled for training in FY 1989. Training is keeping pace with the fielding of DEPMEDS equipment.

The Naval Reserve will staff 15 DEPMEDS-equipped fleet hospitals with Selected Reservists. DEPMEDS equipment will not be provided to the Naval Reserve. Rather, the Navy is purchasing and storing the equipment as prepositioned war stocks. Reserve units will be established and commence training in the year prior to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the new fleet hospital. Expansion of the Fleet Hospital Training Activity at Camp Pendleton, California, is necessary for the Naval Reserve to meet its goal of 40 percent of personnel trained by the IOC of each hospital.

The other reserve components do not use DEPMEDS equipment.

### Other Medical Equipment

In addition to DEPMEDS, all reserve components, except the Naval Reserve, report shortages of both medical and medical support items.


The Army National Guard has 76 percent of required medical equipment on-hand. There are shortages of dental chairs, x-ray sets and apparatus, sterilizers, and surgical sink units. Critical shortages in medical support equipment include five-ton trucks, dolly sets, and tentage.

The Army Reserve has only 51 percent of its required medical equipment. It is short dental, x-ray, and laboratory sets. The percentage of required medical support equipment on-hand is only 29 percent. The lack of trucks, water trailers, generators, and radio sets would seriously hamper medical units from moving and communicating on the battlefield.


The Air National Guard has approximately 75 percent of its required medical equipment. General mission medical equipment is at approximately 95 percent. Items for units' support contingency and wartime missions are at 50 percent. Nuclear, biological, and chemical protective equipment; cold weather gear; communications equipment; generators; vehicles; and tentage are notable shortages in medical units.



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## Hospital Ships

In August 1988, members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board visited the USNS COMFORT, one of the Navy's two hospital ships. When fully staffed, the ship, with its excellent equipment and facilities, represents an extraordinary capability to treat and support battlefield casualties. It is staffed by active component medical personnel and by civilian personnel who operate the ship. The Board is concerned that the ship is manned only by active component personnel and that there is no opportunity for reserve component personnel to train on the ship's modern medical equipment and facilities. Original manning documents included Reserve billets but they were changed to active component billets in 1987. Billets have again been identified for possible Selected Reserve manning. A working group has been convened to work towards restoration of these billets if Reserve manning is again approved.

## Summary and Recommendations

More than two-thirds of medical personnel support and approximately three-fourths of Department of Defense dedicated medical evacuation crews in wartime will be provided by the reserve components. Critical shortages of officers and enlisted personnel with wartime medical skills and properly equipped medical care facilities in the National Guard and Reserve are matters of concern. Budget reductions in the medical area have adversely impacted all of the components.

Progress is being made in recruiting, retention, and equipping of the medical forces. Training for medical personnel

The Air Force Reserve has 89 percent of its required medical equipment. Shortages exist in air evacuation contingency kits, portable liquid oxygen units, suction apparatus, water test kits, and radia detectors. Medical support equipment shortages include forklifts, radios, radio test equipment, water trailers, generators, vehicles, tents, and tent heaters.


Minor medical contingencies can be supported by all of the reserve components. However, current shortages of both medical equipment and medical support equipment would have a serious negative impact on the accomplishment of wartime missions.

in some of the critically short specialties is being made more practical. Flexibility has been built into training programs and opportunities so that they fit better into medical professionals' schedules. As a result, medical readiness should begin to show improvements.

Medical exercises have enhanced the ability of the services to properly evaluate, treat, and evacuate patients to rear echelons for care and subsequent return to duty. These exercises increase medical readiness in the reserve components.

The Board recommends:


- a change to the law in order to permit implementation of the Board's recommendation stated above.
- consideration be given to conducting HIV screening simultaneously with the screening of the Individual Ready Reserve, which is required by law.
- conduct interservice training for common medical skills, and that initial test joint service training programs be funded and evaluated.






# Facilities 7

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## General

The reserve components manage more than 5,300 facilities in about 4,800 communities around the nation and overseas. These facilities are necessary for administration, training, and mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve. Sufficient facilities are required to support force structure, training of the force, and equipment modernization programs. Some sites are used for storage or maintenance of equipment.


As additional missions are given to the reserve components, increasing attention needs to be paid to the adequacy of facilities. There have been many facility improvements in recent years. However, many armories, reserve centers, training sites, storage areas, and maintenance facilities remain inadequate. Force structure, mission, and equipment changes have caused facilities to become inadequate. Other facilities no longer meet safety or security needs. Inadequate training, storage, maintenance, and administrative

facilities can adversely impact unit readiness.

Overall, funding for military construction and maintenance of reserve component facilities is insufficient. Backlogs of projects in all components continue to increase.

Many training, maintenance, and storage facilities are used jointly by different components. For example, Air National Guard units and Air Force Reserve units often share airfield space, with one component responsible for management of the facility and the other a tenant. The Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve share some facilities. The Coast Guard Reserve uses other services' reserve centers as well as active component facilities. In some instances, more than two components share facilities. Multiple service use of facilities is economical and should be exploited where possible.

Some National Guard or Reserve unit equipment, that will be needed upon mobilization, is not required for routine



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
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
RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 1988(U)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE  
AFFAIRS/LOGISTICS) WASHINGTON DC RESERVE FORCES POLICY  
BOARD 1988 F/B 15/1

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training. Such equipment may be prepositioned in other locations where it will be readily accessible if a unit is mobilized. The Marine Corps Reserve allots only a training allowance of equipment to its units. The remainder of the units' authorized equipment is prepositioned. Programs of this nature reduce storage problems at the unit level.


The location of a reserve component facility can affect recruiting efforts by the services. Proximity of a National Guard or Reserve member to a training site may influence choices to join or remain in a reserve component. The appearance of the training center contributes to recruiting, retention, and effectiveness of training. Appearance also may influence community attitudes towards the National Guard or Reserve.

Facilities in the community may be the only visual symbol to many citizens of the resolve of the nation to provide for its defense. These factors can directly affect the readiness of units at a particular location.

### **Mobilization Facilities**

Upon mobilization, many reserve component facilities will be closed. Training of the force will be consolidated into approximately 1,200 larger mobilization sites. The Army closes the most facilities as its National Guard and Reserve units prepare for deployment. The Marine Corps Reserve will concentrate its forces, after initial processing at home stations, at stations of initial assignment.

Some reserve component units will deploy directly to the theater of operations from their home stations.



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However, most units will continue training at mobilization sites or stations of initial assignment prior to deployment. Units needing additional equipment, prior to deployment, may receive it at these installations, at ports of embarkation, or from prepositioned stocks.

Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve aviation units generally mobilize at their peacetime training stations where any necessary training and administrative processing for overseas deployment is accomplished.



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The Coast Guard Reserve has only three units that deploy outside the continental United States upon mobilization. Less than 25 percent of the Coast Guard Reserve reports to interim locations prior to deployment to ships or overseas locations where they individually augment gaining commands. The remainder of the Coast Guard Reserve reports directly to their gaining commands.

Most mobilization sites and stations of initial assignment are generally adequate for reception, processing, and training of mobilized personnel. Adequate housing may not be available at peak periods. Contract housing and contract feeding may be required at some locations. At locations where facilities are shared among components, more extensive planning may be required for full mobilization of all components.

The ability of mobilization sites to respond to the needs of limited mobilization is tested occasionally. However, tests of full mobilization surge capabilities, required by current mobilization plans, have not been conducted at most facilities recently. The Board recommends that tests of

surge capabilities at mobilization sites be planned, funded, and conducted to evaluate manning, training space adequacy, and housing capacity at each facility. These tests should help determine whether current mobilization plans can be supported.

### Major Construction

Major construction of facilities for the reserve components is necessary to replace or renovate existing buildings. Additionally, facilities are needed to accommodate new force structure and larger equipment being distributed to the National Guard and Reserve. New missions, larger units, and relocation of reserve centers and armories because of changing demographics, receive priorities for construction funds. The Coast Guard Reserve does not have a segregated military construction budget and does not have separate buildings for its exclusive use. One hundred fifty-seven major construction projects for the reserve components were completed in FY 1988. See Table 35. Nearly twice that number of major construction projects are scheduled for completion in FY 1989.

**Table 35**  
**MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS**

	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>USAR</u>	<u>USNR</u>	<u>USMCR</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>USAFR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Completed FY 1988	35	21	10	3	59	29	157
Projected FY 1989	140	38	13	5	56	44	297
Source: Individual Reserve Components. Data as of September 30, 1988.							

Some recently completed projects had been planned in earlier years but had to wait for funding. Examples of projects completed include armories and reserve centers (some for joint use); equipment maintenance and storage facilities; training facilities for specialized or regional training; special buildings for training devices or simulators; and rehabilitation of aging utility systems. However, budgetary constraints may hamper completion of all of these planned projects.

Force structure growth and equipment conversions to modern aircraft, equipment, and vehicles require modern facilities for efficient and safe operation. Delays in providing appropriate unit facilities affects modernization plans as well as morale and motivation of personnel. As a result, retention, recruiting, and unit readiness may be reduced.

#### **Unfunded Major Construction Requirements**

The value of required, but unfunded, major construction projects for the reserve components approximates \$7.4 billion. Unfunded requirements in each component at the end of FY 1988 were:

● Army National Guard	\$2.7B
● Army Reserve	\$1.9B
● Naval Reserve	\$1.0B
● Marine Corps Reserve	\$0.1B
● Air National Guard	\$1.0B
● Air Force Reserve	\$0.7B
Total	\$7.4B

More than 60 percent of this \$7.4 billion requirement is in the Army's reserve components. Failure to meet planned construction requirements each year has caused the value of unfunded

projects to grow. Annual funding has not kept pace with new requirements.

Many projects for the reserve components have been designed but remain unfunded due to budgetary constraints. Delays in designed projects also increases costs. Continued use of antiquated or inefficient facilities causes additional costs for operations and maintenance. This decreases funds available for training. The result is reduced mobilization readiness.

#### **Inadequacy of Buildings**

Although there have been significant improvements in building adequacy in some components, many buildings used by the National Guard and Reserve are grossly inadequate. Some were intended as temporary structures but are still being used. Table 36 displays the number and percentage of all buildings considered inadequate by each reserve component. The table also shows improvements reported since last year. The significant change in Naval Reserve data is due mostly to a reevaluation of adequacy standards. Additional construction and repair funds are needed to resolve the problem of inadequate facilities. Revitalization of existing physical plants will continue to suffer as new initiatives claim priority on available funds.



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**Table 36**  
**SERVICE ESTIMATES OF BUILDING INADEQUACY**

	ARNG	USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG	USAFR	USCGR	Total
Reason for Inadequacy								
Obsolescence	5119	164	71	12	900	126	0	6392
Size	1129	110	164	0	700	112	147	2362
Condition	2525	206	144	0	0	41	0	2916
Total Inadequate	8773	480	379	12	1600	279	147	11670
Number of Buildings Managed	21970	2184	1919	89	4800	697	240	31899
Percent Considered Inadequate								
FY 1988	39.9%	22.0%	19.7%	13.5%	33.3%	40.0%	61.3%	36.6%
FY 1987	52.0%	21.0%	71.2%	35.1%	20.0%	50.7%	62.0%	N/A

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.



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### **Military Construction Budget**

Military construction backlogs exist in the reserve components. In spite of this, and because of budgetary constraints, amounts requested for military construction funding are declining. Congress, however, did provide more funds for reserve component military construction in FY 1988 and FY 1989 than requested by the Department of Defense. Table 37 shows the amounts requested and appropriated for FY 1988 and FY 1989, along with a projected request for FY 1990. This table also displays service estimates of continued growth in the construction backlog.



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**Table 37**  
**MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING**  
**(Millions of Dollars)**

	FY 1988	FY 1989	Projected FY 1990
<b>Army National Guard</b>			
Military Construction Request	170.4	138.3	125.0
Military Construction Appropriation	184.4	229.2	N/A
Construction Backlog Cost—FY End	2500.0	2660.0	2714.0
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	170.5	215.2	120.2
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maintenance and Repair	5.6	1.4	0.0
<b>Army Reserve</b>			
Military Construction Request	95.1	79.9	76.9
Military Construction Appropriation	95.1	86.0	N/A
Construction Backlog Cost—FY End	1900.0	1905.7	2338.1
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	95.1	86.0	76.9
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maintenance and Repair	14.9	4.9	3.5
<b>Naval Reserve</b>			
Military Construction Request	73.7	48.4	40.3
Military Construction Appropriation	73.7	60.9	N/A
Construction Backlog Cost—FY End	997.0	1046.0	1076.0
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	67.1	53.5	44.2
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maintenance and Repair	31.6	37.5	30.0
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>			
Military Construction Request <sup>1</sup>			10.6
Military Construction Appropriation <sup>1</sup>			N/A
Construction Backlog Cost—FY End	83.8	94.1	98.8
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	27.2	5.0	10.0
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maintenance and Repair	3.3	3.6	3.5
<b>Air National Guard</b>			
Military Construction Request	160.8	147.5	164.6
Military Construction Appropriation	151.3	158.5	N/A
Construction Backlog—FY End	1043.5	1081.5	1150.0
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	19.0	32.0	53.0
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maintenance and Repair	40.0	42.0	48.1
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>			
Military Construction Request	79.3	58.8	46.2
Military Construction Appropriation	79.3	70.6	N/A
Construction Backlog Cost—FY End <sup>2</sup>	713.8	911.2	918.6
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	17.4	26.0	17.8
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maintenance and Repair	5.0	7.0	10.0
<b>DoD Totals<sup>3</sup></b>			
Military Construction Request	579.3	472.9	463.6
Military Construction Appropriation	583.8	605.2	N/A
Construction Backlog Cost—FY End	7238.1	7698.5	8295.5
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	396.3	417.7	322.1
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maintenance and Repair	100.4	96.4	95.1

Notes: 1. Marine Corps amounts included in Navy Department for FY 1988 and 1989.

2. Air Force Reserve redefined "backlog" in FY 1988.

3. Coast Guard Reserve does not have military construction funding.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988



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Table 37 also shows amounts committed to reducing construction backlogs. The Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve are increasing the amounts allocated for backlog reduction.

Deferral of military construction projects due to constrained resources increases the amount of funding required for maintenance and repair accounts. Accordingly, the backlogs for maintenance and repair in the National Guard and Reserve continues to grow. Amounts committed or planned for reduction of the backlog of maintenance and repair accounts are shown in Table 37.

According to budget request projections through FY 1991, major construction funds will be reduced approximately 30 percent, minor construction project funding will be increased 36 percent, and funds for planning and design will decline approximately 44 percent.

### **Base Closures**

Base closures can have a significant impact on reserve component training

and the amount of money which must be spent on transportation to training sites. The Board cautions that serious consideration should be given to the impact of base closures on the reserve components. Where possible, some facilities, or portions thereof, might be transferred to a reserve component to reduce the impact of inadequate facilities. Transfers could also reduce the amount of funds required in the defense budget for reserve component facility construction. Some of the bases proposed for closure could become mobilization sites or storage facilities for mobilization equipment, thus reducing requirements for construction or leasing of new facilities.

### **Equipment Storage**

Equipment modernization of the reserve components has dramatically increased the requirement for adequate storage facilities. Size of the equipment, additional support equipment for sophisticated weapon systems, and increased amounts of equipment distributed to the National Guard and Reserve have caused severe shortages of storage space. Modern equipment provides improved capability and compatibility. It must be stored where it can be readily maintained. Only the Air Force Reserve reports adequate storage facilities for nearly all its equipment.

Storage and maintenance facility requirements have been identified in most components for such things as bulk, prepackaged, mobilization equipment; vehicles; aircraft; sea vessels; DEPMEDS hospital sets; electronic countermeasures pods; munitions; and special purpose vehicles.



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Many National Guard and Reserve facilities are inadequate in size and cannot be expanded to accommodate the new equipment. Some remote storage arrangements lack proper security, reduce the availability of equipment at training locations, and unnecessarily increase equipment usage. Training with equipment may be reduced due to the added time needed to get equipment from storage areas. Newer aircraft often have different storage, maintenance, and operational requirements than equipment being replaced.

Many units would exceed their storage capacity if all authorized equipment were provided. The Army's reserve components and the Marine Corps Reserve issue, to some units, only that equipment needed for training. This reduces storage requirements at the unit level. Full mobilization sets are stored elsewhere or prepositioned overseas.


Budget constraints on military construction funding makes long term leasing of storage and maintenance facilities a practical solution to short range storage problems. This may not be the least expensive solution over the long term but equipment can be easily protected through leasing arrangements. Special outdoor unheated storage buildings are being acquired by some components to reduce the scope of the storage problem.

Indoor storage facilities are not feasible for all equipment. It must be realized, however, that equipment stored outside is subject to more rapid deterioration than when properly stored in protective shelters. Outside storage also requires increased equipment maintenance and subsequently reduces time available for training.

Post mobilization equipment in storage is occasionally unpacked and tested by the National Guard and



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Reserve during training exercises. This testing provides for rotation of stock and evaluates the effectiveness of the storage system to support rapid mobilization.

Facilities-related problems mentioned by the Board in earlier reports continue to be of concern. Some of these are inadequacy of small arms firing ranges (both indoor and outdoor), encroach-




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ment by civilian housing and commercial businesses on training lands and spaces, and environmental concerns such as noise "pollution".

### **Summary and Recommendations**

Each of the reserve components have identified additional facility requirements. Many of these have been continued from year to year because of resource constraints. New missions and increasing distribution of modern equipment to the reserve components are stretching the adequacy of facilities—whether they be for administration, training, maintenance, or storage.

Facility requirements continue to be added at the same time as backlogs in construction projects, and in maintenance and repair projects, continue to grow.




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
Military construction funds, as well as maintenance and repair funds, for the reserve components, should be increased to keep pace with facility needs. Inadequacy of facilities degrades the effectiveness of training. Equipment deteriorates when exposed for extended periods to the environment. The condition of facilities used for training influences recruiting and retention of National Guard and Reserve members.

The Board recommends:

- tests of surge capabilities at mobilization sites be planned,

funded, and conducted to evaluate manning, training space adequacy, and housing capacity at each facility.


- increase military construction appropriations for the National Guard and Reserve to keep pace with increasing roles and responsibilities.
- additional funding be requested and appropriated to reduce the backlogs in construction and maintenance and repair projects in the reserve components. 



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


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# Readiness **8**

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## General

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JCS-1) defines readiness as "the ability of the military forces, units, weapon systems or equipment to deliver the output for which they were designed." Measuring and reporting readiness of the reserve components of the United States is a complex and sometimes subjective exercise.

There is no simple means for measuring readiness. An objective and uniform readiness measuring system for reporting unit readiness does not exist. As a result, many people resort to using the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) as a way of measuring readiness. This is not what the system was designed for and can be very misleading. It is reasonable to believe, however, that a unit, which is resourced fully with its personnel and equipment and trained properly in individual and unit skills, should be ready to perform its mission.



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## Status of Resources and Training System

FY 1987 was the first full year in which units reported status under SORTS. The system was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide uniform policy and criteria, for selected active and reserve component units, to report the level and condition of unit resources and the level of training. Based on this policy, each service develops implementing instructions indicating which units are to report and what should be reported. Units report four resource areas under SORTS—personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training. An overall unit resource area, based only on resources organic to and training under the operational control of the reporting unit, is also provided.

Each resource area is assigned one of five category levels under SORTS. The levels are used primarily as a management tool and merely indicate a unit's peacetime status, at the time of the report, relative to the wartime requirement. Category levels do not project a unit's combat ability once mobilized. Definitions of the category levels are:

- C-1—Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-2—Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-3—Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake major portions of the wartime

mission for which it is organized or designed.

- C-4—Unit requires additional resources and/or training in order to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with resources on-hand.
- C-5—Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

### Interpreting Readiness Data

A SORTS report indicates a unit's resource and training status on a particular date, in the areas evaluated. The report should be only one of several indicators employed to determine reserve component unit readiness. SORTS category levels alone do not indicate a unit's readiness. Tangible factors such as numbers of personnel, training, equipment, facilities, and funding all impact on readiness. Intangible factors such as leadership, morale, cohesiveness, skill retention, and physical fitness, strength, and stamina of individual members also affect a unit's combat readiness.

In addition to SORTS, the results of mobilization tests, combat readiness evaluations, operational readiness inspections, and other criteria must be examined to determine the true combat readiness of a reserve component unit. There is no single number that can be pointed to as representing the readiness of a unit, or an entire reserve component. Determining readiness is a complex evaluation process.



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Readiness, even when completely and accurately evaluated, is only one of many factors that go into determining military capability. Military capability is defined by JCS-1 as "the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective". Readiness is only one supporting pillar of military capability. The others are force structure, modernization, and sustainability. The abilities to mobilize and deploy the forces must also be considered when analyzing military capabilities of the reserve components.

There are other factors that must be considered when measuring readiness. Department of Defense policy is to equip first, those reserve component units that will be first to fight. Readiness is limited by assets and time available. It is not expected that all



reserve component units will be 100 percent ready during peacetime. Some units are not organized, resourced, or authorized to achieve that level. Some units will not receive all of their equipment until mobilized and, therefore, cannot be considered ready until that time. Other units may not be ready due to a recent reorganization, or because they have received new equipment with which they have not had an opportunity to train. Many of these organizations could rapidly be made ready to deploy with an intense period of training.

If a unit is not adequately trained or resourced with personnel or equipment, and there are no immediate plans to raise the unit to a status whereby it can undertake major portions of its mission; and if such a unit is not identified specifically as a "cadre"-type unit; then, in this era of budget constraints, policy

makers need to give consideration to deactivating the unit and placing its assets where they can be more effectively employed.

Mobilization preparedness is a major objective of the reserve components. All components, except the Coast Guard Reserve, utilize the Status of Resources and Training Systems report as an indicator of unit status. The SORTS report alone does not present a complete picture of unit readiness. All factors and indicators must be carefully analyzed to determine true mobilization and combat readiness of a reserve component unit.

#### **SORTS Profile of the Reserve Components**

Table 38 presents major limiting factors of the reserve components, as reported through SORTS.



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**Table 38**  
**SORTS<sup>1</sup> PROFILE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS**  
**AND MAJOR LIMITING FACTORS**

	Limiting Factors FY 1988 <sup>2</sup>	
	Most Critical	Second Most Critical
Army National Guard	Personnel (Individual Skill Qualification)	Personnel (Strength)
Army Reserve	Personnel (Strength)	Personnel (Individual Skill Qualification)
Naval Reserve		
Commissioned	Equipment On-Hand	Equipment Condition
Reinforcing/Sustaining (R-3)	Training	Personnel (Strength)
Marine Corps Reserve	Personnel (Strength)	Equipment Condition
Air National Guard	Personnel (Strength)	Training
Air Force Reserve	Personnel (Individual Skill Qualification)	Training
Coast Guard Reserve	Personnel	Training
Overall DoD		
Selected Reserve	% C-3/R-3 or Better	Limiting Factors
FY 1988	81	Personnel      Training
FY 1987	75	Personnel      Equipment Condition
FY 1986	70	Equipment On-Hand      Personnel

Notes: 1. Status of Resources and Training System.

2. Limiting factors are based on number of units affected as reported in SORTS.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

An analysis of SORTS discloses the following:

- Of the reporting units, 81 percent were rated C/R-3 or better at the end of FY 1988.
- All reserve components reported that the percentages of units reporting C/R-3 or better increased over FY 1987, except for commissioned units of the Naval Reserve. This may, in part, be due to a 27 percent increase



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between FY 1987 and FY 1988 in the number of reporting units in the Naval Reserve.

- The table shows limiting factors of each reserve component as reported through SORTS. Overall limiting factors to Department of Defense reserve component readiness in FY 1988, in order of total number of units affected, were personnel shortages, individual skill qualification, equipment condition, equipment on-hand, and training. Personnel, training, and equipment problems are discussed in other chapters of this report.

## Readiness Limiting Factors

Accounting for all factors, the reserve components informed the Board of what they perceive to be their most serious limiting factors to readiness in FY 1988.

One of the most critical limiting factors for the Army reserve components and the Marine Corps Reserve is lack of military occupational specialty qualification. This problem is discussed in the Personnel Chapter of this report. Another critical readiness limiter for the Army reserve components and the Marine Corps Reserve is equipment shortages. The Naval Reserve commissioned units also have equipment problems. These are discussed in the Equipment Chapter of this report.

Availability of training, particularly at inland training centers, is the most serious readiness limiter for Naval Reserve reinforcing/sustaining units.

Pilot availability, to accomplish increased training demanded by more modern and sophisticated aircraft, was the most critical readiness limiter identified by the Air National Guard. The Air National Guard is taking steps to alleviate this problem by developing



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specially tailored training programs, and by revising inspection schedules so that more time can be spent on training.


The Coast Guard Reserve reported that it has insufficient resources to develop a Selected Reserve adequate to meet even half of its highest priority mobilization manpower requirements.

### Summary

There is no single objective and uniform readiness system for reporting unit readiness for the reserve components. However, when all indicators are considered, the Board believes that, although there are problem areas, the reserve components are generally ready, and in a better posture to mobilize and accomplish wartime missions, than in any previous period reviewed by the Board.

Some units can undertake only a portion of assigned wartime missions or are not prepared to perform missions because of service-directed resource changes. Many factors, delineated elsewhere in this report, adversely impact a unit's overall readiness. They include skill qualification levels, shortages of full-

time support personnel, medical personnel and equipment shortages, turbulence caused by personnel turnover and force structure changes, incompatible or insufficient equipment, inadequate facilities, and a variety of training issues.

Resolution of these reserve component problem areas requires continued emphasis and support from all levels to include the services, the Department of Defense, and the Congress. The National Guard and Reserve are a vital part of the national security and must be kept ready to support national strategy. 



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## Board Activities in FY 1988

# A



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## General

Activities were conducted during FY 1988 to enable the Board to fulfill its mission as "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components." (10 USC 175(c)). Activities included quarterly meetings; a field study; briefings; and meetings with defense policy makers, Congressional leaders, leaders from executive departments and agencies, as well as from the private sector.



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## Board Meetings and Committees

The Board met in FY 1988 on the following dates:

- December 7-9, 1987
- March 7-9, 1988
- June 4-12, 1988
- September 12-14, 1988



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The Board uses standing committees to study and formulate recommendations on issues relating to the National Guard and Reserve. Those committees include:

- Logistics Committee
- Personnel Committee
- Training and Mobilization Committee

In addition, a special Ad Hoc Committee was formed to address specific aviation issues in the reserve components.

## Field Study

Members of the Board and staff conducted a field study in Switzerland and Israel during the period June 4-12, 1988. The purpose of the study was to examine and understand the reserve component programs and systems of those countries. A field study report, "Overseas Study of Reserve Component Issues", was published by the Board. Copies are available upon request. The following elements and commands were visited:

### Switzerland

- U.S. Embassy
- Swiss Ministry of Defense
- Swiss 7th Armor Regiment
- Swiss Air Force and Antiaircraft Troops

### Israel

- U.S. Embassy
- Israel Ministry of Defense
- Balish Field Unit Training Center

- Regional Mobilization Center
- Reserve Training Center
- Israel Aviation Industries (IAI)
- Israel Defense Force Recruit Training Base
- Civil Defense Instruction Center
- Ashod Navy Base

### **Briefings Received by the Board**

- Army Survival, Recovery, and Reconstitution System
- First U.S. Army Exercise OPERATION GOLDEN THRUST
- Hospital Ship USNS COMFORT
- JCS Exercise PROUD SCOUT
- Low Intensity Conflict
- Medical Reserve Recruiting Campaign
- National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
- National Guard Participation in Drug Interdiction
- Naval Reserve Force Ships
- Operational Use of Naval Reserve Forces
- Realignment of the 81st Infantry Brigade, Washington Army National Guard
- Report on Joint Medical Exercise
- Reserve Component 200K Call-Up
- Reserve Component Logistics Training Study
- 1986 Reserve Components Survey
- Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation



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- Sociology of the National Guard and Reserve
- The Air Force Reserve
- The Air National Guard
- The All-Volunteer Force
- The Army National Guard
- The Army Reserve
- The Coast Guard Reserve
- The Marine Corps Reserve
- The National Guard Bureau
- The Naval Reserve
- 10 USC 673b Authority and the War Powers Act
- U.S. Army Field Feeding System
- U.S. Central Command
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Marine Corps Force Structure Changes
- U.S. Special Operations Command
- Watkins v. U.S. Army




### **Meetings with Military and Civilian Leaders**

- Acmon, Colonel Uri Commander, Armor Brigade, Israeli Defense Forces
- Andres, Colonel Dudley M. (USA) Deputy Chief of Staff For Operations, First U. S. Army
- Arieli, Captain Beny Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Israeli Naval Forces
- Bailey, Captain Harry E. (USNR) Reserve Coordinator Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare)
- Bavaria, Colonel Joseph A. (USAF) Defense/Air Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Israel
- Ben-Shoshan, Rear Admiral Avraham Commander, Israeli Naval Forces
- Binder, Corps Commander Rolf Swiss Army Chief of Staff, Training
- Bowles, Captain Hugh C. (USN) Joint Exercise and Training Division J-7, Joint Staff
- Brick, Mr. Samuel T., Jr. Director, Legislative Reference Service, Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Burdick, Major General Donald (USA) Director, Army National Guard
- Carlucci, Honorable Frank C. Secretary of Defense
- Chen, Brigadier General Yitzhaky Commander, Training Center, Israeli Defense Forces
- Christen, Corps Commander Jean-Rodolph, Swiss Army Commander, 1st Corps
- Conaway, Major General John B. (USAF), Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau
- Crist, General George B. (USMC) Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command
- Dixon, Colonel Howard L. (ANGUS) Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
- Duncan, Honorable Stephen M. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
- Durig, Corps Commander Walter Commander-in-Chief, Swiss Air Force and Antiaircraft Troops
- Eitan, Lieutenant General Rafael (Ret.) Former Chief of Staff, Israeli Defense Forces
- Fischer, Divisionnaire Karl Swiss Army, Chief of Infantry
- Flueckiger, Colonel J. Peter Swiss Army Chief of Information Service, Training Group



- Goren, Brigadier General Ron  
Deputy Chief of Staff,  
Israeli Air Force
- Hanke, Colonel James S. (USA)  
Army Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Israel
- Hassett, Mr. Fred  
Deputy Chief of Mission,  
United States Embassy,  
Switzerland
- Hod, Major General Mordachi (Ret.)  
Chairman of the Board, Israel Aircraft  
Industries (Former Chief of Staff  
Israeli Air Force)
- Holmes, Forrest S., Esq.  
Office of the General Counsel  
(Personnel and Health Policy),  
Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Hurley, Brigadier General Paul (USA)  
Director of Transportation,  
Energy, and Troop Support  
Department of the Army
- Jordan, Divisionnaire Daniel  
Swiss Army Commander,  
1st Armor Division
- Jung, Divisionnaire Werner  
Swiss Air Force Chief of  
Command and Operations
- Lawrence, Mr. G. Andrew  
Executive Director, National  
Committee for Employer Support  
of the Guard and Reserve
- Lessey, Honorable Samuel K., Jr.  
Director, Selective Service System
- Lindsay, General James J. (USA)  
Commander-in-Chief,  
United States Special  
Operations Command
- Mauden, Colonel Brian D. (ANGUS)  
Chief, Mobilization Division,  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for Reserve Affairs
- Mayer, Honorable William, MD  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Health Affairs)
- Meetze, Major General Henry W.  
(USAR), Chairman, 6th Quadrennial  
Review of Military Compensation  
Steering Committee
- Montgomery, Congressman G. V.  
(Sonny), House Armed Services  
Committee
- Moskos, Doctor Charles C.  
Professor, Northwestern University  
and Chairman, Inter-University  
Seminar on Armed Forces  
and Society
- Pickering, Honorable Thomas R.  
United States Ambassador to Israel
- Rabin, His Excellency Yitzhak  
Minister of Defense of Israel
- Record, Doctor Jeffrey  
Senior Research Fellow,  
Hudson Institute
- Rush, Colonel Francis M. (USAF)  
Staff Director, 6th Quadrennial  
Review of Military Compensation



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- Scheer, Major General Roger P. (USAF), Chief of Air Force Reserve
- Shaw, Mr. Dennis R. Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy)
- Sheaffer, Rear Admiral Edward D., Jr. (USN), Deputy Director, JCS Support Defense Intelligence Agency
- Smith, Rear Admiral E. Neale (USNR), Director of Naval Reserve
- Steinberg, Colonel Barry P. (USA), Chief, Litigation Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Army
- Tamary, Brigadier General Nelemir, Commander, Emergency Stores Unit, Israeli Defense Forces
- Temple, Lieutenant General Herbert R., Jr. (USA), Chief, National Guard Bureau
- Vardi, Brigadier General Aharon, Commander, Civil Defense Instruction Center, Israel
- Vilnay, Major General Matan, Chief "A" Branch, Israel Army Defense Forces
- Ward, Major General William F. (USA), Chief, Army Reserve
- Weber, Mr. Frank, Chief of Command Systems Branch, Mobilization Division, Department of the Army
- Weeks, Colonel Leo (USA), Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Switzerland
- Whittlesey, Honorable Faith Ryan, United States Ambassador to Switzerland
- Yost, Admiral Paul A., Jr. (USCG), Commandant, United States Coast Guard

### **Board Staff**

The Board's full time staff includes military and civilian personnel.

#### **Staff Directors:**

- Colonel Philip R. Fogle, USAR
- Captain Donald C. Gillies, USNR
- Colonel Billy R. Lingo, USAFR
- Colonel Jerry D. Simmons, ARNGUS
- Colonel William R. Young, USMCR

#### **Enlisted Advisor**

- Master Sergeant Georgianna A. Hildebrandt, USMCR

#### **Executive Secretary**


- Mrs. Brenda Dent

#### **Secretary**


- Ms. Yvette Scott

The Board is also supported and assisted by others who contribute to special projects and activities. They include:

- Colonel A. Bowen Ballard, USAFR
- Lieutenant Richard M. Brierly, USCGR
- Colonel Ray L. Burns, USA
- Lieutenant Colonel Robert Burns, III, USAF
- Colonel James V. Dugar, ANGUS
- Yeoman First Class Nancy E. Frey, USNR
- Second Lieutenant Josie E. Jackson, USAFR
- Colonel Gerald S. Kean, ANGUS
- Captain Raymond E. Knapp, USAFR
- Mr. John Lee
- Second Lieutenant Lawrence E. McDermott, USAFR
- Mr. Ernest Milner
- Captain Ned D. Moore, Jr., USNR
- Commander Michael E. Moore, USCG
- Colonel Richard E. Moss, ANGUS
- Colonel Terry D. Norris, USAFR
- Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Powell, USAR
- Lieutenant Colonel Fred P. Reinero, USAF
- Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Reynierse, USNR
- Captain Jayson C. Seal, USMCR
- Captain Roger W. Triftshauser, USNR
- Colonel Terry Ward, USAF
- Colonel Ernest R. Zuick, CA ANG



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